DSS: Defense and Strategy

whodunnit?

2010-09-30T07:47:00.001-07:00

Hey folks - I know its been a while, but lets rekindle this old flame.

One of the most interesting things to run across the wire is the stuxnet computer worm which has infected the critical computer infrastructure for Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. This infection has almost certainly caused a delay in Iran's ability to field a nuclear weapon.

This isn't something that normally gets DSSfeed revved up - big boy tech toys usually do the trick, but this exotic cyber attack has given this blog a new lady to admire.

Here's what we know,

1) Stuxnet is a worm - it propagates itself without outside assistance, all the while hiding its tracks. Once the genie is out of the bottle, it is very difficult to contain. The virus begins by a connected network user plugging in a USB drive, automatically sending the worm into the system. Iran is reportedly using windows based Siemens controllers for much of its nuclear infrastructure – Stuxnet is designed specifically to attack these controllers. Also interesting – the virus does not reportedly send back information to its creator. Whoever designed this either knew it would work really, really well, or that the media would provide all the data they needed to determine the worms effectiveness.

2) The malware is VERY sophisticated – The reason being Richard Falkenrath, a former high level Whitehouse advisor, explained in a recent interview on Bloomberg, is that Stuxnet uses stolen digital certificates to allow the worm to move freely. Given the relative complexity of this worm, Falkenrath went on to say that this took the resources of a nation state to carry out. Even more impressive, if not removed correctly, Stuxnet can ruin entire systems.

3) Iran seems to be the target – This is almost certainly sabotage against the Iranian nuclear program. Reuters reported that the breakdown of affected computers is as follows. Since the worm is hard to detect and does not send user information back to its creator, there may be thousands more units that are infected that we have no idea about.

Looks like pacman is having a feast… nomnomnomnom

So whodunnit?

Its hard to guess with any level of certainty - it’s all conjecture at this point. I think we can say with confidence that the attack was most likely conjured by an state based enemy of Iran. Not many private individuals have years worth of time to develop a virus that doesn’t yield any financial gain. Maybe I just underestimate the tenacity of nerds, but I think this was an orchestrated effort by one, or several governments.

Logic would suggest Israel. It is the state most threatened by a nuclear Iran, and it has been known to use cyber warfare to achieve its goals. See this article on the Israeli attack on the Syrian nuclear plant.

Some other hints – deep in the code of Stuxnet is a word “Myrtus.” The New York Times reported that this may be a biblical clue (or a red herring) to the originators of the worm. Myrtus is a plant native to the Iranian region. It also is Old Testament heroin Esther’s original given name. (Her name was Hadassah, which means myrtle). If you remember your biblical history, Esther, and her cousin Mordacai saved the Jews in Persia from the Jew hating prince Haman. Maybe Myrtus is being used as the savior to the Jewish people from Iran. It is only a minor piece of evidence, but it’s certainly fun to think about.

Its unlikely that we will know who developed the virus anytime soon.
The prime suspects, Israel and the United States aren’t talking. Instead were chuckling.

The genie is out of the bottle

2010-05-13T10:30:00.000-07:00

This story has been making the rounds through the defense/national security field. Conn Carroll of the Heritage Foundation has a round-up of commentary on the point over at The Foundry.

A Russian company is marketing a devastating new cruise missile system which can be hidden inside a shipping container, giving any merchant vessel the capability to wipe out an aircraft carrier.

Potential customers for the formidable Club-K system include Kremlin allies Iran and Venezuela, say defense experts. They worry that countries could pass on the satellite-guided missiles, which are very hard to detect, to terrorist groups.

"At a stroke, the Club-K gives a long-range precision strike capability to ordinary vehicles that can be moved to almost any place on earth without attracting attention," said Robert Hewson of Jane's Defense Weekly, who first disclosed its existence...

"The idea that you can hide a missile system in a box and drive it around without anyone knowing is pretty new," said Hewson, who is editor of Jane's Air-Launched Weapons.

"Nobody's ever done that before."

Hewson estimated the cost of the Club-K system, which packs four ground or sea-launched cruise missiles into a standard 40-foot shipping container, at $10-20 million.

"Unless sales are very tightly controlled, there is a danger that it could end up in the wrong hands," he said.

The threats to our security and that of our allies are abundantly clear. Russia is already the world's single largest proliferator of nukes and missiles. What this represents is the next stage in this trickling-down of proliferation: the potential acquisition of these systems to terrorists or other non-state actors that are hostile to the United States or our allies.

For $20 million, you can sink a carrier. You can punch a hole into a very big building, and bring it down. You can destroy any number of things that cost many times more money to make for very little cost.

$20 million (on the outside) is still a lot of money, certainly. It's probably even beyond the reach of al-Qaeda's operating budget. But, a terrorist group that is financed by a state could make swift work of this. Hezbollah severely damaged an Israeli warship in their 2006 conflict, and they may be receiving Scuds from Iran via Syria. Is it really so hard to imagine that these things could make its way to them? Is it so hard to imagine the PRC surreptitiously arming its mercantile navy, and using them as pocket-guided missile destroyers? What would that do to the balance of power in the Pacific and Indian oceans? Could other rogue states like Venezuela and Syria acquire a few of these, and suddenly find their regional position vis-a-vis our allies (and their adversaries) in the region bolstered by a wide margain? Could the Scud-in-a-Bucket scenario be realized, and freighters armed with these things could hold entire countries hostage with WMD-tipped cruise missiles?

I wouldn't begin to hazard a guess at the solution to this nightmare. The missile non-proliferation regime is completely gone, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime looks like it's going, too. I will, however, provide a few points to help establish a framework for how we should approach this:

First, Bush was right: there is an axis of evil out there, and proliferation is one of its key characteristics. I would define it as an extended patron-client system that runs from Russia and China down to the mid-level rogue states, and then to terrorists and the broader transnational threat. Weaponry, know-how, money, and political heat goes down the chain; while money, political cover and achievement go back up. There does also seem to be some cooperative support along the different tiers as they help advance what their own level of technical achievement is, and spread that knowledge to their peers. Tier One, I would define as Russia and China; Tier Two, the rogue states; and Tiers Three and Four terrorists and the transnational threat, though there's likely some overlap, here.

Second, missile defense must be viewed as a unified entity. There should be no distinction between a Brilliant Pebbles or some other space-based system; the GBI; the SM-3s; ABL, KEI, or any other boost-phase system; THAAD; or a Phalanx system for our ships. Rather, they must be viewed as a singular, integrated whole that protects and defends our home territory, our bases and platforms abroad, and our forces in the field. Ditto those three points for that of our allies. We may not necessarily have to expressly pay for their protection, but we should at least have the cooperation and cost-sharing that we have with Israel and its missile defense system. The strength of our alliance system, and the bedrock of the liberal democratic international order, is predicated on our ability to protect our allies from attack (or, at the very least, promise such an overwhelming response to an aggressor that they would be dissuaded from an attack). Without that bedrock, our partnerships break-up, and we're all put back to the pre-WWI realist sandbox.

In a world in which multiple actors with motives and thinking that we can't even begin to guess at can threaten the world with catastrophic damage for a few bucks and with no warning, then the US must err on the side of caution and develop and deploy sufficient defenses to protect us and our allies against attack. I would recommend something sufficient to handle China's arsenal all the way down to this threat - keep Schelling's dichotomy in place with Russia for the time being (until we get below 1,000 deployed strategic warheads), but definitely make sure that we can defend against everything else.

Will that be ever be done? No. But, I would however, like to restress my first point to policy makers: the connections up and down this ladder are very real. And while these groups may be played off against each other, they are natural allies against the American-led liberal international order. Our foreign policy must be crafted towards breaking this coalition up, guiding states wherever possible into the free world, and destroying those who will remain hostile to the US and our allies. Let's make it happen.

- Evan Moore graduated from DSS in the Fall of 2009. His thesis topic was on the prospects for future Middle East democratizaion.

The NPR on Force Structure

2010-04-18T06:08:00.000-07:00

The NPR is remarkably non-committal on the U.S. nuclear force structure. It tends to skirt the issue by insisting that flexibility will rule the triad, while ignoring the obvious fact that under New START cuts will have to be made to one or more of the legs. The NPR states that "the United States should retain a smaller Triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, and heavy bombers. Retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities." The document admits that the technical hedge will be reduced overall, but compensates for it by retaining the "ability to upload some nuclear warheads as a technical hedge against any future problems with U.S. delivery systems or warheads, or as a result of a fundamental deterioration of the security environment."

The NPR is full of ambiguity in addressing the force sizes of each leg of the triad. It promises to "sustain strategic submarines," while floating the idea to "consider reducing from 14 to 12 Ohio-class submarines in the second half of this decade." The ICBM force is to be completely de-MIRVed, which is a modest warhead reduction since no more than 50 warheads are on ICBMs with multiple warheads. There is no indication that the sacrosanct 450 Minuteman-III force will be reduced, perhaps to avoid or postpone upsetting the bipartisan Senate ICBM Coalition. In a further move towards a de facto dyad, the U.S. will maintain "a smaller and highly capable nuclear bomber force." Since the NPR talks of funding upgrades to the B-2s and converting some B-52Hs to conventional roles, it is safe to assume that the nuclear bomber force will be a scant 18 B-2s and a few dozen B-52Hs.

Despite the ambiguity in the NPR on force structure, the numbers in New START will clearly lead to significant force reductions. The New START limits the U.S. and Russia to 800 total strategic delivery vehicles and 700 deployed ones. Setting the bomber fleet aside for the moment, the U.S. currently has 450 ICBMs and 288 SLBMs (336 total when the 48 unloaded for submarine refit are counted). That comes to 738 deployed delivery vehicles, without bombers included. The U.S. will likely have to either reduce the SSBN fleet by 2 (to take out 48 SLBMs) or reduce the ICBM force by 50 Minuteman. Since either of these reductions would take the total down to 694 or 688, there would either have to be additional cuts to accommodate the bomber fleet, or most of the bombers would be "non-deployed."

What are the implications of such reductions? First, cuts in ICBMs will provide a potential adversary with a lower threshold to attempt to reach strategic parity. China would basically need to double or MIRV its ICBM force to be equal with the U.S. in that capability. Second, cuts in SSBNs will reduce the flexibility of being able to keep a certain number of boats on strategic patrol while deploying some to trouble spots to reassure allies. Third, cuts to either could be a death blow for the fragile solid rocket motor (SRM) industry. In the wake of the cancellation of NASA's Constellation program, the SRM industrial base has lost well over a half or two-thirds of its business. Further cuts in orders for ballistic missile SRMs may well knock this critical industry into insolvency. Say goodbye to manned space flight and deterrent sustainability that day.

By boxing in the U.S. force structure this way, the nuclear force is moving perilously close to a dyad. The bomber force has suffered from neglect for years, consisting of 20 year old B-2s and Eisenhower/Kennedy-era B-52s. Studies to produce a next-generation bomber drag on, pushing the timeframe for initial operational capability into the late part of this decade or 2020s. If bombers really are valued for their stability, ability to be recalled, and flexibility, it would follow that there would be a commitment to sustain the capability. This has yet to satisfactorily emerge - a new bomber has been talked about for years, with little movement towards developing one. The perils of a dyad should be obvious - we lose the ability to send signals by raising alert levels and forward deployments. And if we would for whatever reason decide to strike, it is impossible to recall an ICBM, not so a bomber.

The NPR therefore dodges and postpones a lot of the tough decisions on force posture. Although it claims to endorse the limits set by the New START, it offers no concrete path for achieving those reductions. If it did so, it may have lost the votes from senators whose states would be hit hard by the reductions (states the delivery vehicles are deployed or manufactured in). Unless there are classified analyses of this issue, the New START may not win many of the votes it sought to avoid offending. It is foolish to commit to a set force structure for ten years, but the NPR and New START leave little room for maintaining the flexibility to adjust to changes in the international security environment.

Ragged Old Flag

2010-04-17T16:41:00.000-07:00

Incredible. This never gets old.

"I thank God for all the freedoms we've got in this country. I cherish them. Even the rights to burn the flag. I'm proud of those rights. Let me tell you something, we've also got the right to bear arms, and if you burn my flag, I'll shoot you."

What do you do when your own theory reaches its expiration date?

2010-04-12T11:08:00.000-07:00

Let's ask Tom Schelling.

The NPR and Declaratory Policy

2010-04-10T10:12:00.000-07:00

The Nuclear Posture Review released last week turned out to be far from the transformative document President Obama lobbied for. In his Prague speech of April 2009, the President declared he would "reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy." It could be argued he somewhat succeeded in that objective.

To truly understand the changes it is necessary to understand the previous policy. President Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara introduced the policy of flexible response, which committed the U.S. to pursuing a range of responses in case of conventional or nuclear aggression. This policy morphed into the practice of issuing ambiguous declarations of U.S. response policies. By adopting a policy reminiscent of Schelling's "threat that leaves something to chance," the U.S. often kept adversaries off-balance and unsure about potential U.S. responses. This can be seen in President H.W. Bush's warning to Saddam Hussein about using WMD and in President W. Bush's promise to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression with all means necessary. This calculated ambiguity therefore kept adversaries guessing and provided U.S. presidents with substantial freedom of action as events developed.

The 2010 NPR has made two basic changes to U.S. declaratory policy: 1) the U.S. promises not to respond to a chemical attack with nuclear retaliation and 2) the U.S. promises not to use nuclear weapons against any country in full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The NPR states that countries that use "CBW against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response... Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat." Since the U.S. is "reserving the right" to change its policy with regard to biological attacks, it is fair to say that the threat of nuclear retaliation still exists for countries that would use BW. Only chemical weapons use seems to be immune from the prospect of nuclear retaliation. This is a reasonable development, given the fact that CW are hardly weapons of mass destruction when compared to biological and nuclear weapons. On the battlefield they are much easier to defend against and in most scenarios their impact is relatively localized. The one area where this policy may prove problematic is in extended deterrence. Many allies do not feel this way about CW, for understandable reasons. North Korea, Syria, and Iran have lots of chemical weapons. Do our allies in Seoul, Ankara, or Abu Dhabi consider chemical attacks undeserving of nuclear retaliation?

Declaring that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons against countries in full-compliance with the NPT is a reasonable policy, if somewhat difficult to interpret. In most instances, the U.S. would have no desire or need to use nuclear weapons against a country that was not pursuing an illicit nuclear weapons program. Examining two case studies is instructive. In 2002 it was revealed that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program. The IAEA Board of Governors did not find Iran in noncompliance with its NPT obligations until 2006. Would the U.S. have renounced preemptive nuclear strikes to destroy Iran's capability in that time period? Currently, Syria has not fully cooperated with IAEA inspectors investigating the nuclear facility destroyed by Israel in 2007. Syria has not been found in noncompliance by the IAEA Board of Governors. If it used CBW against Iraq or Turkey, would the U.S. take nuclear retaliation off the table because an IAEA Board weighed down by political pressure failed to put it on notice?

This brings us to an important point regarding this aspect of the policy. Should not a state be required to be in compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as the NPT, to avoid the possibility of nuclear retaliation? Otherwise it seems possible that BW could become "the poor country's usable nukes." It becomes a foreseeable possibility for a state to forgo nuclear weapons and be in full compliance with the NPT while developing and deploying robust biological and chemical weapons. Would not this be attractive for countries that cannot acquire nuclear capabilities but want an asymmetric deterrent anyway (look in Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia). To those who say conventional U.S. forces can provide the same level of deterrence and retaliation as nuclear weapons, what do the continuing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the potential one on the Korean peninsula, say about trusting conventional strength to produce quick and adequate victories?

I conclude by arguing that the declaratory policy section of the NPR is not the travesty it could have turned out to be ("no first use," "sole purpose of nukes is to deter nuclear attack"). The exclusion of chemical weapons from the list of reasons to launch nuclear retaliation is reasonable from an American perspective, but I hope we consulted with our friends and allies to make sure they felt the same way. There are currently few (if any) countries in *actual* compliance with the NPT that we worry about as a threat. The NPR refrained from defining "compliance" (Board of Governors referral, noncooperation, suspicions), which leaves the U.S. with enough flexibility to argue that a country is non-compliant (and thus eligible for nuclear attack) even if it has not been found in noncompliance by the IAEA. I do worry that some countries may read a green light into this, and decide to abide by the NPT while developing alternative means of deterrence - but here again, the U.S. "reserves the right" to change as threats develop.

Overall, the "Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons" section of the NPR has turned out to be acceptable declaratory policy. It is also good to keep in mind that what a country says one day may not be what it does the next. Even if an NPT-compliant state launched a chemical or low-level biological attack that killed as many people as the 9/11 attacks did (however unlikely such a result would be), I doubt we would feel completely bound by this policy document. At the end of the day, ambiguity seems to remain a central pillar of our declaratory policy.

NPR Released

2010-04-06T10:48:00.001-07:00

After months of delays, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review was released today. It can be found here. Secretary Clinton (State), Secretary Gates (DOD), Admiral Mullen (JCS), and Secretary Chu (Energy) gave a briefing on its relase. They were followed by Undersecretary Ellen Tauscher (State Dept), Undersecretary Jim Miller (DOD), General James Cartwright (JCS), and Thomas D'Agostino (NNSA). In the coming days we will seek to provide analysis, defenses, and rebuttals of the key policies embedded in the new NPR. Until then, we invite you to read the document as well.

Obama and Kim - Pledge to "Hang Out More"

2010-04-01T04:33:00.000-07:00

In an apparent reversal of White House policy, United States President, Barack Obama met with North Korean Dear Leader, Kim Jong-Il early this morning. The two apparently struck up a relationship quite quickly as Kim suggested to begin breakfast with Champagne. According to White House Staff, Obama responded with, "hell its 5 o clock somewhere."

The two leaders decided to go bowling, upon request from DPRK General Ri Yong-Ho, who is apparently the country's "Dear Bowler." Obama swept the North Korean envoy, which was seen by the international community as an upset.

Obama responded to his bowling critics with a turkey in the 10th frame, placing punctuation on his accomplishment with a loud "Booya." Clearly frustrated, the Dear Leader suggested the two move on to more pressing matters: the diplomatic gift giving session.

Obama, clearly excited by his choice of gift first presented the North Korean envoy with snuggies, the popular blanket gown. Press Secretary Robert Gibbs commented on the gifts "these are no normal snuggies, they are the designer kind. I really think President Obama outdid himself on this one."
The North Korean dictator apparently loved the gift and decided to sport it in his latest military photograph. Kim Jong Il apparently liked the designer garb so much that he will now allow his working class to wear them, as long as they are affixed with the traditional Kim badge.

After the gift exchange, the two pledged to "hang out more." Obama subsequently released a statement declaring the two countries as future bowling allies. The statement also mentioned that President Kim "knows how to party." The two are scheduled for a follow up hang session early next week.

Happy April Fools, folks.

The Frankenstate

2010-03-29T08:15:00.000-07:00

You might have noticed a lull in activity on DSSFeed. In my case, its because I have been working tirelessly on my thesis. Holding a full time job and writing a thesis isn't advisable, but I suppose its doable. You just have to be willing to sacrifice some things in your life, like sunlight, your health, and relationships with your friends and family. Such minor things can be overlooked I suppose.

Well I handed in a draft thesis, and subsequently imbibed a few drafts to celebrate. (see what I did there?)

My thesis is on the post colonial state in Africa. The vast majority of states on the continent were formed by western powers who left the continent in hast after decolonization, and left the artificial borders they drew.

Henry Kissinger comments on these borders

The colonial powers often found it useful to divide up ethnic or tribal groups in order to complicate the emergence of a unified opposition to imperial rule.

Lord Salisbury commented at a dinner party on colonialism

(we were) drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s foot ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.

Such methods were useful for the colonists, but terrible for the people on the continent of Africa. These borders mashed together cultures and nationalities that were traditional rivals. After the colonial powers left, the disparate groups often engaged in civil conflict, resulting in the death and displacement of millions.

I decided it was best to coin a new term to designate these states. In my reading I didn't find a term I liked, or that even described the issue all that well. In my thesis I write -

I propose the use a different term to describe these African states. The term Frankenstate seems to be a more apt term to describe the post colonial African state. Mary Shelley’s book Frankenstein, chronicles the life of a scientist that meddles in the fairs of the divine by creating life. Victor Frankenstein pursued creating life with the noblest of intentions; he sought to discover the secret to life to end the pain and misery of death. Instead the result was a disfigured monster, “a vision so horrible as his face, of such loathsome, yet appalling hideousness.” Like Frankenstein’s monster, post colonial African states have become unwieldy, with leadership that pursues the most carnal desires, murdering and pillaging without recourse. They are heterogeneous in nature, stitched together only by their western Prometheus who has systematically neglected responsibility for their creation.

The remaining thesis investigates the history of Sudan and Somalia, and how they relate to solving the problem of the Frankenstate. I'll save those conclusions for later!

Tactical Nukes and the NPR

2010-03-02T09:56:00.000-08:00

The confluence of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations has brought U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the fore again. Two recent stories drew my attention: this one from the New York Times describing the White House influence on the NPR, which includes unnamed officials revealing back-channel negotiations with European allies debating whether or not to withdraw the approximately 200 B-61 air-deliverable “gravity bombs” stored in six countries; and this story which indicates that the U.S. may decide to retire the Nuclear Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM-N), which the Japanese have considered a vital U.S. weapon for ensuring their security against both China and North Korea.

These developments are troubling to say the least, and strategically foolish to take at this time (even if one believes they need to be taken eventually). First, the proposal to withdraw our tactical nuclear weapons from our NATO allies is not a wise move because the U.S. would essentially get nothing for it. According to this Guardian story, officials in “Benelux,” Norway, and Germany are planning to call for the removal of U.S. tactical nukes from Europe (no advocacy for withdrawing them from the Italians or Turks…yet). Though most recognize that these nukes, only deliverable via fighter-bombers (think F-16s, the new F-35, etc.), are of limited military utility, their political importance has been their status as a cornerstone of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance for over fifty years. To remove them would mean that the U.S. would be perceived as having even less reason to retaliate against an ally struck by a biological attack or ballistic missiles. The diminished footprint in Western Europe is sure to reflect the lessened importance the Obama administration attaches to such important allies as the UK (see here).

That being said, if the Europeans don’t want them (and more importantly, their political and military officials), the U.S. cannot force them down their throat. A more comprehensive strategy to “de-nuclearize” Europe would be more effective in satisfying Europeans while upholding the Trans-Atlantic alliance. Separate from the START accord, the U.S. could propose to Russia a treaty to reduce, limit, or open for inspection arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons, in exchange for the U.S. withdrawing some or all of its nukes from Europe. This has long been a Russian talking point, and the fig leaf it has hid behind for its maintenance of 3-4,000 tac-nukes. If the U.S. (in consultation with European allies) offers to return these to domestic bases, the onus for weapons reductions and increased transparency will be on Moscow. However, it is doubtful whether the Turks would agree to evicting U.S. nukes or if the other Central and Eastern European allies in NATO would consent to removing most or all U.S. tactical nukes from the continent.

Therefore current proposals to unilaterally withdraw all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe are naive. The U.S. would get nothing for a significant concession. Better to maintain them as additional leverage when the time comes to try to negotiate a reduction in Moscow’s 10-1 advantage in these weapons.

Turning to the Pacific theater, the issue of TLAM-N retirement is more subtle and bilateral. These nuclear cruise missiles, designed for deployment on attack submarines, have been mostly kept in storage since the end of the Cold War (although secret deployments are highly likely). Nonetheless, their mere presence and the latent capability the U.S. possesses with them have reassured Japan as it faces mounting threats to its security from Beijing and Pyongyang. In fact, Tokyo communicated to the Strategic Posture (Perry-Schlesinger) Commission that the “credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent depends on its specific capabilities to hold a wide variety of targets at risk, and to deploy forces in a way that is either visible or stealthy, as circumstances may demand.”

The Commission went on to find that “In Asia, extended deterrence relies heavily on the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles on some Los Angeles class attack submarines. This [TLAM-N] capability will be retired in 2013 unless steps are taken to maintain it. U.S. allies in Asia are not integrated in the same way into nuclear planning and have not been asked to make commitments to delivery systems. In our work as a Commission it has become clear that some U.S. allies in Asia would be very concerned by TLAM-N retirement.” Therefore any decisions to retire this unique capability should not be made absent consultation with Japan and an assessment of alternative ways to reassure Japan that the U.S. extended deterrent will guarantee its security. It is unlikely that the NPR will do this. If the U.S. does not want to raise Tokyo’s insecurity to the point it develops its own deterrent, it must take its commitments to extended deterrence seriously.

Tactical nuclear weapons have returned to the forefront of the nuclear posture debate. This time it concerns their very existence in U.S. arsenals – the TLAM-Ns will be retired and the B-61s will lose their purpose (not much reason to maintain tactical gravity bombs for fighter aircraft in the continental U.S.). Nuclear disarmament and Global Zero advocates have loudly claimed that they are not in favor of the U.S. unilaterally disarming. If they want that claim to be believable, they should communicate to President Obama that unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear weapons is unwise, if for no other reason than to maintain levers for future disarmament. Others, including defense hawks, can just oppose such policies on the demerits of their naivete.

NPR details leaking

2010-03-01T05:47:00.000-08:00

From the Times, this morning (emphasis added):

As President Obama begins making final decisions on a broad new nuclear strategy for the United States, senior aides say he will permanently reduce America’s arsenal by thousands of weapons. But the administration has rejected proposals that the United States declare it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, aides said.

Mr. Obama’s new strategy — which would annul or reverse several initiatives by the Bush administration — will be contained in a nearly completed document called the Nuclear Posture Review, which all presidents undertake. Aides said Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates will present Mr. Obama with several options on Monday to address unresolved issues in that document, which have been hotly debated within the administration.

First among them is the question of whether, and how, to narrow the circumstances under which the United States will declare it might use nuclear weapons — a key element of nuclear deterrence since the cold war.

Mr. Obama’s decisions on nuclear weapons come as conflicting pressures in his defense policy are intensifying. His critics argue that his embrace of a new movement to eliminate nuclear weapons around the world is naïve and dangerous, especially at a time of new nuclear threats, particularly from Iran and North Korea. But many of his supporters fear that over the past year he has moved too cautiously, and worry that he will retain the existing American policy by leaving open the possibility that the United States might use nuclear weapons in response to a biological or chemical attack, perhaps against a nation that does not possess a nuclear arsenal.

That is one of the central debates Mr. Obama must resolve in the next few weeks, his aides say.

Many elements of the new strategy have already been completed, according to senior administration and military officials who have been involved in more than a half-dozen Situation Room debates about it, and outside strategists consulted by the White House.

As described by those officials, the new strategy commits the United States to developing no new nuclear weapons, including the nuclear bunker-busters advocated by the Bush administration. But Mr. Obama has already announced that he will spend billions of dollars more on updating America’s weapons laboratories to assure the reliability of what he intends to be a much smaller arsenal. Increased confidence in the reliability of American weapons, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. said in a speech in February, would make elimination of “redundant” nuclear weapons possible.

“It will be clear in the document that there will be very dramatic reductions — in the thousands — as relates to the stockpile,” according to one senior administration official whom the White House authorized to discuss the issue this weekend. Much of that would come from the retirement of large numbers of weapons now kept in storage.

Other officials, not officially allowed to speak on the issue, say that in back-channel discussions with allies, the administration has also been quietly broaching the question of whether to withdraw American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, where they provide more political reassurance than actual defense. Those weapons are now believed to be in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey and the Netherlands.

At the same time, the new document will steer the United States toward more non-nuclear defenses. It relies more heavily on missile defense, much of it arrayed within striking distance of the Persian Gulf, focused on the emerging threat from Iran. Mr. Obama’s recently published Quadrennial Defense Review also includes support for a new class of non-nuclear weapons, called “Prompt Global Strike,” that could be fired from the United States and hit a target anywhere in less than an hour.

The idea, officials say, would be to give the president a non-nuclear option for, say, a large strike on the leadership of Al Qaeda in the mountains of Pakistan, or a pre-emptive attack on an impending missile launch from North Korea. But under Mr. Obama’s strategy, the missiles would be based at new sites around the United States that might even be open to inspection, so that Russia and China would know that a missile launched from those sites was not nuclear — to avoid having them place their own nuclear forces on high alert.

A couple of thoughts:

1. If you thought that Global Zero was a lovely little childish fantasy that would be properly ignored by the adults at the table (as I did), you were right to hope, but wrong to expect. The Administration is looking to codify it in any means possible. The task falls upon the Republican minority in the Senate, led on this front primarily by the inestimable Jon Kyl, to do what they can to stop this insanity.

2. The notion that some sort of equitable trade is being established, here, in terms of modernization for no new nukes is ridiculous. Our forces are effectively being held together by duct tape, gum, and prayers. A few cake parties later, and we won't even have a scientist on the job that knows how to build these things. We need to field a completely new force, including the RNEP. RNEP was effectively dead-on-arrival, yes, but political reality =/= actual reality. When countries like Iran are willing to disperse, bury, and harden their assets ahead of a strike by the US, and the political leadership is willing to pass the buck and try to fall-back on assured destruction in their strategic approach, then it follows that the US should actually be able to target and hold at-risk the assets that these countries value.

3. The President seemingly places little value on the Transatlantic Alliance, the bedrock of Western (and, really, global) security for the past 65 years. Unless this is matched with a complete declaration and verified withdrawal/elimination of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, then the Obama Administration will effectively allow the recusitation of a de facto Soviet sphere of influence. The old captive nations will be held hostage again by a revanchist Russia with no means to check or counter the thousands of nuclear weapons that are still remaining in their stockpile.

Though Moscow may sound sweet and conciliatory, today, what is to stop them from cutting off European gas supplies again? From trying to assassinate foreign political leaders to ensure their desired outcomes in elections? From fomenting separatist movements in neighboring countries, invading them, and effectively annexing their territory? Will they do anything on Iran? On North Korea? Will they change their defense doctrine, which lists NATO expansion as one of the principal threats to Russian security? Really, what material benefit can this "Reset Button" strategy hope to achieve?

To willfully throw Eastern and Central Europe to the wolves again after twenty years of doing everything possible to secure their partnership is nothing less than a complete abdication of American strategic and moral leadership.

4. Seriously, the CTBT? Really, Mr. President, what gave you any indication that the Senate was going to let that one pass?

Passively Provocative

2010-02-25T06:28:00.000-08:00

I've read differing arguments about the likelihood of entering an armed conflict with China. Most of those who think the idea is unlikely point to our economic overlap, noting that fighting one another would be irrational. I think Americans need to understand the Chinese value more than just economic prowess, although that is very important to them. The concept of One China is far more important to the PRC's legitimacy. Proof is in an article published in the UK's Times Online.

Here are some highlights

some highlights.

Now almost 55% of those questioned for Global Times, a state-run newspaper, agree that “a cold war will break out between the US and China”.

“We have nothing to be afraid of. The North Koreans have stood up to America and has anything happened to them? No. Iran stands up to America and does disaster befall it? No.”

This time China must punish the US,” said Major-General Yang Yi, a naval officer. “We must make them hurt.” A major-general in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Luo Yuan, told a television audience that more missiles would be deployed against Taiwan. And a PLA strategist, Colonel Meng Xianging, said China would “qualitatively upgrade” its military over the next 10 years to force a showdown “when we’re strong enough for a hand-to-hand fight with the US”

I believe the above statements prove that state weakness can be just as, if not more, provocative than state strength.

Biden and Nukes.

2010-02-18T17:43:00.000-08:00

The Transcript.

Fool me once...

2010-02-17T14:16:00.000-08:00

Fool me once, strike one. Fool me twice, strike three.
-Michael Scott

I think were on strike 5 by now.

To say the least, I am disappointed with this administrations handling of national security thus far. Constitutionally, defense takes precedence over every state endeavor. This administration doesn't treat national security with the deference it deserves. Though they have had their successes in Afghanistan, it seems as though we have turned a blind eye to other issues that are of much more consequence.

Secretary Gates published an article in Foreign Affairs about a year ago entitled "A Balanced Strategy." The crux of his argument was since the United States has limited resources, we must allocate them in a balanced manner towards both large and small threats. Essentially this meant reallocating funds from large threat expenditures, and moving them towards low intensity threats. Inevitably, Gates admits that we will be accepting risk on low probability, high impact threats, while lowering risk in high probability, low impact threats. This strategy, which had decreasing defense expenditures and waste at its heart, was noble, but has now hurt our ability to defend the United States in the short term and long term.

What am I talking about specifically?

Canceling the F22 - The Weekly Standard just published an eye opening article into the severe miscalculations we have made about assessing foreign air threats, and our ability to maintain air superiority. The Russians and Chinese are working feverishly towards a capability to threaten US air superiority. The F-22 was our sole guarantee to such dominance, and we capped the numbers at 187. Instead, the administration favored the F-35, which has been delayed, poorly managed, and is costing billions more than expected. The F-35 is also not able to carry out the air superiority mission like the F-22. Now the F-22 production lines are closed and were stuck with a castrated jet.

The F-22 was not meant to fight, although it certainly has the capability to do. It was meant to dissuade and deter our opponents from settling issues on the battlefield. Now, we may not have that ability.

Read more in DSSFeed's previous posts, here.

The scaling back of missile defense - While I was pleased to see the successful testing of the Airborne Laser (ABL), a program which I admittedly thought would fail and still have my doubts about, the handling of missile defense has been quiet. We have seen the scaling back of missile defense and our ability to counter rogue threats, which has also hurt our relationship with our European allies. The desire for an expanded program is there. Nuclear tipped ballistic missiles are the greatest threat to western civilization, and our ability to survive in a hostile world depends on a robust missile defense system. This administration however relies on a lofty goal of nuclear zero, a policy no practical thinker on nuclear policy accepts. Missile defense is here today, and it works.

Closing Guantanamo - The issue with the closing of Guantanamo was not that I have a particular infatuation with a southeast bay in Cuba. Rather, I take issue with the lack of planning this administration gave to its closure. It was a knee jerk reaction that a wide eyed president promised. Now we have dozens of combatants which we are searching to parse off, and that may come back to fight us in the long term. Now the administration is backpedaling, hinting at the support of an indefinite detention law. Though there is no question that Guantanamo carried considerable political baggage, and it's closing may have paid diplomatic dividends elsewhere, it should have been done with a more carefully thought out plan.

My frustration will undoubtedly continue, but I am excited that Republicans have a shot at retaking House and Senate seats which may promise gridlock in Washington, which is a nice respite after experiencing a Democratic supermajority.

So. Much. Snow.

2010-02-06T01:13:00.001-08:00

Not defense related, but DC is being hammered by snow. Lots of it.

Let's make this simple

2010-01-28T12:28:00.000-08:00

Everyone who does NOT have a leaked draft-copy of the 2010 QDR, please raise your hand.

Blame America - Follow up

2010-01-21T08:26:00.001-08:00

And it gets better,

Hugo Chavez has blamed America for the earthquake in Haiti. According to ABC News Chavez asserted that

the U.S. navy launched a weapon capable of inducing a powerful earthquake off the shore of Haiti. He adds that this time it was only a drill and the final target is ... destroying and taking over Iran.

Video is included in the link above. Keep in mind, this is the same tyrant that Obama is trying to normalize relations with.

Oh boy...

Blame America - redux

2010-01-19T08:23:00.000-08:00

Its like clockwork. Anytime an international crisis erupts, whether by act of man, God, or tectonic plates the United States will invariably be assigned guilt for the aftermath. We have been faced with these no win situations before, and we will encounter them again.

Its interesting, Obama is likely not used to such criticism. I think many on the left thought that the blame game was indicative of Bush's personality, not the US's role in the world. Now the administration is faced with the blame America crowd from throughout Europe. For example France has accused America of occupying Haiti. The WSJ further explains how America is being blamed by foreign governments for the handling of this crisis.

I can't say that I agree with many of these criticisms.

No matter which way we handle world crises, America will always be heavily scrutinized, but she takes it in stride. In terms of aid, the United States government has pledge 100 million dollars to relief efforts. The dollar figure does not tell the entire tale.

To paint a bigger picture, aid coming from America is not merely from our government, but rather from private individuals, charities, and corporations. The number that these groups have contributed easily eclipses our governments pledge by over 100 million, with donations still pouring in. Combined that’s at least 300 million from America , 10,000 troops and the aid of our advanced military systems, namely the USS Carl Vinson, a Nimitz class carrier which holds four distilling units that can make 400,000 U.S. gallons of potable water a day, can serve 18,000 meals per day, and is equipped with a full floating hospital. These are invaluable contributions that no other nation in the world can offer.

Personally, I'd rather see compassion of private organizations pour out to Haiti rather than from our government. That is more reflective of who we are as a people, we do not donate because of guilt or coercion, but because the American people are the most compassionate, willing, and able people in the world.

NPR delayed a month

2010-01-06T14:37:00.000-08:00

Josh Rogin at The Cable reports that the Nuclear Posture Review will be delayed until March -

The Obama administration's rollout of its new nuclear strategy will be delayed until March, the Pentagon told Congress last week.

The notification came in the form of a letter from Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Miller to Sens. Carl Levin and John McCain, chairman and ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services committee, respectively. The letter, obtained by The Cable, said that the new strategy, known as the Nuclear Posture Review, will be delivered to Congress on March 1, not Feb. 1 as was previously planned.

The announcement comes amid reports that the NPR is mired in an internal administration debate over some key issues, such as whether or not to abandon a "first use" policy, how many nuclear weapons are needed for whatever missions the NPR identifies as crucial, and how far the review will go toward advancing President Obama's stated goal of a future world free of nuclear weapons.

But arms-control advocates see the delay as not so surprising (what review isn't delayed in Washington?) and they argue that the postponement will give the administration more time to give the NPR the senior-level attention it deserves.

"It's not particularly surprising. I believe it's due to the fact that principals haven't been able to really dig in to the substantive issues of the NPR," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

Some who favor sharp reductions and more commitments to a nuclear drawdown see the delay as one last chance to have their views considered by the White House and the National Security Council, which may have a different take than the Pentagon on some issues. For example, the Pentagon is said to be against adopting a "no first use" policy and may still be pushing for a new class of nuclear warhead.

The Bush administration program to build a new warhead, called the Reliable Replacement Warhead, is dead, senior administration officials such as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Ellen Tauscher have said repeatedly. But Tauscher and other have also indicated that they would present a budget in February that meets Senate Republican calls for "stockpile modernization," although there is no consensus on what that means.

"The trouble in the debate is that the term ‘modernization' gets used to describe a number of things, from new weapons to improvements to the nuclear weapons complex, and other things as well," said John Isaacs, executive director at the Council for a Livable World, a nongovernmental organization that advocates for the goal of zero nuclear weapons that Obama announced in his Prague speech.

John Noonan opines at The Weekly Standard blog -

None of this is very surprising. The NPR is torn between military strategists, White House officials, and the Russians. The White House wants aggressive cuts to our nuclear forces, with seemingly no regard to nuclear strategy. The Russians are lecturing us on cutting our ballistic missile submarines and ICBMs, while they pump billions into new ICBMs, supersonic bombers, and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Pentagon appears to be the only even broker in this mess, arguing for pragmatic cuts to our nuclear war reserves and active stockpiles, which should fulfill treaty requirements without compromising national security.

Somewhere, Obama is going to have to bend. The Pentagon has indicated their willingness (eagerness, even) to provide a full classified briefing to key members of the House and Senate. The hard data and intelligence defense planners operate with is what's guiding their stubborness over nuclear cuts, where the White House seems to be lightly armed with talking points and ideology. Color me overly optimistic, but I suspect the metrics will win out in the end -- particulary with an old Strategic Air Command hat serving as Secretary of Defense.

I'll wager a prediction: we move down to around 1,500 warheads, which will be accomplished by de-MIRVing our ICBMs, plugging up a few launcher tubes on the subs, and reducing our inactive stockpile. In exchange, the Pentagon may have to kill its long-standing first-use policy. Finally, it may be difficult for Obama to push START ratification through the Senate without some sort of language on sustaining the nukes that do survive the cuts. I highly doubt he ressurects the Reliable Replacement Warhead, but Senate deterrence champs like Kyl and Lieberman will likely ensure that our strategic forces are well maintained for the next few decades.

-UPDATE-

Michael Anton speculates, there, that the NPR may be trying to lower force levels below 1,000

About four months ago, the Guardian reported that Obama rejected an early draft of the NPR and told planners, in effect, not to show him another until it came back with a deployed warhead level of three figures; that is, take the arsenal down to fewer than 1,000 warheads for the first time since the closing days of the Truman Administration. This was particularly alarming since there seemed to be no rationale for that number beyond optics: everyone likes to break a nice, round number.

But I asked around and experts assured me that the report was not true; the real floor was going to be 1,500, a level most (but not all) nuclear professionals—uniformed and civilian—could live with. In addition, the story was not picked up by any American papers. Another thing I should have known: never trust British reporting on Washington until you see it somewhere else.

But now it is in an American paper. Does that make it true? It makes me believe it more. And it helps explain the delay, and the sudden appearance of so many fraught stories about a seemingly mundane report to Congress.

Evan Moore is a recent graduate of Missouri State University's Defense and Strategic Studies program. His thesis was on the prospects for democratrization in the Middle East.

Heritage on QDR Reform

2010-01-04T10:55:00.000-08:00

Veterans of Dr. DeBiaso's class on defense policy and planning will recognize many of the points raised by Mackenzie Eaglen and former Senator Jim Talent in this Heritage Foundation piece on QDR reform.

Here is a sample of the introductory paragraphs, which should provide a decent flavor of the rest of the report (which is well-worth reading in its entirety):

Many policy analysts agree that the QDR has historically provided an inadequate and often tendentious blueprint for how to organize for the future. Previous QDRs have been criticized for being too budget-driven, shortsighted, and politically motivated. They have repeatedly failed to identify priorities, consider the full spectrum of possible security threats, and outline programs and budgets consistent with the broader foreign policy objectives of America's leaders.

There are signs that the forthcoming QDR, due in February 2010, will be similarly shortsighted. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has indicated that he will reduce force structure to levels that are inconsistent with the nation's security commitments, focus on a limited number of threats, and mortgage future military capabilities to pay for today's battles under the flawed assumption that America will likely never again face a conventional enemy. Vegetius, with his charge to prepare for the unexpected, would never have condoned such excessive optimism, especially not in the face of the rise of sophisticated military powers that are hostile to U.S. allies and interests.

A flawed QDR will lead to a weakened and underprepared military. A misguided strategy could justify a repeat of the procurement holiday and defense cuts of the 1990s and harm America's ability to deter war or, if necessary, to fight and win.

However, Congress can still rescue the overall process. With some revisions, the QDR could become the trusted defense strategy that Congress originally intended. Congress recently expanded QDR oversight by adding political appointees to the panel that reviews the strategy, but Congress should appoint the entire panel--as opposed to the Secretary of Defense appointing a majority--to ensure the group provides a truly independent assessment. Furthermore, by correlating the QDR more closely with the White House's foreign policy guidance, increasing buy-in from Congress, ensuring that the process is not purely budget-driven, and addressing both short-term and long-term national security risks, Congress can avoid past mistakes and ensure that America not only prepares for war and peace, but prepares well.

Evan Moore is a recent graduate of the DSS program. His thesis is on the prospects for democratization in the Middle East.

41 Senators: No START Ratification without Nuke Modernization

2009-12-17T21:05:00.001-08:00

From Bill Gertz's latest Inside the Ring column:

All 40 Republican senators and one independent wrote to President Obama on Wednesday reminding him that the current defense authorization law links modernization of the aging U.S. nuclear arsenal to further U.S.-Russian arms reductions.

The law applies to the not-yet-finished successor to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expired on Dec. 16.

The 41 senators - enough to block formal ratification of a new treaty, which requires 67 votes - stated in the letter that they agree with the defense legislation's language that says modernizing the aging U.S. nuclear stockpile is critical to further U.S.-Russian arms cuts.

"In fact, we don't believe further reductions can be in the national security interest of the U.S. in the absence of a significant program to modernize our nuclear deterrent," the senators stated.

A Republican Senate aide said the letter is intended to put the White House on notice that formal ratification of a new START accord must include specific plans and funding for upgrading U.S. nuclear weapons outlined in Section 1251 of the Democrat-drafted 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed into law by Mr. Obama on Oct. 28.

A White House National Security Council spokesman had no immediate comment on the letter.

The senators stated that a bipartisan commission headed by former Defense Secretary William J. Perry and former Energy Secretary James R. Schlesinger first drew the linkage between proposed new arms cuts under START and modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons.

The commission members "were unanimously alarmed by the serious disrepair and neglect they found [in the nuclear arsenal], and they made a series of recommendations to reverse this highly concerning situation," the letter says.

Specifically, the senators called for full and timely life-extension upgrades to the B61 and W76 warheads; funding for "a modern warhead" with new features for life extension; full funding for nuclear stockpile surveillance; and full funding for timely replacements of the Los Alamos plutonium plant, the Oak Ridge uranium plant and a modern nuclear-pit facility.

The senators made clear to the president their view that the nuclear-modernization plan should be fully funded beginning with the fiscal 2011 budget and that the new treaty should be sent to the Senate for ratification with the plan.

The senators also stated that the president should follow the defense authorization provision that the new treaty "must not limit U.S. missile defenses, space capabilities, or advanced conventional modernization, such as non-nuclear global strike capability."

Russia's government has linked the new treaty's arms cuts to limits on U.S. missile defenses.

Evan Moore is a recent graduate of Missouri State's DSS program. His thesis topic was on the prospects for democratization in the Middle East.

Perspective on Iran

2009-12-17T14:08:00.000-08:00

John Noonan at The Weekly Standard's blog provides perspective on Iran's missile test -

First, the Sajjil-2 is a solid fuel rocket. That's the type of power source that we use in our own Minuteman III rockets, as solid fuel is stable in flight and requires no preparation time ahead of a launch. Liquid fuel, which powers the Iranian Shahab-3 fleet, is highly corrosive and sloshes around in a rocket's downstage, destabilizing flight and degrading accuracy. It's so toxic that the fuel eats away at a missile's internal tanks, and thus needs to be inserted right before launch. That prep time is important, as it gives us a little extra warning prior to a hostile missile launch, which could be used to kill Iranian birds before they fly. With this new Sajjil-2 system, Iran has the ability to keep their missiles hot and ready for execution, killing any chance of an advanced warning or neutralization actions prior to a launch.

Second concern is that this missile is staged. Our Minuteman III ICBMs are a three stage, solid fuel system that have impressive range and accuracy (particularly impressive considering the fact that the fleet is approaching its 40th anniversary). Iran now has a two stage, solid fuel rocket. When they figure out how to add that third stage to the Sajill-2, they'll have a delivery system with the legs to reach the east coast of the United States.

The Sajjil, by the way, is most definitely not a space launch system. It's a weapon, period dot. And it's designed for one purpose: strategic delivery of a nuclear reentry system. This constitutes a direct threat to US bases in the region, our European allies, and will eventually result in Iran being able to hold the entire eastern seaboard at risk with nuclear-tipped ICBMs.

And its nuclear program -

Iran's nuclear program is spread throughout a variety of experimental laboratories, hardened enrichment facilities, heavy water manufacturing plants, and two plutonium reactors currently under development (Bushehr could come online within a few months). That far exceeds what's needed to turn on the lights, but it's also beyond what's needed for a basic nuclear weapons program.

Consider North Korea, which manufactured two limited yield nuclear weapons using only a plutonium reactor, a plutonium reprocessing facility, and -- presumably -- some sort of weapons laboratory. Why is Iran pumping billions more into building and protecting triple the number of facilities required to build a basic nuclear weapon, akin to the Fat Man or Little Boy bombs detonated in 1945?

The answer could be that Tehran is skipping basic weapons construction and moving towards an advanced thermonuclear design. Consider that they've already experimented with advanced weapons designs like two-point implosion, nuclear triggers, and have built their own facility at Arak that could be used to produce both tritium, which is a suspected boosting agent in hydrogen bomb designs, as well as weapons-grade plutonium. They've spent billions building, hardening, and protecting uranium enrichment, which could be used along with plutonium in a staged nuclear device. All this at an astronomical cost and effort compared to the similar North Korean nuclear program...

Iran may be skipping basic, cumbersome nuclear designs and moving straight to a fully deliverable hydrogen style weapon akin to what's employed by the United States and Russia. Such a powerful weapon would compensate for Iran's inaccurate missile fleet and allow them to hold vast swaths of allied and American territory at risk.

Evan Moore is a recent graduate of Missouri State University's DSS program. His thesis topic was the prospects for democratization in the Middle East.

So, what are you reading over the break?

2009-12-13T20:32:00.000-08:00

Apparently, a new literary masterpiece is sweeping the nation.

Adults Go Wild Over Latest In Children's Picture Book Series

I have to admit, I've fallen behind in my reading. Part of that has been due to blocking-out time to research for my thesis. Part of that has been due to me keeping up with the chattering class of our op-ed pages and political websites. However, most of it has been a product of abject laziness. There's been a great deal of compelling and insightful reading to hit bookshelves over the past few years, and I've not done my part to keep up.

So, now that I apparently have a great deal of time on my hands, I submit to you my preliminary reading list:

1. By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld, by Bradley Graham

The early years of the Bush Administration seem very distant, now. As the period of the Democratic Party's control of Congress enters its fourth year; the Bush Administration's heyday of immediately after the liberation of Iraq, the early shoot-outs in Fallujah and Najaf, and the steady increase in the Iraqi insurgency's steadily increasing carnage seem very distant. But while a lot of water has passed under the bridge, it is worth revisiting one of the most controversial figures of that era: SecDef Don Rumsfeld. The man who once got higher ratings in his daily press briefings than MSNBC did in primetime took the brunt of the blame of how Iraq turned out, and the public likely has long since passed judgement on him. However, Bradley Graham apparently gives an insightful, balanced, and detailed assessment of his life, career, and time at the Pentagon during the Bush Administration. If one is looking to examine how personality impacts decision-making in policy, this book would be an excellent case study in that.

2. The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945, by George H. Nash.

If there was an introductory course into modern American Conservatism, this would be on the reading list alongside other historical reviews like The Conservative Mind From Burke to Elliot by Russell Kirk, and a more recent compilation from John Mickelthwait and Adrian Wooldrige from The Economist, The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America; as well as the theory books from Hayek, Goldwater, and the rest. To a young Conservative looking for an understanding of how this movement came to be, Nash is indispensible reading.

I would be remiss if I did not mention that he has written a sequel to this work, which examines the movement from where he left off, and points towards the future. He also recently delivered an exceptional lecture at the Heritage Foundation, and I highly recommend viewing it if you have the time.

3. How Rome Fell: Death of a Superpower by Adrian Goldsworthy

Before I came to DSS, Roman history was my thing. Unfortunately, my expertise was in the same area that the general public is largely familiar with: the Julio-Claudian era, with a heavy emphasis on Julius and Augustus Caesar. I was a diletante in Early Republic history, and had a bit of knowledge on the Punic Wars, but not enough to be conversational in against an expert. The public, I do not believe, is versed in the decline of Roman power, other than as a means to draw very broad parallels to present American policy: "The Roman Empire fell, so will the American, too," etc. or some variation thereof.

Also, most of the literature on the subject has been heavily influenced by the English historian Edward Gibbons' seminal The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, which was first published in 1776, and volumes continued to be issued to 1789. For an American, the frame of the Revolutionary War, the crafting of the Constitution, and the election of George Washington is very clear. One suspects that those contemporary events had at least some impact on Gibbons' perspective. Certainly, the continuing legacy of Enlightenment thought did. (I mean, Jesus killed Rome? Come on, Ed.)

Goldsworthy posits that the continual outbreak of civil wars in the the late-Third, Fourth, and Fifth Centuries denied critical time for the emperors to deal with the incusions and threats along their borders. Since every man on the throne continually faced the possibility of a revolt from his generals, he spent most of his time in collecting his power, rather than focusing on domestic concerns like updating his bureaucracy, reforming the economy, and all that jazz.

More informed than Gibbons, and at significantly less page-count. What more can one ask for?

Honorable mentions, which are on the top of my "Get to it Eventually" list:

Paul Rahe; Soft Despotism, Democracy's Drift.

Craig Shirley; Reagan's Revolution, and Rendevzous with Destiny

But, really, in all frankness, my reading stops as of about 9:30am, Christmas Morning. Because, after that, there's going to be a whole of DragonAge: Origins being played. It's one of those games that you can spend 4 days continuously playing, and still not finish it - and, really, in comparison to the paltry 7 hours of Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, I'll take the swords and spells.

I mean, just look at it. She turns herself into a SPIDER for crying out loud.

Evan Moore is a recent graduate of Missouri State University's Defense and Strategic Studies program. His thesis topic was on the future prospects for Middle East democratization, and he is looking for a job like whoa.

WSJ on START

2009-12-10T21:11:00.000-08:00

From their editorial, today -

The Administration decided that rather than negotiate an extension of the existing Start treaty, a whole new arrangement to limit warheads and delivery systems should be crafted. In July, the U.S. and Russia signed a "framework agreement" to reduce stockpiles by as much as a third. Alas, the Administration was so focused on the numbers that it neglected the stickier details—such as verification, and whether the current Start regime would stay in place if negotiations dragged on.

Though the far weaker party, the Russians have figured out their leverage over an Administration eager to show any progress. Pushing that advantage, Russia has already secured lower ceilings on nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, scaled back verification, and pocketed other strategic concessions.

Let's take those in order. The U.S. looks likely to agree to cut the number of permitted delivery vehicles, such as missiles, long-range bombers and submarines, by half, to 800 or less. This is to Russia's advantage, which as of last spring had 814—and not all of them in working condition. Many of America's 1,198 nuclear delivery vehicles—from B-2 bombers to ICBMs—are being fitted with conventional weapons. The ceilings in a new Start would likely make no distinction between bomb types. If the goal is to move away from nukes, why limit the military's capacity to deploy conventional weapons?

As for verification, with fewer allowable warheads, Ronald Reagan's "trust but verify" maxim applies more than ever. Yet Russia wants to reduce oversight, and it specifically told the U.S. that continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant would end once Start expired. The Russians are building new RS-24 mobile nuclear missiles at Votkinsk. According to one Russian general, the RS-24 will by 2016 constitute four-fifths of its ICBM forces. Without monitoring, the U.S. won't know for sure how many of these missiles the Russians make and where they are deployed.

While Russia invests in new warheads and missiles, the Obama Administration has yet to lay out its own plans for updating the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Even staunch proponents of arms control concede that to be able to reduce the quantity of U.S. arms, we have to improve the quality. The Senate should ask why the White House isn't.

The Russians also refused to discuss their huge advantage in tactical weapons, and the Administration said OK. After the July "framework agreement," Russia signalled that U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic stood in the way of a final deal. Mr. Obama obliged, informing the Poles and Czechs of his reduced defenses late on the day before the sixth round of Start talks in Geneva. The announcement pleased the Russians, though it still hasn't got Washington a deal. Stay tuned for more concessions as U.S. negotiators try to get it before the year's end.

Also on START

2009-12-03T00:13:00.000-08:00

Fox News White House Correspondent Major Garret reported that the START Follow-on agreement is down to "the final sentences and paragraphs"

Two quick thoughts:

1. If it is true that a deal is imminent, then that's the worst news ever. It's very likely that the American negotiation team decided to give the Russians the moon at the negotiationg table.

2. Let's not overlook the fact that there's likely a lot of meaningful substance that can be still in those last few sentences and paragraphs.

The point was raised in the Heritage panels, below, but I'll echo it, here: since the START follow-on will likely not be ratified for several months after signing, and we'll be in an interregnum of pre-1987 conditions no matter what; we might as well have the moral confidence to temporarily walk away from these negotiations if we're giving away too much, and try this again, later, without the pressure of a self-imposed deadline to rid the world of nuclear weapons before the Nobel speech in Oslo.

DSS Invades Heritage

2009-12-02T23:54:00.000-08:00

Something to run in your background during your workday: Two Heritage Foundation panels on the START Treaty featuring DSS professors Andrei Shoumikhin and Keith Payne.

START Follow-On Treaty Could Interfere With Conventional Strike Systems

2009-11-20T10:06:00.001-08:00

The latest from Baker Spring at the Heritage Foundation. How's the paper coming along, David?

The Obama Administration is currently rushing to establish a treaty to succeed the expiring Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Early indications are that this neaw agreement will limit U.S. options to field conventionally armed missiles -- something Congress warned the Administration not to do.

Conventionally armed missiles provide the U.S. with a valuable option in protecting and defending the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. Without this option, the U.S. would be more -- not less -- dependent on the nuclear-armed missiles in its strategic arsenal.

There have been several signs that this new treaty could curtail America's ability to field conventionally armed missiles, including provisions limiting the number of both delivery vehicles.

Specifically, the treaty negotiators have been instructed to limit the number of strategic-delivery vehicles -- intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers -- to between 500 and 1,100. These instructions were provided in a July 6 "joint understanding" between President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev.

It appears that these delivery vehicles will be counted against the limit whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads. This is not certain, however, because it is possible that the new treaty could use definitions that exclude conventionally armed, strategic-delivery vehicles -- particularly ones that are not currently in the U.S. arsenal.

Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. His thesis is on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East.

Untying Offensive and Defensive Systems

2009-11-13T07:30:00.000-08:00

Before I get on with the content of this post, I want to sincerely apologize for the lack of content on DSSFeed. Most of us have been terribly busy with the semester hitting its peak work load. No excuses though. I know most of you hang on the edge of your seat for updates and I apologize for keeping you there - it must be quite uncomfortable.

As you probably know, there is a lot off buzz about the future the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. A bit of background -

The United States and Russia signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991, effectively reducing the size of the United States and Soviet (now Russian Federation) strategic arms deployment. The subsequent Moscow treaty initiated further reductions, but relies solely on the verification regime of the initial START treaty. However, on December 5th of this year the START agreement will expire, thus rendering the Moscow treaty unverified until its expiration in 2012. In order to prevent a gap in verification, the administration has set a goal to renegotiate the START treaty, at least in part, by December 5th.

It is likely that there will be an interim agreement signed prior to December in order to provide an extension for a comprehensive agreement, which may take several years to negotiate and ratify.

There are some troubling rumblings coming out of the administration which make me question our dedication to primary and extended deterrence. Most notably was a joint statement issued on April 1st, in which both parties committed to negotiating the issue of the "interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.”

I posit that there are four major reasons why tying offensive and defense strategic systems is bad for the security of the US.

1) It will effectively set a precedent for future agreements. After a treaty is ratified, it ascends to law higher than our constitutional. We may bind our hands in future agreements because of our carelessness during this one. We do not know the future of Missile Defense its true potential. Though it is not a perfect technology now, we may well have that technology one day. Be weary of entangling alliances.

2) Missile defense is crucial to deterring, and dissuading our opponents, particularly rogue states. It is too important to concede no matter who we are negotiating with. With Iran developing sophisticated warhead designs, and North Korea continuing to develop ICBM's, we will soon operate in a world in which those states can threaten the US mainland.

3) Both major strategic arms reduction treaties (START, SORT) we negotiated on the heels of a major advancement in missile defense (SDI, and the removal of the US from the ABM treaty). Missile defense allows us to negotiate in a position of strength.

4) Russia has not proven itself as a reliable partner in strategic arms control. Most notably, their testing of a modifed Topol M - the RS 24 violates START if it is deployed. They also seem to be channeling back deals with the Iranian regime which has undercut our effort to stifle the rogue nuclear program.

This is an important piece of language to watch for once START has been renegotiated. It may set the tone for future arms control treaties, and could even bind our ability to defend America from rogue missile threats.

CSBA Pres. Krepinevich deprives DSS students of a thesis topic.

2009-10-29T00:59:00.000-07:00

From DODBuzz - CSBA President Andrew Krepinevich has issued a report warning of a possible sharp increase in the number of nuclear states in the coming years, and reccommends that the US get serious in how to deal with it.

Key grafs from story -

[Krepinevich] describes the “Second Nuclear Regime,” where proliferation has moved from advanced industrial powers, centered around the U.S. and Europe, to emerging Asian states, such as India, Pakistan and North Korea, with more to follow: Iran, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. A nuclear armed Iran would likely be a proliferation “tipping point,” where the barriers to proliferation disappear altogether, producing a domino-effect as Arab states wanting “peaceful” nuclear power, what Krepinevich calls the “starter kit” for nuclear weapons, accelerate weaponization efforts.

In such a world, strategists and military leaders must go further than just ruminating about how deterrence theory can be jerry rigged to fit a larger set of nuke wielding actors. Military planners must prepare to fight on a day-after-nuclear-explosion battlefield, he says, a warfighting environment (including radioactive contamination and potential second strike) of such complexity and potential cost, it renders obsolete many basic tenets of U.S. military power projection. How for example, do you locate your primary fighter strike force at bases in the Gulf, such as Doha, within easy range of Iran’s nuclear tipped missiles?

After having observed the importance American commanders placed on “force protection” when faced with guerrillas armed with roadside bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s difficult to imagine a scenario where those same commanders would send troops into harms way against a nuclear armed opponent. Yet, as Krepinevich points out, if, as is likely, proliferation becomes reality, the U.S. cannot be frozen out of options by the threat of nuclear strike. Somehow, policymakers and military commanders must be provided options for strategic maneuver, even with the threat of nuclear attack hanging over their heads.

Planning for a campaign against a nuclear armed regional adversary must include some combinations of missile defenses, long range strike assets to take out nuclear weapons and special operations, or larger, forces that can seize and render a safe a hostile state’s nuclear arsenal. Of course, in a proliferated world, an added danger is that some terrorist group gets their hands on a nuke. In such a world, the ability to “track back” a nuclear detonation, to identify “nuclear fingerprints,” will be absolutely vital.

Good luck on that last part.

Read the whole thing. Because I didn't.

Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. He is currently writing his thesis on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East. Really. Swear.

Dr. Payne in the next National Review

2009-10-16T14:47:00.000-07:00

Heads-up: the November 2, 2009 edition of the National Review features a piece by DSS's own lord and master, Dr. Keith Payne. Here's the cover, and a link to the NR-Digital site.

Also featured is a piece from Jamie Fly, the executive director of the Foreign Policy Initiative (where, again, I interned for over the summer).

Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. He is currently writing his thesis on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East.

Just came across the wire

2009-10-02T11:32:00.000-07:00

The Foreign Policy Initiative (which is a great outfit based in DC) has put out another open letter, this time joining with the Center for European Policy Analysis urging President Obama to reiterate and reforge America's relationship with Poland and the Czech Republic in the wake of the late-unpleasantness with the Third Site.

WASHINGTON October 2, 2009 -- A distinguished group of foreign policy experts today urged President Barack Obama to reiterate America’s commitment to its Central European allies and improve the U.S. defense relationship with the Czech Republic, Poland and those countries’ neighbors. In an open letter to President Obama, the bipartisan group of signatories echo concerns expressed by a group of Central European leaders earlier this year about growing perceptions of U.S. disengagement from Central Europe. The letter requests that Obama pursue opportunities to place U.S. strategic assets on Polish and Czech soil and increase defense cooperation with allies in the region. The letter also urges the White House to “send a clear message about the depth and sincerity of America’s engagement in this region that shares our values and is vital to our security.”

The signatories are: Elliott Abrams, Max Boot, Seth Cropsey, Thomas Donnelly, Jamie M. Fly, Richard W. Graber, Brian Green, Jakub Grygiel, Larry Hirsch, Robert Kagan, David J. Kramer, William Kristol, Charles W. Larson, Robert J. Lieber, Tod Lindberg, Thomas G. Mahnken, Michael Makovsky, Clifford D. May, A. Wess Mitchell, Martin Peretz, Peter Podbielski, David Satter, Randy Scheunemann, Gary Schmitt, Dan Senor, Simon Serfaty, Marc Thiessen, William Tobey, David J. Trachtenberg, Ken Weinstein, and Leon Wieseltier.

Earlier this month, the administration canceled plans to place missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. The sites were intended to respond to the threat posed by Iran’s missile and nuclear programs.

Full text of the letter can be found here. Key paragraphs:

We urge you to reiterate America's commitment to these allies that have endured Russian intimidation in support of the United States and a shared commitment to democracy. One way to do this is to move quickly to ensure that some of the land-based SM-3 missile defense sites your administration is proposing will be placed on Polish and Czech soil. Further, the United States should leave the door open to deploying Ground Based Interceptors should a long-range missile threat from Iran materialize sooner than you anticipate and alternative technologies not be available to defend against it. The planned deployment of a U.S. Patriot battery to Poland should proceed without delay, and similar arrangements should be explored with other allies in the region. We also encourage you to explore other ways to improve the U.S. defense relationship with both countries as well as their neighbors, including increased U.S. support for defense modernization efforts.

In July, a group of Central European leaders addressed to you, in an open letter, their concerns about the weakening state of U.S. relations with their region. "When it comes to Russia," they wrote, "our experience has been that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not only strengthen the West's security but will ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy." Mr. President, our friends' advice is sound. Their wisdom has been earned both under the thumb of Soviet rule and in the shadow of today's more assertive Kremlin.

Polish and Czech leaders supported U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan despite heavy criticism. Though the signatories of this bipartisan letter have varying views on the merits of your administration's proposed missile defense architecture for Europe, we are united in our concern about the effect that even the perception of U.S. disengagement from Central Europe could have on our allies in the region. Supporters of the United States should not have to gamble on the staying power - or the commitment - of American leadership. We urge you to make every effort to ensure that Moscow does not conclude that America retreats in the face of threats to its most loyal allies.

Full disclosure - I interned with FPI over the summer.

Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. He is currently writing his thesis on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East.

On Iranian missile system development

2009-09-30T08:38:00.000-07:00

John Noonan at The Weekly Standard's blog has a great review of the status of Iran's missile system development. It's not written in DC wonk-speak, so it serves as a pretty good place for people who don't live, breathe, and eat this stuff to jump in, and understand the parameters of the situation:

A reader emails: The government is playing down Iran's missile tests as scantly more than "provocative," while some political pundits are calling them gravely serious. What's the real story? Just how far along are they in [missile] development?

Short skinny: It's serious.

Iran's test provides some useful insight into where the regime sees itself in 6-8 years -- as a proven nuclear power with full deterrence capabilities. The fuel they used, for example, is in itself destabilizing. Iran has traditionally powered their rockets with volatile liquid fuel. Because liquid rocket fuel is unstable, their rockets required significant preparation immediately before the ignition sequence. That's why you see headlines screaming about a North Korean missile launches weeks before they actually happen -- intelligence services can detect activity at launch sites well ahead of scheduled tests. Liquid fuel also "sloshes" in its tank, which destabilizes trajectory. Solid fuel burns evenly and remains steady during flight, which is why Russia, China, and the United States all use it in their various ICBM booster systems.

Full deployment of solid-fuel boosters would give Iran a "launch-on-warning" capability that they've never had before, as it's stable enough to store without significant prep time. That means the old paradigm, where Middle East tensions would escalate to the point that Iran started fueling their rockets in response to a tactical or strategic threat, is gone. Now, if the United States or Israel were to hit Iran conventionally, we'd have to hit 100 percent of their rockets with an initial, coordinated surprise attack -- an unlikely scenario, even considering the unmatched abilities of our Navy and Air Force.

The second concerning aspect of the test is Iran's further use of staging technology. The Minuteman III ICBM uses three solid fuel stages to boost the missile into orbit, then a manageable amount of liquid fuel to guide the nuclear reentry system into a safe release point. The hybrid system optimizes both range and accuracy. Iran's not quite there yet, but they've got the basics down with the first and second stages.

Yesterday's test proves that Iran has figured out both staging and solid fuel technology. The next logical step is to combine the two, yielding a fully functional ICBM. Couple that with a nuclear reentry system (thankfully not an easy technology to master), and Iran will have a full nuclear deterrent similar to the United States and Russia during the Cold War.

The idea of Iran using its terrorist proxies under the aegis of nuclear ICBMs and MRMBs is chilling. And President Obama has now cut a critical component of our contingency plan against this scenario -- European missile defense.

Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. He is currently writing his thesis on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East.

Posted without comment.

2009-09-25T15:57:00.001-07:00

COIN in Afghanistan is a heads-or-tails game in DC

2009-09-24T21:46:00.000-07:00

David -

Thanks for bringing me onboard.

- Evan

----------------------

Fred and Kim Kagan, from AEI and the Institute for the Study of War, respectively, have recently released an analysis of the situation in Afghanistan, and called for an additional 40-45,000 troops to be added next year to supplement the 68,000 American forces that will be there by the end of 2009. The Kagans were part of Gen. McChrystal's strategy assessment team, and their recommendations square-up with what other guys on the panel have publicly been saying, including Anthony Cordesman and Bruce Riedel. They also, famously, released a similar report in the prelude to the surge in Iraq, and also served in an advisory capacity to Gen. Petraeus with Gen. Jack Keane before that report was issued, as well.

Word has filtered down that Gen. McChrystal has prepared three options to deal with the situation that he outlined in his assessment, within the framework of the strategy that the President announced back in March. That formal request for additional forces has not yet been formally submitted, media sources have picked it up. McChrystal's "high risk" option is on the order of 15k additional troops, the "medium risk" is of somewhere on the order of 25K, and the "low risk" - which is COIN by the book - is on the order of 45,000.

However, the Beltway media is abuzz with news that the Obama Administration has gulped pretty hard at the situation, and we've seen messages coming out of the White House that they're trying to come up with an alternative strategy, or find a way to get out, altogether. Christian Brose at the Shadow Government blog of Foreign Policy magazine posits that given the weight of his public committment to the fight in Afghanistan in the campaign, and his instinctive addition of troops this year before Gen. McKiernan was fired and McChrystal sent in his stead, the President is trying to give the appearance that he is weighing every concievable option before going forward with COIN-by-the-book. This would concievably help placate his liberal base, and give the public the impression that he isn't just ordering a dramatic escalation of an unpopular war for the hell of it.

Unfortunately, I don't think that the politics for the President will bear out like that. For one, his base in Congress is pretty dead-set against any further troop increases. His base in the liberal movement is equally dead-set against them, as well. His political team (Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel has been specifically mentioned) is making continual Vietnam parallels, saying that he risks being another Johnson - a domestic-policy liberal that got caught up in an unpopular war, and wasn't able to do as much as he wanted to on the domestic front. With the President losing suppport from political independents, and disapproval ratings for the war in Afghanistan around 60% angering your base doesn't strike me as the expedient thing to do.

Subseqently, we've heard that the White House is looking at alternative strategies - mainly, the increased use of Predator and cruise missile strikes to "focus" on al-Qaeda rather than the Taliban - as if the two weren't intermingled and intermarried by this point, anyway. Unfortunately, this policy is unworkable, as Michael O'Hanlon and Bruce Riedel point out - we'd lost what intelligence sources we'd have, as well as basing rights in the face of an angry (or non-existant) Afghan government. Furthermore, as the experience of the 1998 cruise missile attack shows, striking from several hundred miles away is a bit of a non-starter when your target can move around and your missiles take a long time to arrive.

As General McChrystal has pointed out, the current situation is deteriorating, and current levels are inadequate. So, in regards to Afghanistan, President Obama is left with, essentially, a choice of double-or-nothing. His first choice would be extraordinarily difficult to get, his second would lead to absolute disaster, but has the percieved-value of being politically expedient.

While we're drawing parallels to the past, I would offer another one to the President while he makes his decision. This comes from a talk that I had this summer with a well-known political commentator who has served in previous Republican administrations. In the health-care fight at the beginning of the Clinton Administration, polling data looked pretty shaky for Republicans, and it looked like something big might actually be passed. Then, in early October of 1994, there was the infamous "Blackhawk Down" battle in Somalia, and network television was flooded with the horrific sight of American servicemen being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Afterwards, Clinton's poll numbers began to decline, and health care (then) was defeated.

I don't like making political points out of things like this, but there is a point that has to be made: a President is judged, holistically, on the performance of his administration. The fruits of his foreign policy - and anything that might incidentally occur on his watch - does impact Congress and the public's willingness to go along with his domestic agenda. Mr. Obama would be well-served to take heed of that advice, and not pursue a policy that undermines everything that Americans have fought and died for for 8 years. Afghanistan is not a far-away land of which we know little, it is where the murder of 3,000 Americans was concieved. It is time for the President to be the commander in chief, and fight and win a war based on what is militarily necessary, not by what poll numbers or Rasputin-esque political operatives tell him to do.

Roll the hard six, Mr. President.

Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. He is currently writing his thesis on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East.

The CTBT Revisited: Has Anything Really Changed?

2009-09-22T19:09:00.000-07:00

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), an agreement which would ban all nuclear tests, may soon be revived from its purgatory in the Senate. It was signed by President Clinton in 1996 and rejected by the Senate in October 1999. The arguments that denied ratification by a 19 vote margin still ring true today. In his Prague speech, however, President Obama called for prompt U.S. ratification of the treaty. He is expected to do the same at the UN later this month.

In rejecting the CTBT, Senate opponents listed several concerns that motivated their decision. They believed the CTBT was unverifiable and that others nations could easily cheat; the ability to enforce the treaty was dubious; the U.S. nuclear stockpile would not be as safe or reliable in the absence of testing; and the benefit to nuclear nonproliferation was minimal.

Ten years later, many of these concerns are still relevant. The issue of verification has been improved but not settled. The CTBT Organization has set up a network of 228 monitoring stations around the world, but significant gaps still exist. There are no stations in India or North Korea, and only one in Pakistan and Turkey. Sixty-one stations detected North Korea’s nuclear test in May 2009, but none detected radioactive gases to corroborate the seismic data. If North Korea was able to conceal such radiation, there is no reason to believe China or Russia could not as well.

As the continuing crises with North Korea and Iran illustrate, enforcing treaty obligations or punishing rule-breakers is not always effective. It is often, in fact, completely ineffective due to a lack of international cooperation. If a nuclear test were detected in Pakistan, India, or China, what would happen next? If the record with Pyongyang or Tehran is any indicator, the violating state would take some rhetorical heat and little more than a toothless UN Security Council resolution (if that). The CTBT will not immediately change other states’ policies.

The last decade has not been kind to the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Though the Stockpile Stewardship Program has successfully replaced older components, confidence in reliability has declined as the warheads age. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has stated that a credible U.S. deterrent cannot be maintained without testing or modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons. If modernization is not pursued, many experts believe testing will be needed to guarantee the weapons’ reliability.

Most significantly, the treaty’s perceived benefits toward enhancing nuclear nonproliferation are still debatable. Pro-CTBT voices have made several valid claims to consider. They argue that without the CTBT the nuclear arms race will continue, especially in Asia, with more states hedging their capabilities to be able to assemble a nuclear weapon quickly. Treaty advocates are quick to point out that the U.S. has already received a benefit for pursuing ratification – the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995. The NPT, which divides the world into five nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the rest as non-NWS, is up for review in May 2010. The non-NWS are likely going to insist on CTBT ratification in exchange for nonproliferation cooperation.

These arguments still do not explain how the CTBT will be good for nonproliferation. For one, the existence of a nuclear arms race (outside India and Pakistan) is suspect, given the fact that the U.S. and Russia are reducing their nuclear stockpiles. Nuclear hedging is a problem to be tackled by IAEA monitoring; not by attempting to ban nuclear tests (the NPT already does this for non-NWS). Though the non-nuclears may insist on entry into force of the CTBT, there is little reason to believe they will take tougher actions on Pyongyang and Tehran once the U.S. ratifies it. If unilaterally and bilaterally reducing nuclear arsenals and not testing for 17 years have done nothing to convince non-NWS of U.S. leadership, why will the CTBT?

The CTBT is simply not in the U.S. national interest. The U.S. would not be guaranteed a seat on the Executive Council, which geographically would be unfriendly to Washington. Since it requires North Korean, Pakistani, and Egyptian ratification (to name a few), the U.S. would be binding itself to a treaty unlikely to ever enter into force. Though there would be a growing ability to detect nuclear tests, there would be no effective way to enforce the treaty. The U.S. stockpile would continue to atrophy as explosive testing for reliability would be prohibited, which could spur proliferation. The CTBT needs to be rewritten to mitigate these drawbacks, not “immediately and aggressively”[xi] brought before the U.S. Senate.

Walking Away from the Third Site and European Allies

2009-09-17T03:51:00.000-07:00

In an excellent WSJ article, Peter Spiegel details the reasons behind the Obama administration’s shelving of the missile defense third site in Central Europe. Though they are claiming that it was based on a technical assessment and that Iran’s long-range ballistic missile program is proceeding slowly, it should be apparent to the casual observer that this has been Obama’s plan since January 20th. In a move to appease Russian objections to installing U.S. military assets in their “sphere of influence,” the U.S. has walked away from defense commitments made to Poland, the Czech Republic, and other nations within range of Iranian missiles. This decision is misguided and dangerous for several reasons.

First, the procurement issue. Even if you accept the delay in Iranian ICBM capabilities until mid-2010s, due to the slow acquisition process (and slower deployment timetable), that is about the time the Third Site would become operational. By shelving the plans, the U.S. will be putting itself in the position where it finds the Iranian missile program progressing faster than its missile defense deployment. In the time period between Iranian long-range missile capability and U.S. BMD deployment, Iran may be able to coerce the U.S. or Europe by threatening unprotected European cities. Their stopgap measure of rotating terminal-phase missile defenses (those that intercept the missile in its last minutes of descending flight) through Europe will leave plenty cities vulnerable and will take just as long to deploy (and probably cost more).

Second, the timeline issue. The 2007 national intelligence estimate, which had a lot of political influences, delayed the timeline of Iran’s nuclear program. However, it failed to account for technical surprise, and it is likely the missile estimate failed to do so as well. In 1998 virtually every intelligence agency in the world was surprised when North Korea launched a three-stage ICBM. In 2003 the unraveling of (some of) the A.Q. Khan network revealed how private individuals could essentially proliferate nuclear weapon technology to any country with cash. The point is that a significant surprise – such as North Korean or private-network assistance, could propel Iran to an ICBM capability far sooner than the intelligence currently suggests. The third site would have provided valuable insurance against this possible eventuality.

Third, the allies’ defense. True, the administration is pledging to deploy some missile defenses, like terminal-intercepts, but this is a far cry from the planned midcourse-intercept system that could have provided coverage of virtually all of Europe. Terminal systems have a small “footprint” that can only cover smaller areas, like a city. In a must read letter to the Obama administration, current and former leaders of Central and Eastern Europe basically ask not to be forgotten or sacrificed. They state “all is not well in our region or in the transatlantic relationship…storm clouds are starting to gather on the foreign policy horizon… [Russia] at a regional level and vis-a-vis our nations, increasingly acts as a revisionist [power].” They worry that Russia’s intimidation and influence-peddling will lead to a neutralization of their region.

Regarding the missile defense site, they pointedly write that “regardless of the military merits of this scheme and what Washington eventually decides to do, the issue has become a symbol of America’s credibility and commitment to the region… The small number of missiles involved cannot be a threat to Russia’s strategic capabilities, and the Kremlin knows this. We should decide the future of the program as allies and based on the strategic pluses and minuses of the different technical and political configurations.” They conclude on this subject that “abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too deeply in it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic can undermine the credibility of the U.S. across the whole region.” Central and Eastern Europe would know about Russia’s operations. They lived under their iron boot for generations.

Finally, the Russian problem. The Russians have protested loudly to the planned third site since it was first announced, despite the fact it is only 10 defensive interceptors that would be incapable of countering one SS-18 or even catching up with its missiles if they headed out over the polar routes. Once again, our allies understand the situation: “When it comes to Russia, our experience has been that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not only strengthen the West’s security but will ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy as well.” This would require firmness in negotiations with Putin and Medvedev.

The third site was likely the price the Obama administration figured it could pay to get Russian assistance on sanctions against Iran and in order to conclude the START follow-on. If anyone is convinced the Russians can exert the leverage to make the Iranians comply with their obligations (forget the UN Security Council, China will still block that), they have not been paying attention. Short of a crippling cut-off of all gasoline imports or nuclear reactor fuel from Russia, Iran is unlikely to even consider talks about its nuclear program. As I stated in a previous post, linking the new START to removal of the missile defense site from Europe would be unacceptable. Linking offensive and defensive weapons is walking right back into the Cold War paradigm the Clinton and Bush administrations did so much to end.

This is perhaps the administration’s worst foreign policy action to date. It delays deployment of a real capability that could not only defend European allies but also the eastern United States from Iranian missiles. It cannot be viewed as anything other than backing away from commitments made to Central and Eastern European allies and ignoring their legitimate concerns. The Senate should reject ratification of the START follow-on treaty and mandate the deployment of the planned missile defenses as the price for their support. Given this decision and the administration’s likely objection to warhead modernization, it will be hard to get 67 votes to ratify START.

9-11

2009-09-11T10:27:00.000-07:00

Never Forget.

When peace, like a river, attendeth my way,
When sorrows like sea billows roll;
Whatever my lot, Thou has taught me to say,
It is well, it is well, with my soul.

Take Two Steps Back

2009-08-28T07:04:00.000-07:00

UPDATE:

Although I personally believe that the European missile shield is dead, the Obama administration came out and denied claims of scrapping the program. There really is no coherent policy from this administration on European missile defense.

Maybe I'm being a bit melodramatic, but I feel like I have said goodbye to a lot of things since January 20th. I said goodbye to the F22 in this article, and arrivederci to Professor Dr. Thayer here. (Footnote - Dr. Thayer is now at Baylor teaching political science.) We are also seeing the loss of a once triumphant economy through government coercion and poor fiscal policy. More importantly we are seeing the loss of US Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities due to political mismanagement.

DSS professor, Ilan Berman predicted the demise of the European missile shield back in March.

In March, President Obama sent a secret letter to Russia’s president in March suggesting that he would back off deploying a new missile defense system in Eastern Europe (Poland and the Czech Republic) if Moscow would help stop Iran from developing long-range weapons.

Although at face value this seemed like a decent trade off, it's certainly was not the case once you start peeling back this onion. The United States has petitioned for some time to stage missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic as a means of defense against Iran, as well as the Soviet Union. It came with significant political will and even diplomatic costs. The Poles have been quite receptive, especially after the invasion of Georgia and our offerings of sophisticated air defense technology, but the Czech's haven't received the request as warmly. So, the Czech's have asked for a state referendum to determine the future of missile defense.

The problem with this letter being leaked is that we effectively tipped our hand. Since March, there has yet to be a referendum on the issue because both countries know there will be political consequences for pursuing a program this administration has no interest in.

Just this week Professor Berman, and Cliff May (President of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies) wrote on Op-ed for the Wall Street Journal on the issue of our lukewarm attempts at BMD and extending deterrence to our allies in the Middle East -

A half-hearted missile defense effort only encourages investments in missile technologies on the part of our adversaries, making them believe that with additional resources they will be capable of overwhelming American defenses.
U.S. missile-defense policy should be designed to elicit the opposite response. Our enemies and competitors should be forced to conclude that energy and funds spent developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them will be wasted because Americans have the know-how and hardware to prevent them from reaching their intended targets.

Also keep in mind that we are unable to create an effected extended deterrent if we are unwilling to invest in missile defense technologies for these allies.

It looks like its a done deal - The Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza reported yesterday that the Obama administration is going to scrap the "third site" in Poland and the Czech Republic.

An Op-ed in today's Washington Times gives a clear picture at the logic behind the cancellation.

The Obama administration also has floated the idea of a combined U.S.-Russian missile defense system and of a Joint Data Exchange Center for sharing information on missile launches. It is unclear what the United States expects in return for trading away the defensive system in Eastern Europe, but giving up something tangible for a promise of good behavior from Moscow is a fool's bargain.

So we are effectively taking a step back from making nuclear weapons delivered by ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete. Shouldn't this be our goal?

RRW Rat Race

2009-08-19T13:13:00.000-07:00

So the letter of the day is apparently R. I'm not sure that it is a tribute to pirates worldwide, but i'm sure they arghhhh happy.

So why not discuss a word that has two R's! RRW or reliable replaceable warhead.

A program that was once dead has since been revived, well at least the debate has been. This should have been done yesterday.

Elaine M Grossman wrote on the latest tug of war in an article published through the Global Security Newswire. I assure you, it's a worthwhile read.

Much to my surprise, Robert Gates is leading the charge on the issue, and has received considerable support from top officials including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Energy Secretary Steven Chu, Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, as well as his successor, Gen. Kevin Chilton, and perhaps most importantly DSSFeed. That is an impressive list, no matter what you think about this administration or this blog for that matter.

Most surprising to me is Chu's about face, as his Department of Energy called for the death of RRW in their FY2010 budget. (although it did call for a program which very much resembles RRW)

The support is not universal. Joe Biden, being the heavy hitting nuclear strategist that he is, was the lone critic at the NSC meeting. His concerns are legitimate - how can we expect other nations to limit and even disarm their nuclear arsenals if we are modernizing ours.

His logic is sound if you believe nuclear abolition is the primary end goal for our arsenal - he makes a poor argument if you tend to think otherwise.

The RRW is aimed at maintaining a credible deterrent, and were not the only ones contemplating it. The Russians and Chinese have blatantly pursued nuclear modernization programs, even pursuing new kinds of warheads like EMP and ERW.

While they move ahead, we are lagging behind. We have a large arsenal, and as of January 2009, it is estimated at 5,200 nuclear warheads: approximately 2,700 operational warheads, 2,200 of which are strategic (greater than 3,500 miles) and 500 are nonstrategic (less than 3,500 miles) warheads. We have about 2500 in reserve due to START restrictions. The size and scope of the arsenal means next to nothing if our opponents know they will not function on a reliable basis. Imagine trying to deter a robber with a rifle he knows isn't loaded - it won't work very well I promise.

We must also consider the safety mechanisms of these weapons. Some of these weapons like the w62 and w76 are still operational and date back to the 70's. Consider the fact that just 2 years prior; cars were required to be outfitted with seat belts. We are stockpiling weapons that were built during the same era that seat belts were new. Consider the new safety technology that has increased the survival rates of drivers everywhere. Now think of how much higher the stakes are on nuclear weapons. Shortfalls in safety are not acceptable - and Gates agrees.

Also consider the scientific capital we are missing out on. The United States has not built a nuclear warhead since 1992, and the scientific community has lost out on perhaps cutting edge technologies that may make the US in a better strategic position, perhaps by even making nukes impotent and obsolete.

The goal isn't disarming the world of its nukes, because it's far too lofty. Convincing rogue nations and even potentially FTO's to disarm will ultimately be fruitless. I don't want to hear the hogwash that diplomacy may work. No nation that is looking out for its national preservation will give up their nuclear warheads if they deter their regional and global opponents. It just won't happen. The only way nuclear states will give up their weapons is if they realize they will no longer help them achieve their unique geopolitical objectives.

So fight on Righteous Gates. (I'm still not forgetting that you lead the charge on axing the f22)

Back to school... back to school...

2009-08-17T08:35:00.001-07:00

So DSS is going back into session this fall starting August 24th. Ahhh back to the grind.

Much has changed since the summer recess. A few DSSers got married, some got engaged, and im sure some have had their hearts broken. Summer lovin, it happens so fast...

Anyhow, it seems as though the international community did not take a "summer break." Many strategically significant events have taken place, leaving students of defense and strategy with much to think about. (I'm sure as I write this that Walt is daydreaming about a victorious confrontation with the PRC over Taiwan)

So what will be the hot button issues for DSS this semester? What will guide the thesis options for students. Just as an aside, when I wrote the word thesis, a little part of me died.)

Will it be...

Burma's nascent nuclear program?

The successes and failures of Afghanistan and Iraq?

The significance of the shift in ballistic missile defense?

The volatile situation in Honduras?

The status of Dr. Thayer takeover of the Swedish riksdag?

Feel free to comment on what issues will guide the discussion.

Now off to buy some books...

On the Dear Leader - Does traditional deterrence theory apply?

2009-08-05T07:07:00.000-07:00

Yes - another blog post on the DPRK.

The chief reason: I am reading Bradley Martin's Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty.

The secondary reason - North Korea is very important to US strategic interests and setting a precedent for rogue nuclear states.

You probably also know that the Dear Leader (Kim Jong-il, not Obama) once again captured a world audience by hosting former President Bill Clinton and "negotiating" the release of two American journalists.

So let me share a bit of what I have learned from the book as well as the recent Clinton visit.

Power in North Korea is highly centralized on the elevated figure that is Kim Jong-il. He is the unquestioned centerpiece of the reclusive communist state. The cult of Kim Jong-il is said to be even stronger than his Father, and former leader of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung.

Kim Jong Il succeeded his father by strong arming his competition, including siblings, party members and even his own uncle. His greatest tactic? Hwang Jang Yop, a high ranking North Korean official who defected to South Korea describes Kim's ruse.

Kim Jong-il is by nature a person who does not like living in harmony with others. He makes people fight against each other and depend only on him. Thus, when he talks about strengthening the organization, he means making strict rules to guarantee unconditional obedience to him... the more party members criticize each other and fight among themselves, the greater Kim Jong-il's authority becomes.

Does this seem a little familiar? Recall the recent North Korean rocket launch. The world was heavily divided between the West (plus Japan) and the rest of the world about how to react. Kim sits back and watches his stock go up, while we waste political capital forging a coalition to respond to his antics. If we "feed the animals" in this way, it is almost impossible to deter their unwanted actions.

I also want to call attention to the theories of deterrence which some have applied to the Dear Leader. The argument goes something like this - Kim Jong-il is a rational actor bent on self preservation. His political actions will undoubtedly reflect his desire to maintain control.

This logic is not flawless, decision making can be influenced by a number of factors. What Keith Payne calls "cognitive distortion" influences decision making in the DPRK. Cognitive distortion can come from a number of factors, but most notably drug and alcohol abuse. Keep in mind that Hitler's decision making was influenced by a cornucopia of stimulants, depressants, and even cocaine.

North Korean governance at least seems to be somewhat influenced by the cognitive distortion of Kim Jong-il.

Bradley Martin writes:

Like others who had worked in the higher levels of the regime, Hwang noted Kim Jong-il's penchant for holding drinking parties. But Hwang put them in context as "an important element in Kim Jong-il's style of politics."

Bradley goes on

Although the parties had a business function from Kim's point of view, they inevitably led to some drunken policy making. Kim at his parties would occasionally issue orders so odd they could not be carried out.

Deterring such an individual with such habits would be extremely difficult. The solution is not only attempting to deter him, but also hedging against potential attacks. The deployment of Aegis BMDS is a good step towards defending against a North Korean missile launch.

One last thing - I am willing to bet that Kim Jong-il is extremely opposed to this current administration.

Hwang wrote

He (Kim) even dislikes the good fortune of other countries, and becomes jealous of leaders in other countries who are known to be popular with the people.

Hwant writes that Kim justifies this jealous because

Kim opposes the worship of any individual. He is the Great Leader of the people and therefore not an individual.

So what can we learn from all this?
1) We often play into the hands of Kim by making him the centerpiece of the nuclear debate. Our "in-fighting" only strokes his ego and gives him strategic leverage.

2) It is unlikely that Kim Jong-il can be unquestionably deterred by our nuclear and BMD capabilities. His drunken parties (thrown with cognac no doubt) have lead to decision making before, and could potentially lead to a catastrophic strategic move.

3) It is unlikely that Obama's god-like (newsweeks words, not mine) presence is well received in Pyongyang. Kim is no doubt jealous of Obama's popularity in the US and world wide. As a result, it is unlikely that any "negotiations" with North Korea will be fruitful under this administration.

4) The Clinton visit was a way to increase the prestige of the regime, and merely legitimized the capture of the two American journalists. Although this wasn't a move of our administration, it was likely a mistake.

More info on the F22

2009-07-24T07:18:00.001-07:00

A Yahoo News article outlines that there is a significant delay on the readiness of the "darling" f35. Hat tip to a friend on the story.

An internal Pentagon oversight board has reported that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is two years behind schedule, according to multiple congressional aides familiar with the findings...

The White House and some lawmakers who favor halting the production of any new F-22 warplanes say the F-35 will fill the gap and meet the nation's combat aircraft needs.

Senators and aides now lament that the Pentagon oversight panel's more pessimistic view on the F-35 program was not publicly released during the F-22 debate. They are calling for more open disclosure of the problems with the development of the F-35.

The Pentagon's Joint Estimate Team (JET), which was established to independently evaluate the F-35 program, is at odds with the Joint Program Office, which runs the F-35 program, the aides said. The oversight panel's calculations determined that the fighter won't be able to move out of the development phase and into full production until 2016, rather than 2014, as the program office has said.

That's assuming there are no further problems with the program, which has already faced cost overruns and schedule delays. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) said the delay could cost as much as $7.4 billion. The discrepancy between the Joint Estimate Team and the Joint Program Office was noted in a March report by the GAO, but it received little attention at the time.

So we are axing the F22 without a clear outlook on when the replacement will be done? Oh, I think our opponents won't lament the delay until 2016. The f22 is available NOW, and is significantly more capable than the F35.

This from Aviation Week.

Regardless of the vote in the Senate, “ The F-22 funding termination this week doesn't change a thing [about the tactical advantages offered by the stealth fighter’s advanced systems] and I think history will bear out the F-22 advocates' position when all the dust settles,” a senior U.S. Air Force intelligence officer tells Aviation Week. “ The F-35 [Joint Strike Fighter] is not an F-22 by a long shot,” he says. “There's no way it's going to penetrate Chinese Air Defenses if there's ever a clash.”
The intelligence official was referring to the fact that penetrating the latest surface to air missile defenses is something only the F-22 can do. China and Russia have variants of the the S-300/400 family that includes the SA-20 which is being sold in Asia and the Middle East. The F-22 can stay ahead of SA-20 because it it flies about a half-mach faster, two-miles higher and has a smaller Radar Cross Section than the F-35.

and this

“I’m still planning on getting those airplanes,” says Brig. Gen. Peter Pawling, who earlier this year was commander of the Hawaii ANG’s 154th Wing and has now moved to the staff of U.S. Pacific Command. “I’ve been assured that [despite a smaller fleet] they are still coming to Hawaii.

“It’s just that the F-35 and F-22 are such different airplanes,” Pawling says. “There are those who think you can simply build more F-35s [to compensate for a smaller Raptor fleet]. But the F-22 is one of those once-in-a-lifetime airplanes. There is nothing out there that can fly against it. If we had a major conflict [against someone with advanced air defenses], I can’t imagine going in there with anything but an F-22.”

The congress, our secdef, and our president are making a HUGE mistake.

So long, old friend

2009-07-21T10:04:00.000-07:00

According to the New York Times Senate democrats led the charge to remove provisions for funding seven more F22's from a military defense bill. This news is not particularly surprising, given the administration and Gates' overt feelings on the cost and utility of F22.

Sean outlined a few months ago about the importance of the F22 in his DSSFeed blog. I find his arguments on deterrence particularly convincing. Sean Wrote

Rather, elected officials and defense experts should insist on a return to the strategy of deterrence. They must make the argument that not only will the Raptor ensure air superiority for 40 years, but that it is necessary to have that capability for dissuasion and deterrence. A strong case can be made that the F-22 will dissuade rising competitors like China from challenging the US in the realm of air combat. Its advanced avionics and high technology can also deter a resurgent (and uppity) Russia from seeking a fait accompli in any future aggression against Eastern Europe (assuming F-22s are deployed in Europe).

The administration seems to disagree and it looks like the world's most advanced fighter will be capped at #187. The administration seems bent on cutting the defense budget of vital resources like the F22, in favor of grossly expanding other parts of the budget.

The administration rather favors the production of the F35 as its primary weapon to ensure air superiority over any current or potential adversaries. The problem is that many air force wonks disagree.

Retired General Merrill McPeak told Fox News

"I think it's a real mistake, The airplane is a game-changer and people seem to forget that we haven't had any of our soldiers or Marines killed by enemy air since 1951 or something like that. It's been half a century or more since any enemy aircraft has killed one of guys. So we've gotten use to this idea that we never have to breathe hostile air."

Former SecDef, Bill Cohen ( a clintonite ) said this about the f22

The F-22 will enable the Joint Strike Fighter (f35) to carry out its primary strike mission. The JSF(F35) was not designed for the air-superiority mission.

It all comes down to this - the f35 cannot achieve the same strategic objectives that the f22 was designed for.

We know that plans for the f35 have been hacked by the Chinese which means that its value has been at least somewhat compromised. Not to mention the fact that the f22 outperforms the f35 statistically in air to air exercises almost across the board.

So instead the funds will be diverted by the administration to some stimulus package designed to save wild horses.

Au Revoir, Raptor, mon ami!

The best news you've heard on healthcare

2009-07-17T05:32:00.000-07:00

The health care debate rages on. The left seems to have elevated the concept of health care to a right rather than a responsibility, a huge jump in American governmental philosophy. Perhaps they are right on the issue, but the ensuing implementation of health care by the federal government is going to be what I like to call MOAB, or the Mother Of All Bureaucracies. Not to mention the fact that our constitution is silent on the issue of health care, which means that legislation would require some kind of constitutional amendment. But lets be honest, that silly thing called the Constitution that won’t stop team Obama from ramming this through though.

Here's the issue with Americans, we always want something for nothing. The house wants to impose a 5.4% tax on the wealthy to pay the billions that are needed to raise money to implement this system. So long as the majority of citizens aren't paying for it, they don't mind taxing the minority. This is what we call de facto wealth redistribution for a socialized health care system. Those words should scare constitutionalists.

So easy access to health care for all eh? Let’s toss out the issues of implementation and constitutionalism. Those arguments are so last week anyhow. Let's look at the question at hand.

Is there free health care available for every American on demand?

By God there is! Great news! No need to inflate the deficit anymore this year Obama. No trillion dollar plan is needed. I've got your health care solution and its right under your nose.

Every American can get free healthcare by enlisting in the United States military. In fact under the 2006 Defense Authorization Act, any citizen that qualifies may enlist in the Army up until age 42.

That means for a good 24 years, every citizens eligible for service, which these days is darn near universal, is entitled to free health care through military service. This also includes insurance for your children.

The issue today isn't the question of access to health care, the military is more than happy to provide it to American's willing to defend their country. The question is, are American's universally willing to work to those ends?

My guess? They aren't.

The Dear Leader Exacts Revenge

2009-07-08T06:04:00.000-07:00

It seems as though the Dear Leader has not forgotten the Department of Treasury's successful 2006 bulwark of North Korea from the international financial system. The AP is reporting that North Korea is suspected of cyber-attacks against our Department of Treasury, Secret Service, and a few other agencies. I guess this is Kim Jong Il's attempt at revenge. Revenge you may ask? If you don't know the story - you should.

Daniel Glaser is known the architect behind the throttling of North Korea's illicit financial networks. Glaser works as the Department of the Treasury's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes. It serves as the offensive branch of the treasury which protects the international financial system from funding the activities of rogue nations, drug cartels, and terrorist organizations. They are the unsung financial warriors of our current GWOT (or overseas contingency.... whatever Barry and Napolitano call it.) They also have constructed mechanisms to keep rogue nations like Iran and North Korea out of the international financial system, thus hurting their chances of financing a war of annihilation against the United States and its allies. Needless to say I am thankful for their efforts.

One of the greatest efforts put forth by the TFI and the program under it FINcen (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) a program designed in 1989 to counter the use of the international financial system as a tool of criminals. Essentially FATF is a coalition of large first-world economies which monitor each others financial dealings and places restrictions on those that deal with less than savory characters. Since membership is voluntary, it takes some convincing to persuade nations to give up the free flow of financial capital.

Originally, the program targeted drug cartels as a part of the crusading war on drugs. We learned in the post 9-11 world that the system was also effective against other illicit networks; including FTO's and rogue states.

Glaser, serving as the head of the U.S. delegation to FATF, convinced member nations that it was not within their economic interest to allow banks in their territory to deal with the money laundering- counterfeiting- Hennessey drinking-Rambo loving- Kim Jong Il regime. These banks had a fiduciary obligation to their shareholders to insulate themselves from North Korea. It did help that section 311 of the patriot act allowed FINcen to target specific banks and order US banks to halt their dealings with them.

The most notable bank was the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) which crumbled under the financial isolation. This sent a clear message - stop dealing with North Korea or your financial institution may be next. This is the best "kickass" moment I think the Department of Treasury will ever experience.

Stuart Levey commented on the real impact of the financial restrictions was that,

"many private financial institutions worldwide responded by terminating their business relationships not only with [BDA], but with North Korean clients altogether".

Within a short period of time, North Korea found their hands financially tied. Thus we gained leverage over the North's nuclear program. Leverage that we quickly wasted - this was THE window of opportunity for the United States to take a meaningful shot at Kim's illegal nuclear program. Instead the Bush administration valued the six party talks as almost an end.

Robert Joseph (professor at DSS) commented in a WSJ article,

"For a short period, a matter of weeks, the approach seemed to produce results. But when Pyongyang announced its willingness to return to the negotiations, the Bush Administration, in an abrupt reversal of its policies which I opposed and could not support, rushed headlong into the snare. By February 2007, the Talks were becoming the strategy, and an end in themselves. There would be no more “pressure” placed on the North. Strengthening interdiction capacities and even implementing the mandatory UN sanctions were seen as too provocative, as threatening the prospects for diplomacy. It soon became apparent that the Administration would endure any humiliation to keep the Talks going. The spectacle of American diplomats pleading for foreign banks to facilitate the return of the assets from Macao, some of which were known to stem from the North’s proliferation activities, could not have been more pathetic or, ironically, more damaging to the prospects for diplomacy. "

So we lost an opportunity. We did however make inroads to discovering a meaningful tactic against rogue nations. If we can strangle finances, rogue states will come to their knees. Note that FATF is currently targeting Iran.

So it looks like Kim Jong Il is exacting his revenge against the United States Treasury in the form of cyber attacks. I'm not certain that his "revenge" will have a lasting impact on the United States, but I do know that the combination of the Patriot Act, FINcen FATF did.

Although I'm sure his advisers informed him that the attack was a resounding success.

Just as a side note, if you ever get the chance, take a look at Bradley Martin's Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty. I'm in the process of reading it now - the stories of the two Kim's - father and son - are unreal.

Mr. Obama Goes to Moscow

2009-07-06T07:50:00.000-07:00

President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev are meeting in Moscow to discuss a successor to the soon-to-expire Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). On the table for consideration (according to U.S. and/or Russian officials) are levels of deployed and stockpiled strategic nuclear warheads, strategic delivery systems (intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, and bombers), and missile defense. Off the table are nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the Russians hold in abundance.

Truly understanding the situation between Washington and Moscow requires a brief look at the numbers:
U.S. - 2,200 strategic nukes deployed (~2,500 reserve)
U.S. - ~1,000 ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers
U.S. - 400-500 tactical nukes
Russia - 2,700 strategic nukes deployed (unknown thousands in reserve)
Russia - ~650 ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers
Russia - 3,000-5,000 tactical nukes

In terms of strategic delivery systems, the U.S. still has decades before most of its systems will need replaced, while many Russian systems will reach the end of their service lives within the next decade, reducing their numbers to around 330.

The Obama Administration, in its rush to conclude the START follow-on by the current treaty’s expiration date on December 5th, is therefore playing into the Russians’ hands. By pushing for deep warhead cuts (the Russians will not go below 1,500 deployed) and considering a further reduction in the permitted number of strategic delivery vehicles, U.S. negotiators are essentially getting nothing for something. Since the Russians will have to eliminate many of their aging warheads, missiles, and bombers with or without an arms control treaty, they are trying to maintain parity with the United States through a new START accord. In return, the U.S. is getting something it would have gotten without having to reduce the survivability and flexibility of its nuclear arsenal.

Until recently, the Obama Administration was seemingly giving credence to Russian objections to a third missile defense site in Central Europe. Even former Secretary of Defense (and nuclear abolitionist) William Perry (D) stated in House testimony that trading missile defense for Russian promises was absolutely unreasonable. The president’s special assistant, Michael McFaul, stated last week the U.S. was “not going to reassure or give or trade anything with the Russians regarding NATO expansion or missile defense.” This is a step in the right direction. Tying defensive conventional systems to offensive nuclear systems, which President Medvedev is still insisting on, is a relic of the Cold War “mutually assured destruction” thinking.

Therefore, the U.S. approach to the START follow-on has been fundamentally flawed. By agreeing not to include nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the limits, the U.S. allowed Russia to maintain its biggest geopolitical advantage. Many experts believe it is these “battlefield” nuke stockpiles that will be the likely source of any future nuclear terrorism or nuclear use by a state (Russia explicitly states they would be used to “de-escalate” an invasion of their homeland). Furthermore, once U.S. warhead and delivery system levels have been drastically reduced, Washington will little leverage to urge Moscow to reduce its tactical nukes.

The arms control process is also misguided in the link some are attempting to make between a new START and “global zero,” the nuclear abolitionist movement. The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission determined that complete nuclear disarmament required a “fundamental transformation of the world political order.” Guiding a new treaty along what optimists consider a decades-long goal is a recipe for miscalculation and bad decisions. The Obama Administration needs to take a step back, assess U.S. interests over the long term, and proceed with a modest START follow-on from there. Idealism is one thing. Dealing with the Russians about nuclear weapons is entirely different.

Virtual Army Experience

2009-05-28T07:05:00.000-07:00

I wrote a story for the Washington Times this week on the Virtual Army Experience, the Army's new tool to shape public conceptions of the Army. The 19,500 square foot arena is designed to give players a real feel for the combat situations that our military experiences every day in Iraq and Afghanistan. Truth be told - nothing can emulate real combat in my opinion, but the simulator harps on the more glorified aspects of being a soldier. If you want to read more about it, take a look at the article.

The highlight of my day was meeting Sergeant Jason Mike, a silver star recipient for his service in Iraq. Sgt Mike is a part of the Army's "Real Heros" program which is designed to put a heroic face to the Army.

Sargeant Mike is truly a hero.

When his convoy was on a patrol mission to clear supply routes of hostile targets and IED's, Sgt Mike's three hummer convoy was ambushed. Sgt Mike, a combat medic, proceeded to encounter the threat head on, fending off over over 50 insurgents while treating three injured soldiers. At one point Sgt Mike faced the enemy alone, wielding two weapons, an m249 light machine gun and an m4 assault rifle. Because of his heroism, Sgt Mike's convoy escaped the ambush with no casualties.

This man could not be more awesome. He even has his own action figure, which true to the story, has him wielding two weapons. Just as an aside, I was let down that the action figure was made in China.

His full story is here

The VAE was being showcased during a Joint Forces open house at Andrew's AFB. The tarmac was covered by aircraft from each o the services. I snapped a few photos, so here they are for
your enjoyment.

The B17 Memphis Belle. Probably the most famous bomber from WWII.

The Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor. RIP

Sikorsky HH-53 "Super Jolly Green Giant"

The Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon

America's Strategic Posture

2009-05-25T15:48:00.000-07:00

In the past several weeks, two key reports came out that analyzed the strategic posture and nuclear weapons policy of the United States. The one put out by the Strategic Posture Commission that was chaired by William Perry and James Schlesinger and included panel members Keith Payne and James Woolsey can be found here. The Council on Foreign Relations published a report on the U.S. nuclear weapons policy, which was chaired by William Perry and Brent Scowcroft, can be found here.
While the reports carry key differences, it is remarkable the amount of congruence between them. Some of the major similarities concerning the role of nuclear weapons include:

Nukes assure U.S. allies through extended deterrence
Geopolitical conditions for a "world without nuclear weapons" do not currently exist
Nuclear hedging is an appropriate strategy in an uncertain world
Ambiguity has been, and continues to be, good for U.S. deterrence
Importance of assurance/consultation with allies before changes in nuclear posture
Nuclear terrorism is more likely to take place than deliberate use by a state

There are also major similarities concerning modernization and arms control:

Article VI of the NPT calls for "nuclear as well as general" disarmament
Modernization of nuclear warheads can take place simultaneously with reductions
Both reports recognize that all other P5 states are modernizing their arsenals
The nuclear infrastructure and human expertise is decaying through lack of funds and a shortage of people entering the career field
Support for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and strengthening of the NPT

I encourage you to read the reports (at least their "findings" and "recommendations" sections) in order to reach your own conclusions and see what the experts are saying. The reports were divided on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which could be coming before the Senate in the next year. Also, the NPT Review Conference is set to take place in 2010 (with a preparatory session this month), so this debate is only going to get more important in the very near future.

In Defense of Defense

2009-05-12T15:07:00.000-07:00

In order to win the debate over funding, the pentagon must urge the president to reevaluate his duties to the state and prioritize these responsibilities, reflecting their importance in our annual budget. There are rich historical and philosophical traditions which influenced the debate and ratification of our constitution. It serves as the highest authority in the United States, and should serve as a compass in defining our government’s responsibilities as a state. The preamble gives the clearest inventory of the federal governments responsibilities.

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Each of these responsibilities is contingent upon the ability of the federal government to defend itself from internal and external threats. We would not be able to guarantee the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our children should we be overcome by a foreign adversary. This includes the defense of our border, as well as the free flow of energy and assets abroad.

As one of the constitutionally enumerated responsibilities, the United States must be willing to reevaluate its spending habits. Though many take issue with the amount of money we spend on the GWOT, its budget is eclipsed by non enumerated responsibilities including social security, federal education, and housing and urban planning. If we are serious about our constitution, our congress needs to reevaluate and ultimately increase funding provided for the defense of the United States as our combatant commanders, not politicians see fit.

On a very basic level, I believe Secretary Gates has a firm grasp on the needs of the United States defense community and tackles the problems in a fiscally responsible manner. His beliefs in a strong balanced approach are consistent with the four goals of the defense community, to dissuade, deter, defend against our enemies and assure our allies. Though in my assessment his views are not perfect,though the thrust of his argument is certainly commendable.

The difficulty is that Gates must face is cabinet level peers are not playing the same game, and are vying for funding in a zero sum game. If Gates does not battle for his rightful share of the pie, the defense of our homeland may become marginalized in its funding because of Washington politics.

Deep Thoughts (By Jack Handey)

2009-05-06T19:39:00.001-07:00

Just a random one I thought I should share:

"Instead of trying to build newer and bigger weapons of destruction, we should be thinking about getting more use out of the ones we already have."

Sergey Kislyak

2009-05-03T19:28:00.000-07:00

As a part of the William Van Cleave guest lecture series, DSS was graced with the presence of Russia’s Ambassador to the United States, Sergey Kislyak on Thursday April 30^th. The ambassador addressed a crowded room, comprised of a healthy mix of students, academics and politicians. The event, graciously coordinated by faculty member Robert Joseph, was the most well attended of the lecture series this academic year. Hats off to the faculty for such a well produced event.

Kislyak addressed a variety of topics, ranging from strategic arms agreements to the recent success of Russian players in the Nation Hockey League. Though his lecture was quite informative as well as persuasive, I came away certain of one thing - Kislyak has an enormous amount of pride for his motherland. His enthusiasm was not tempered either; the ambassador spoke of Russia much like I would boast of America.

Ambassador Kislyak’s lecture highlighted several opportunities for cooperation between the United States and Russia, but he was most contentious over the 2008 South Ossetia War. The ambassador made clear his disapproval of United States’ unsympathetic reaction, bemoaning Russia’s victim status in the conflict. His arguments were framed quite convincingly, but failed encompass the entire portrait. Kislyak used the same tactics throughout his lecture to understate the misdeeds of the Russian Federation, while exaggerating those of other nations.

Ambassador Kislyak demonstrates the breadth of his sympathy for the Georgians.

The event culminated in a Q&A session, in which the ambassador surprisingly fielded unfiltered questions from the audience. This is where the ambassador truly earned his stripes as a diplomat. Kislyak confronted issues of the INF, Iran’s nuclear program, and the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes in an impressive fashion, while accomplishing the seemingly impossible task of placing Russia in a positive light in each case.

The evening concluded with a reception, which gave the audience the opportunity to interact with Ambassador Kislyak on a more casual basis. I left the lecture impressed with what a good sport the ambassador seemed to be.

Students of strategy should be taking notes from the ambassador, who’s skills as a diplomat were on par with our own Dr. Joseph. This leads me to believe that though the geopolitical prestige of the Russian Federation has dropped over the years, they certainly do not suffer from a lack of diplomatic talent.

Yes we can!

2009-04-29T06:36:00.000-07:00

No im not talking about Obama. I'm done writing on his presidency for a while. Too many headaches coupled with endless frustration.

Instead, I'd like to take a minute at how viral his campaign was. In fact it was so catchy that the president of Iran decided to use the campaign slogan "yes we can" as a part of his latest bid to the Iranian presidency.

"Yes we can, Iran." Catchy isn't it?

Perhaps one of the most telling lessons from this forgery is that the public, whether in America or Iran, often craves style over substance; catchy slogans over sound political ethics. If Ahmadinejad can be reelected with the same drone-like chant, it will prove my point.

Although the name Ah-mad-in-e-jad does not flow off the tounge like the tri-syllable name O-ba-ma.

If only I could find the video...

Irony?

2009-04-20T04:47:00.000-07:00

For all the work that Obama put into his campaign to distance himself from Islam, the monicker for his new economic plan seems quite ironic. Obama just announced a "five pillar strategy" which, he hopes, will change the tide of this economic recession.

tact - tækt/
–noun
a keen sense of what is appropriate, tasteful, or aesthetically pleasing; taste; discrimination.

"Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" Memos Released

2009-04-17T08:05:00.000-07:00

I recommend everyone check out the four memos that Obama declassified yesterday. No matter which side you're on, they add a really important aspect to the debate by defining exactly what we're all arguing about - a key detail we didn't really have before this.

Three dealt with specific techniques and how they were applied to detainees. These offer an important insight - adding context to the debate over whether this treatment was justified, simply by defining just what that treatment was.

The fourth looked at, in depth, the legal justification for why this treatment did not violate both the U.S. Constitution and the UN Convention Against Torture. It's really fascinating.

These memos are only lightly redacted, a rarity for such recently created top secret stuff, and I hope they will better ground the debate over the treatment of suspected terrorists in more than the rampant conjecture present on both sides.

Enjoy!

UPDATE: Check out my detailed analysis of the fourth memo here.

Farewell

2009-04-13T18:43:00.001-07:00

This morning I received one of the most disturbing messages that has ever graced my inbox

Good Morning,

I would like to let you know that Dr. Thayer has accepted a position with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and will resign his position with Missouri State University at the end of the Spring 2009 semester. He has been a tremendous asset to our department and will be greatly missed.

I know that you will join me in wishing him well in this new endeavor.

Dr. Bradley Thayer, perhaps one of the programs greatest professors, is leaving us for the Swedes.
Honestly. Sweden. A country he has probably made fun of countless times in countless seminars throughout his years at DSS.

After hearing the news, I went through a wide range of emotions. First I was nervous, then anxious, then wary, then apprehensive, then kinda sleepy, then worried, and then concerned. (if you caught that reference, hats off to you)

Well, I decided to take a look at what Sweden has to offer. Thanks to a top 10 list provided by the Embassy of Sweden, my curiosity has been sated. Here are some highlights.

Swedish Inventions include:
– The perfected the design of the zipper (Gideon Sundbäck).

Oh awesome Dr. Thayer, you are leaving us for the land of the zippers? Ah not just the land of the zippers, but the land of perfected zippers. America only gave you the personal computer, the atomic bomb (your favorite), the bikini, the motorcycle, the cure for polio, toilet paper, the internet, peanut butter and fake bosoms. You are forsaking Old Glory to live under a Scandinavian cross highlighted in 80's neon colors? Terrible.

Mysterious Moose Tracks.
A popular souvenir is the road sign for moose-crossing. Every year a huge number of these signs are stolen from Swedish roads.

In American we don't admire Moose, or their tracks. We hunt them and we eat them, and discard their worthless hoofs. Moose track ice cream is acceptable, which we also invented.

MMmmm! Yummy!
The favorite food in Sweden is usually meatballs with potatoes and lingonberry sauce. Swedish pancakes are also a favorite.

Gross. Enjoy your potatoes and lingonberry sauce, Doctor. I'll think of you next time i bite into a big juicy hamburger.

Oh and good luck acquiring a firearm in Sweden.

Look what you made me do. I'm destined to despise Sweden forever.

Are you happy?

Phew. Now that all of that is out. I'd like to take a moment and pay tribute to a man that has given so much to the program (and stolen a piece of every one of his students) by listing some of his best quotes.

-Yes... Perhaps we should do something about China
-All of you are too WEAK to suggest preemptive nuclear strikes
-Optimism is for cowards
-We're gonna put the Dalai Lama in a cannon and shoot him in to China
-As long as there is a Russia we will fight against them

If you have any other quotes, feel free to contribute!

You will be missed Dr. Thayer. Good luck and god speed.

Fail

2009-04-05T07:29:00.000-07:00

Inferior soldier 1: There goes the TD-2.
Inferior soldier 2: going...going....going... and its in the pacific
Inferior soldier 1: What should we tell the Dear Leader?
Inferior soldier 2: Great success!

So the North Korean missile... err satellite launch failed. I can't say that I am surprised, but it does prove Kim Jong Il's willingness to push the limits of the international community, and more specifically the United States Commander in Chief. He launched a more overtly hostile missile, the TD-2, in 2006, and now through perhaps a more benign medium (a satellite test), he tested a similar missile capability.

Not surprisingly, North Korea state media reported the launch as a success.

So how do we punish this defiant child? Obama is opting for the Security Council route. There, he has legal standing to punish the North Korean regime. In 2006 the Security Council passed resolution 1718 which "demands" (funny how the boys in the UN think they can emphatically use words like demand) the North Korean regime to halt any further testing. We've been down this road before though; the following resolutions strictly prohibit DPRK from testing such missiles. Resolution 825 (the link to this resolution is dead on the UN site... the full text is on wikisource) (1993), resolution 1540 (2004) and, in particular, resolution 1695 (2006). Nothing the security council has drafted or "unanimously decided on will curb that actions of the North Korean regime. Keep in mind all of these resolutions were targeted solely at North Korea. It is clear that the UN can fill a symbolic role in punishing the DPRK, but put faith in anything more is naive.

John Bolton, former representative to the UN lamented on Fox News recently,

I don't think the U.N.'s going to do much of anything. I think it's very unlikely they'll get a stiff sanctions resolution. The sanctions that were imposed in 2006, when North Korea tested missiles and a nuclear device, obviously haven't not stopped them.

I think the real pressure has to be applied on China, which gives North Korea 80 to 90 percent of its energy and a substantial amount of its food and other humanitarian needs. China's got the capability to stop this nuclear program. We've just never applied adequate pressure to them.

This is how you suffocate a tyrannical regime. If Kim Jong Il will not change his policies, then this gives us a rare opportunity to work with China and cut off the regimes life support.

I would assume a nuclear North Korea with a relatively unstable leader is not within the Chinese national interest. However the Chinese would not want a reunified peninsula.

The PRC is crafty and could relieve North Korea of its nuclear program with relative ease. It's up to Obama to figure out a way to do that.

Who is in charge?

2009-03-31T11:41:00.000-07:00

Although I hate to admit it, the Chinese are extremely adept at exposing our vulnerabilities. Their recent investment in technologies to nullify our conventional forces should alarm the defense community.

Over the past century, the United States has projected its military power with a naval fleet, sending envoys worldwide. From humanitarian missions, to regional conflicts, aircraft carriers have been the backbone of our ability to gain air superiority abroad. Disputes in Cambodia, Iran, Grenada, Libya, and both gulf wars (just to name a few) have demonstrated the awesome power that the aircraft carrier brings with it.

However, the age of technology has brought with it the ability to eliminate barriers of entry to military power. What I mean by that is it is now much easier for a state to gain an advantage over a once very expensive technology. The invention, and subsequent advances in ballistic missile technology has created instant power projection. In fact, the Chinese military is replacing the need for manned aircraft, most notably directed at Taiwan, by building more ballistic missiles.

The pentagon recently submitted their annual report on the "Military Power of the People's Republic of China." If you don't think China is a growing threat to US strategic interests, I suggest you peruse the report. It outlines China's efforts to rapidly expand and modernize their forces, as well as significantly augment their stockpile of ballistic missiles.

Perhaps the most alarming report was confirmed today by the US Naval Institute which reports of the development of the PRC's capabilities: The Anti Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM),

After years of conjecture, details have begun to emerge of a "kill weapon" developed by the Chinese to target and destroy U.S. aircraft carriers...
The size of the missile enables it to carry a warhead big enough to inflict significant damage on a large vessel, providing the Chinese the capability of destroying a U.S. supercarrier in one strike.

This development marks the first time a ballistic missile can target a vessel at sea.

These facts provide a fairly clear image of what the PRC is attempting to do: compete with, and even position itself to defeat, US military preeminence.

The question is, can Obama step up to the plate to defend our vulnerabilities. Ballistic Missile Defense spending has, and is going to continue to be hamstrung by this administration. I expect that he will follow in the footsteps of Clinton and cut billions in military spending, thus increasing our vulnerabilities to China.

Couple all of this with the leveraged position China has in trade, as well as in our national debt, one thing is clear; we are not wearing the pants in this relationship.

I encourage you, President Obama, to put on some pants. Here is what they look like.

A True Statesmen

2009-03-25T07:14:00.000-07:00

Where have all the statesmen gone?

It seems that true leadership from both the democratic and republican parties in congress have been quashed by the executive. Unfortunately, we must look elsewhere for the portrait of a true statesman. Daniel Hannan of the British Parliament gave a rousing speech just yesterday on the state of the United Kingdom.

His words ring true here; just replace Gordon Brown and United Kingdom, with Barack Obama and the United States.

Man-Caused Disasters?

2009-03-19T08:57:00.001-07:00

The culture of the newly minted Department of Homeland Security experienced a dramatic shift upon the appointment of Janet Napolitano. Though I was dubious of her appointment at the time, given her relative inexperience to anything but Arizona politics, I extended my support as long as it wasn't betrayed.

Monday, Napolitano had the opportunity to make good on the presidents appointment. In an interview with SPIEGEL, the secretary made light of her apparent omission of the term terrorism in her first testimony to congress:

SPIEGEL: Madame Secretary, in your first testimony to the US Congress as Homeland Security Secretary you never mentioned the word "terrorism." Does Islamist terrorism suddenly no longer pose a threat to your country?

Napolitano: Of course it does. I presume there is always a threat from terrorism. In my speech, although I did not use the word "terrorism," I referred to "man-caused" disasters. That is perhaps only a nuance, but it demonstrates that we want to move away from the politics of fear toward a policy of being prepared for all risks that can occur.

I take issue with this line of thinking for a few reasons.

The term "man-caused disasters" has no precedented use, culture, or strategic meaning. I can think of dozens man-caused disasters (hat tip to Matt Fuller, graduate of Bradley University) that have nothing to do with the phenomenon of terrorism. This term is vague to the point of losing all usefulness.
Is this term just a replacement for the word terrorism? Is there a new definition that has yet to be revealed? Or is this just like saying "fudge" in place of an expletive.
Is it just me or is that term oddly sexist? MAN caused disasters... Its probably just me.

The term terrorism, or terrorist, is useful because it paints a rough picture of the type of combatant being discussed, and how to deal with them. As a general rule, terrorists do not follow the laws of war, because they target civilians for political gain. The United States has a Foreign Terrorist Organization list, published by the State Department, which is used across agencies to define specific threats to US interests.

It will be interesting to see if the name of the FTO list changed to the Foreign Man Caused Disasterist Organization list. That does have a nice ring to it.

Get your boots on soldier... on second thought don't, the DHS has no clue with whom we are fighting.

Photo: The News & Observer

Embracing the Instability Paradox

2009-03-17T23:59:00.000-07:00

Consider this scenario: This weekend thousands of protesters took to the streets in Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province, marching to the house cum prison of Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, the deposed chief justice of Pakistan's supreme court. The group was led by the leader of the opposition party, Nawaz Sharif. A subsequent movement of protestors was about to descend on the capital. The protestors were not giving in until either Chaudhry was reinstated to his previous post, or the military persuaded them to retreat with batons, gas, and perhaps guns.

Recall, Chaudhry was fired twice in 2007 by then-President Pervez Musharraf for filing judgments against Musharraf's increasing incursion on Pakistan's constitution. The streets flooded with lawyers who were then beaten heavily by police. It was then the most significant challenge to Musharraf's rule. The United States, putting their counterterrorism and Afghanistan objectives ahead of democratic ideals, did not withdraw support from Musharraf, perhaps giving him the confidence to stand firm.

The situation this weekend was much more dire. The new president, Asif Ali Zardari, is certainly not as sure in his new role as Musharraf was for a variety of reasons. The protests were far more organized and organized by the political opposition, magnifying the danger of a coup. Surely, the failure of Zardari to fulfill his campaign promise by delaying the restoration of Chaudhry to his previous post, would be the last straw on Pakistan's failing back.

But, an interesting thing happened in Pakistan this weekend: nothing. The government backed down. Christian Science Monitor attributed this to two factors: Zardari did not have the full backing of the military and the Pakistani Army was not likely to step in and stop the protest march to Islamabad. The second factor CSM cites is Zardari no longer had the full, unconditional support of the United States.

Many on the right would blast this decision. Pakistan is a key part of U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Certainly, the United States should support any regime in Pakistan - instability and unrest in Pakistan would spell doom for regional security and U.S. national security. This was the policy of the previous Administration who supported Musharraf right or wrong because that was the perceived key to stability in the country.

This weekend, Obama and Clinton took a different tack. It would appear they put systemic determinants over personal ones. They correctly recognized that Zardari was not as strong as Musharraf and likely not the sole path towards a stable future in Pakistan. Rather, the reconciliation of a gross wrong and the restoration of some semblance of judicial independence, a key to democratic stability was the only way to ensure Pakistan would become more stable. To do so, the current Administration had to fight the urge to provide temporary stability by backing Zardari and instead embrace instability not knowing how the protests would turn out, hoping Zardari would rationally recognize his weakness and capitulate before irrationally ordering a crackdown.

Indeed, Pakistan has many more problems to resolve before they can be considered stable by most measures, but this weekend was an important step - both for Pakistan and the United States. The Pakistani people found that there were more avenues for change than just through force. The United States realized that a little instability in the short term could actually create more stability in the long term.

The paternalism that kept Musharraf in power may have been more destabilizing than the Wilsonianism that allowed Pakistan to settle their own problems this weekend. Hope, here, was indeed a foreign policy. In the same way neoconservatives have faith that democratic institutions and free markets will bring stability, so too liberals hoped that Pakistan's protests, left unaltered by Western intervention, would bring a more stable country. The departure between the two camps is encouraging. In Pakistan's case, it appears that Western interventions have postponed democracy and stability while, at least this weekend, Washington's absence led to a step towards liberal goals.

Photo:
AFP via BBC (16 MAR 2009)

Background:
Christian Science Monitor (18 MAR 2009)
Economist.com (16 MAR 2009)
International Herald Tribune (25 MAR 2007)
Washington Post (17 MAR 2009)

Why Americans Aren't Sold on the F-22

2009-03-17T18:52:00.000-07:00

The F-22 Raptor is the next generation fighter jet that has been designed to ensure American air superiority against any foe during the next several decades. Its advanced technology and tactical capabilities allow it to be part of a first-wave (counter)attack that could achieve penetration of enemy airspace and get a first look at the situation and strike multiple targets while maintaining low observability and high speeds. Yet the Air Force has only been able to acquire 181 of the 381-minimum it argues it needs to fulfill its objectives. Despite full-page ads in the national papers and relentless advertising, a significant groundswell of support is still lacking. Why, then, does the public not seem sold on the need for at least 200 more F-22s?

The answer is not principally the jet's heavy price tag, a question of its capability, or any alleged mismanagement of the procurement program. The major objection is the one of utility. People simply want to know, "what do we need another fighter jet for?" This response should not come as a surprise. To the general public, exposed to the popular news media and statements by their elected officials, the main threat facing the United States is the one posed by terrorism. Defeating a heavily defended North Korea or Iran is scarcely discussed. The need to defend against the possibility of a resurgent Russia or rising China is not even mentioned. If the only threat on the horizon is terrorism, they reason, why do we need a next-generation fighter that cannot attack terrorists any better than the current jets we employ?

The Air Force, however, has thought about the possibilities of facing a rising peer competitor. They know that the record of American air dominance is something that must be maintained and not taken for granted. The US has not lost a single soldier to hostile military aircraft since the Korean War and has not had a pilot shot down since the Vietnam War. Such an achievement was due to vigorous R&D that produced top-of-the-line fighters that were able to achieve and hold air dominance after each of those respective conflicts. It is the judgment of the USAF that it could not reliably sustain global air dominance into the mid-21st century without the 381 F-22s. Without adequate numbers, those records may be broken and American servicemen will be paying the bill with their lives.

What, therefore, is the solution to this problem? Respected military commentators like Ralph Peters are telling Americans that the F-22 is a "supremely unnecessary air superiority fighter" because no power can match our control of the air at this time. Without a visible, clearly existential threat like the Soviet Union in existence, Americans tend to revert to their tradition of experiencing free security and expecting peace to be the norm in international relations. The threat inflation surrounding terrorism may cause many to realize the importance of a strong defense, but they are not putting their trust on something they believe is not useful in the War on Terror. The solution is, as Herman Kahn struggled to get across to the American public in the 1960s, to think about the unthinkable; in this case great power rivalry or war.

This is not to suggest by any means that supporters of the F-22 and other future combat systems should insist that war with China or Russia is inevitable and that is why this new and expensive fighter is needed. Rather, elected officials and defense experts should insist on a return to the strategy of deterrence. They must make the argument that not only will the Raptor ensure air superiority for 40 years, but that it is necessary to have that capability for dissuasion and deterrence. A strong case can be made that the F-22 will dissuade rising competitors like China from challenging the US in the realm of air combat. Its advanced avionics and high technology can also deter a resurgent (and uppity) Russia from seeking a fait accompli in any future aggression against Eastern Europe (assuming F-22s are deployed in Europe).

To conclude, the F-22 is in trouble because Americans simply do not understand its utility and believe it is an unnecessary Cold War relic. This impression can only be reversed by policy-makers and experts insisting that the US return to a strategy of deterrence and dissuasion in order to defend against future peer competitors. If the US does not develop this fighter, its record of sustaining air superiority in every conflict since Vietnam may be at risk, or at least heavily compromised. Investment in the F-22 is a form of insurance, and the public must understand that, though it may seem like a high premium for a low-risk possibility, it will have a huge pay-off in direct (conflict) and indirect (deterrence and dissuasion) results.

March Madness

2009-03-17T10:53:00.000-07:00

College basketball and national defense are oddly similar.

Lets be honest, the Month of March is good for only one thing- March Madness. From a field of 327 division-1 basketball teams, only 64 are chosen to attend the NCAA tournament.

The month is filled with anticipation as sports pundits predict the tournament based on an inexact science known as bracketology. After selection Sunday (just two days ago) subsequent weeks are filled with classic matchups, glorious victory, and humiliating defeat.

Similarly, the Obama administration's "selection sunday" is close at hand. The coming days, weeks, and months will tell us how this administration is planning the future of a variety of US weapons systems including the F22, the airborne laser program, and a variety of missile defense and nuclear initiatives.

Obama has tipped his hand here in a campaign video in which he promises to cut defense spending and decrease the size and reliability of our nuclear deterrent.

Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates is in on the action as well. The Boston Globe reports,

Two defense officials who were not authorized to speak publicly said Gates will announce up to a half-dozen major weapons cancellations later this month. Candidates include a new Navy destroyer, the Air Force's F-22 fighter jet, and Army ground-combat vehicles, the officials said.

The Obama administration has already passed a bare-bone defense budget which will eventually be revised to include what is left of our new weapons programs.

Admittedly, the United States is screeching through a recession, which has devastated the ability for the government to generate revenue. Government agencies should be expected to cut back when every other American is doing the same. This goes for every agency, from the Department of Education to the Department of Defense.

Unfortunately, this is not the case.

Instead, we have passed a grossly irresponsible 1 TRILLION DOLLAR stimulus package which inflates government in almost every arena, while defense spending is projected to decline.

Its almost as if the leadership in this country thinks that national defense is a game.

Basketball is a game. If you lose, you go home, but there is always next season.

If we lose a strategic capability, there is no next season.

David Centofante

2009-02-19T21:46:00.000-08:00

David Centofante is a graduate of Missouri State's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies where he has took interest on issues of deterrence, tools of state power, and missile defense. He has also interned for several D.C. area companies, including the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Prior to that, Centofante served as an Undergraduate Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

Centofante received a B.S. in global justice and policy, with a minor in history, from James Madison University. At JMU, he worked as an assistant to the Nelson Institute for International and Public Policy.

On the side, Centofante occasionally writes for The Washington Times' Base News. He also contributes to Rock the Vote Radio, and political talk radio with the Capital Hill Blues on XM radio.

E mail: David.Centofante@gmail.com

Tim Snyder

2009-02-16T21:40:00.000-08:00

Tim Snyder is a graduate student in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University where his research focuses on U.S. foreign policy analysis. Snyder has worked as a research analyst for missile defense policy at the Lockheed Martin Corporation. Prior to that, he worked for the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute and the Conflict Prevention Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Snyder received a B.A. in International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in 2005 where he focused on international conflict and security. He is a member of the American Political Science Association, the International Studies Association, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and the Society for Military History.

Sean Varner

2008-08-25T11:24:00.000-07:00

Sean Varner is a graduate student in Missouri State University's Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS) program. There he has focused in courses on strategy and defense policy, and is particularly interested in nuclear issues. Varner is currently employed as a research assistant for strategic systems policy at the Lockheed Martin Corporation. Prior to that, he was a student fellow at Grove City College's Center for Vision and Values, a conservative think tank. He was also an undergraduate fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a security-conscious think tank located in Washington, D.C. Sean received his B.A. in political science and history at Grove City College (located north of Pittsburgh, PA) in 2008. He is originally from Shippensburg, PA.