The NPR and Declaratory Policy

The Nuclear Posture Review released last week turned out to be far from the transformative document President Obama lobbied for. In his Prague speech of April 2009, the President declared he would "reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy." It could be argued he somewhat succeeded in that objective.



To truly understand the changes it is necessary to understand the previous policy. President Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara introduced the policy of flexible response, which committed the U.S. to pursuing a range of responses in case of conventional or nuclear aggression. This policy morphed into the practice of issuing ambiguous declarations of U.S. response policies. By adopting a policy reminiscent of Schelling's "threat that leaves something to chance," the U.S. often kept adversaries off-balance and unsure about potential U.S. responses. This can be seen in President H.W. Bush's warning to Saddam Hussein about using WMD and in President W. Bush's promise to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression with all means necessary. This calculated ambiguity therefore kept adversaries guessing and provided U.S. presidents with substantial freedom of action as events developed.

The 2010 NPR has made two basic changes to U.S. declaratory policy: 1) the U.S. promises not to respond to a chemical attack with nuclear retaliation and 2) the U.S. promises not to use nuclear weapons against any country in full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The NPR states that countries that use "CBW against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response... Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat." Since the U.S. is "reserving the right" to change its policy with regard to biological attacks, it is fair to say that the threat of nuclear retaliation still exists for countries that would use BW. Only chemical weapons use seems to be immune from the prospect of nuclear retaliation. This is a reasonable development, given the fact that CW are hardly weapons of mass destruction when compared to biological and nuclear weapons. On the battlefield they are much easier to defend against and in most scenarios their impact is relatively localized. The one area where this policy may prove problematic is in extended deterrence. Many allies do not feel this way about CW, for understandable reasons. North Korea, Syria, and Iran have lots of chemical weapons. Do our allies in Seoul, Ankara, or Abu Dhabi consider chemical attacks undeserving of nuclear retaliation?

Declaring that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons against countries in full-compliance with the NPT is a reasonable policy, if somewhat difficult to interpret. In most instances, the U.S. would have no desire or need to use nuclear weapons against a country that was not pursuing an illicit nuclear weapons program. Examining two case studies is instructive. In 2002 it was revealed that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program. The IAEA Board of Governors did not find Iran in noncompliance with its NPT obligations until 2006. Would the U.S. have renounced preemptive nuclear strikes to destroy Iran's capability in that time period? Currently, Syria has not fully cooperated with IAEA inspectors investigating the nuclear facility destroyed by Israel in 2007. Syria has not been found in noncompliance by the IAEA Board of Governors. If it used CBW against Iraq or Turkey, would the U.S. take nuclear retaliation off the table because an IAEA Board weighed down by political pressure failed to put it on notice?

This brings us to an important point regarding this aspect of the policy. Should not a state be required to be in compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as the NPT, to avoid the possibility of nuclear retaliation? Otherwise it seems possible that BW could become "the poor country's usable nukes." It becomes a foreseeable possibility for a state to forgo nuclear weapons and be in full compliance with the NPT while developing and deploying robust biological and chemical weapons. Would not this be attractive for countries that cannot acquire nuclear capabilities but want an asymmetric deterrent anyway (look in Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia). To those who say conventional U.S. forces can provide the same level of deterrence and retaliation as nuclear weapons, what do the continuing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the potential one on the Korean peninsula, say about trusting conventional strength to produce quick and adequate victories?

I conclude by arguing that the declaratory policy section of the NPR is not the travesty it could have turned out to be ("no first use," "sole purpose of nukes is to deter nuclear attack"). The exclusion of chemical weapons from the list of reasons to launch nuclear retaliation is reasonable from an American perspective, but I hope we consulted with our friends and allies to make sure they felt the same way. There are currently few (if any) countries in *actual* compliance with the NPT that we worry about as a threat. The NPR refrained from defining "compliance" (Board of Governors referral, noncooperation, suspicions), which leaves the U.S. with enough flexibility to argue that a country is non-compliant (and thus eligible for nuclear attack) even if it has not been found in noncompliance by the IAEA. I do worry that some countries may read a green light into this, and decide to abide by the NPT while developing alternative means of deterrence - but here again, the U.S. "reserves the right" to change as threats develop.

Overall, the "Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons" section of the NPR has turned out to be acceptable declaratory policy. It is also good to keep in mind that what a country says one day may not be what it does the next. Even if an NPT-compliant state launched a chemical or low-level biological attack that killed as many people as the 9/11 attacks did (however unlikely such a result would be), I doubt we would feel completely bound by this policy document. At the end of the day, ambiguity seems to remain a central pillar of our declaratory policy.

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Walking Away from the Third Site and European Allies

In an excellent WSJ article, Peter Spiegel details the reasons behind the Obama administration’s shelving of the missile defense third site in Central Europe. Though they are claiming that it was based on a technical assessment and that Iran’s long-range ballistic missile program is proceeding slowly, it should be apparent to the casual observer that this has been Obama’s plan since January 20th. In a move to appease Russian objections to installing U.S. military assets in their “sphere of influence,” the U.S. has walked away from defense commitments made to Poland, the Czech Republic, and other nations within range of Iranian missiles. This decision is misguided and dangerous for several reasons.

First, the procurement issue. Even if you accept the delay in Iranian ICBM capabilities until mid-2010s, due to the slow acquisition process (and slower deployment timetable), that is about the time the Third Site would become operational. By shelving the plans, the U.S. will be putting itself in the position where it finds the Iranian missile program progressing faster than its missile defense deployment. In the time period between Iranian long-range missile capability and U.S. BMD deployment, Iran may be able to coerce the U.S. or Europe by threatening unprotected European cities. Their stopgap measure of rotating terminal-phase missile defenses (those that intercept the missile in its last minutes of descending flight) through Europe will leave plenty cities vulnerable and will take just as long to deploy (and probably cost more).

Second, the timeline issue. The 2007 national intelligence estimate, which had a lot of political influences, delayed the timeline of Iran’s nuclear program. However, it failed to account for technical surprise, and it is likely the missile estimate failed to do so as well. In 1998 virtually every intelligence agency in the world was surprised when North Korea launched a three-stage ICBM. In 2003 the unraveling of (some of) the A.Q. Khan network revealed how private individuals could essentially proliferate nuclear weapon technology to any country with cash. The point is that a significant surprise – such as North Korean or private-network assistance, could propel Iran to an ICBM capability far sooner than the intelligence currently suggests. The third site would have provided valuable insurance against this possible eventuality.

Third, the allies’ defense. True, the administration is pledging to deploy some missile defenses, like terminal-intercepts, but this is a far cry from the planned midcourse-intercept system that could have provided coverage of virtually all of Europe. Terminal systems have a small “footprint” that can only cover smaller areas, like a city. In a must read letter to the Obama administration, current and former leaders of Central and Eastern Europe basically ask not to be forgotten or sacrificed. They state “all is not well in our region or in the transatlantic relationship…storm clouds are starting to gather on the foreign policy horizon… [Russia] at a regional level and vis-a-vis our nations, increasingly acts as a revisionist [power].” They worry that Russia’s intimidation and influence-peddling will lead to a neutralization of their region.

Regarding the missile defense site, they pointedly write that “regardless of the military merits of this scheme and what Washington eventually decides to do, the issue has become a symbol of America’s credibility and commitment to the region… The small number of missiles involved cannot be a threat to Russia’s strategic capabilities, and the Kremlin knows this. We should decide the future of the program as allies and based on the strategic pluses and minuses of the different technical and political configurations.” They conclude on this subject that “abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too deeply in it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic can undermine the credibility of the U.S. across the whole region.” Central and Eastern Europe would know about Russia’s operations. They lived under their iron boot for generations.

Finally, the Russian problem. The Russians have protested loudly to the planned third site since it was first announced, despite the fact it is only 10 defensive interceptors that would be incapable of countering one SS-18 or even catching up with its missiles if they headed out over the polar routes. Once again, our allies understand the situation: “When it comes to Russia, our experience has been that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not only strengthen the West’s security but will ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy as well.” This would require firmness in negotiations with Putin and Medvedev.

The third site was likely the price the Obama administration figured it could pay to get Russian assistance on sanctions against Iran and in order to conclude the START follow-on. If anyone is convinced the Russians can exert the leverage to make the Iranians comply with their obligations (forget the UN Security Council, China will still block that), they have not been paying attention. Short of a crippling cut-off of all gasoline imports or nuclear reactor fuel from Russia, Iran is unlikely to even consider talks about its nuclear program. As I stated in a previous post, linking the new START to removal of the missile defense site from Europe would be unacceptable. Linking offensive and defensive weapons is walking right back into the Cold War paradigm the Clinton and Bush administrations did so much to end.

This is perhaps the administration’s worst foreign policy action to date. It delays deployment of a real capability that could not only defend European allies but also the eastern United States from Iranian missiles. It cannot be viewed as anything other than backing away from commitments made to Central and Eastern European allies and ignoring their legitimate concerns. The Senate should reject ratification of the START follow-on treaty and mandate the deployment of the planned missile defenses as the price for their support. Given this decision and the administration’s likely objection to warhead modernization, it will be hard to get 67 votes to ratify START.

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On the Dear Leader - Does traditional deterrence theory apply?

Yes - another blog post on the DPRK.

The chief reason: I am reading Bradley Martin's Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty.

The secondary reason - North Korea is very important to US strategic interests and setting a precedent for rogue nuclear states.

You probably also know that the Dear Leader (Kim Jong-il, not Obama) once again captured a world audience by hosting former President Bill Clinton and "negotiating" the release of two American journalists.

So let me share a bit of what I have learned from the book as well as the recent Clinton visit.

Power in North Korea is highly centralized on the elevated figure that is Kim Jong-il. He is the unquestioned centerpiece of the reclusive communist state. The cult of Kim Jong-il is said to be even stronger than his Father, and former leader of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung.

Kim Jong Il succeeded his father by strong arming his competition, including siblings, party members and even his own uncle. His greatest tactic? Hwang Jang Yop, a high ranking North Korean official who defected to South Korea describes Kim's ruse.

Kim Jong-il is by nature a person who does not like living in harmony with others. He makes people fight against each other and depend only on him. Thus, when he talks about strengthening the organization, he means making strict rules to guarantee unconditional obedience to him... the more party members criticize each other and fight among themselves, the greater Kim Jong-il's authority becomes.

Does this seem a little familiar? Recall the recent North Korean rocket launch. The world was heavily divided between the West (plus Japan) and the rest of the world about how to react. Kim sits back and watches his stock go up, while we waste political capital forging a coalition to respond to his antics. If we "feed the animals" in this way, it is almost impossible to deter their unwanted actions.

I also want to call attention to the theories of deterrence which some have applied to the Dear Leader. The argument goes something like this - Kim Jong-il is a rational actor bent on self preservation. His political actions will undoubtedly reflect his desire to maintain control.

This logic is not flawless, decision making can be influenced by a number of factors. What Keith Payne calls "cognitive distortion" influences decision making in the DPRK. Cognitive distortion can come from a number of factors, but most notably drug and alcohol abuse. Keep in mind that Hitler's decision making was influenced by a cornucopia of stimulants, depressants, and even cocaine.

North Korean governance at least seems to be somewhat influenced by the cognitive distortion of Kim Jong-il.

Bradley Martin writes:

Like others who had worked in the higher levels of the regime, Hwang noted Kim Jong-il's penchant for holding drinking parties. But Hwang put them in context as "an important element in Kim Jong-il's style of politics."

Bradley goes on

Although the parties had a business function from Kim's point of view, they inevitably led to some drunken policy making. Kim at his parties would occasionally issue orders so odd they could not be carried out.

Deterring such an individual with such habits would be extremely difficult. The solution is not only attempting to deter him, but also hedging against potential attacks. The deployment of Aegis BMDS is a good step towards defending against a North Korean missile launch.

One last thing - I am willing to bet that Kim Jong-il is extremely opposed to this current administration.

Hwang wrote

He (Kim) even dislikes the good fortune of other countries, and becomes jealous of leaders in other countries who are known to be popular with the people.

Hwant writes that Kim justifies this jealous because

Kim opposes the worship of any individual. He is the Great Leader of the people and therefore not an individual.

So what can we learn from all this?
1) We often play into the hands of Kim by making him the centerpiece of the nuclear debate. Our "in-fighting" only strokes his ego and gives him strategic leverage.

2) It is unlikely that Kim Jong-il can be unquestionably deterred by our nuclear and BMD capabilities. His drunken parties (thrown with cognac no doubt) have lead to decision making before, and could potentially lead to a catastrophic strategic move.

3) It is unlikely that Obama's god-like (newsweeks words, not mine) presence is well received in Pyongyang. Kim is no doubt jealous of Obama's popularity in the US and world wide. As a result, it is unlikely that any "negotiations" with North Korea will be fruitful under this administration.

4) The Clinton visit was a way to increase the prestige of the regime, and merely legitimized the capture of the two American journalists. Although this wasn't a move of our administration, it was likely a mistake.

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The Dear Leader Exacts Revenge

It seems as though the Dear Leader has not forgotten the Department of Treasury's successful 2006 bulwark of North Korea from the international financial system. The AP is reporting that North Korea is suspected of cyber-attacks against our Department of Treasury, Secret Service, and a few other agencies. I guess this is Kim Jong Il's attempt at revenge. Revenge you may ask? If you don't know the story - you should.

Daniel Glaser is known the architect behind the throttling of North Korea's illicit financial networks. Glaser works as the Department of the Treasury's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes. It serves as the offensive branch of the treasury which protects the international financial system from funding the activities of rogue nations, drug cartels, and terrorist organizations. They are the unsung financial warriors of our current GWOT (or overseas contingency.... whatever Barry and Napolitano call it.) They also have constructed mechanisms to keep rogue nations like Iran and North Korea out of the international financial system, thus hurting their chances of financing a war of annihilation against the United States and its allies. Needless to say I am thankful for their efforts.

One of the greatest efforts put forth by the TFI and the program under it FINcen (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) a program designed in 1989 to counter the use of the international financial system as a tool of criminals. Essentially FATF is a coalition of large first-world economies which monitor each others financial dealings and places restrictions on those that deal with less than savory characters. Since membership is voluntary, it takes some convincing to persuade nations to give up the free flow of financial capital.

Originally, the program targeted drug cartels as a part of the crusading war on drugs. We learned in the post 9-11 world that the system was also effective against other illicit networks; including FTO's and rogue states.

Glaser, serving as the head of the U.S. delegation to FATF, convinced member nations that it was not within their economic interest to allow banks in their territory to deal with the money laundering- counterfeiting- Hennessey drinking-Rambo loving- Kim Jong Il regime. These banks had a fiduciary obligation to their shareholders to insulate themselves from North Korea. It did help that section 311 of the patriot act allowed FINcen to target specific banks and order US banks to halt their dealings with them.

The most notable bank was the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) which crumbled under the financial isolation. This sent a clear message - stop dealing with North Korea or your financial institution may be next. This is the best "kickass" moment I think the Department of Treasury will ever experience.

Stuart Levey commented on the real impact of the financial restrictions was that,

"many private financial institutions worldwide responded by terminating their business relationships not only with [BDA], but with North Korean clients altogether".

Within a short period of time, North Korea found their hands financially tied. Thus we gained leverage over the North's nuclear program. Leverage that we quickly wasted - this was THE window of opportunity for the United States to take a meaningful shot at Kim's illegal nuclear program. Instead the Bush administration valued the six party talks as almost an end.

Robert Joseph (professor at DSS) commented in a WSJ article,

"For a short period, a matter of weeks, the approach seemed to produce results. But when Pyongyang announced its willingness to return to the negotiations, the Bush Administration, in an abrupt reversal of its policies which I opposed and could not support, rushed headlong into the snare. By February 2007, the Talks were becoming the strategy, and an end in themselves. There would be no more “pressure” placed on the North. Strengthening interdiction capacities and even implementing the mandatory UN sanctions were seen as too provocative, as threatening the prospects for diplomacy. It soon became apparent that the Administration would endure any humiliation to keep the Talks going. The spectacle of American diplomats pleading for foreign banks to facilitate the return of the assets from Macao, some of which were known to stem from the North’s proliferation activities, could not have been more pathetic or, ironically, more damaging to the prospects for diplomacy. "

So we lost an opportunity. We did however make inroads to discovering a meaningful tactic against rogue nations. If we can strangle finances, rogue states will come to their knees. Note that FATF is currently targeting Iran.

So it looks like Kim Jong Il is exacting his revenge against the United States Treasury in the form of cyber attacks. I'm not certain that his "revenge" will have a lasting impact on the United States, but I do know that the combination of the Patriot Act, FINcen FATF did.

Although I'm sure his advisers informed him that the attack was a resounding success.

Just as a side note, if you ever get the chance, take a look at Bradley Martin's Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty. I'm in the process of reading it now - the stories of the two Kim's - father and son - are unreal.

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Fail

Inferior soldier 1: There goes the TD-2.
Inferior soldier 2: going...going....going... and its in the pacific
Inferior soldier 1: What should we tell the Dear Leader?
Inferior soldier 2: Great success!


So the North Korean missile... err satellite launch failed. I can't say that I am surprised, but it does prove Kim Jong Il's willingness to push the limits of the international community, and more specifically the United States Commander in Chief. He launched a more overtly hostile missile, the TD-2, in 2006, and now through perhaps a more benign medium (a satellite test), he tested a similar missile capability.

Not surprisingly, North Korea state media reported the launch as a success.

So how do we punish this defiant child? Obama is opting for the Security Council route. There, he has legal standing to punish the North Korean regime. In 2006 the Security Council passed resolution 1718 which "demands" (funny how the boys in the UN think they can emphatically use words like demand) the North Korean regime to halt any further testing. We've been down this road before though; the following resolutions strictly prohibit DPRK from testing such missiles. Resolution 825 (the link to this resolution is dead on the UN site... the full text is on wikisource) (1993), resolution 1540 (2004) and, in particular, resolution 1695 (2006). Nothing the security council has drafted or "unanimously decided on will curb that actions of the North Korean regime. Keep in mind all of these resolutions were targeted solely at North Korea. It is clear that the UN can fill a symbolic role in punishing the DPRK, but put faith in anything more is naive.

John Bolton, former representative to the UN lamented on Fox News recently,

I don't think the U.N.'s going to do much of anything. I think it's very unlikely they'll get a stiff sanctions resolution. The sanctions that were imposed in 2006, when North Korea tested missiles and a nuclear device, obviously haven't not stopped them.

I think the real pressure has to be applied on China, which gives North Korea 80 to 90 percent of its energy and a substantial amount of its food and other humanitarian needs. China's got the capability to stop this nuclear program. We've just never applied adequate pressure to them.

This is how you suffocate a tyrannical regime. If Kim Jong Il will not change his policies, then this gives us a rare opportunity to work with China and cut off the regimes life support.

I would assume a nuclear North Korea with a relatively unstable leader is not within the Chinese national interest. However the Chinese would not want a reunified peninsula.

The PRC is crafty and could relieve North Korea of its nuclear program with relative ease. It's up to Obama to figure out a way to do that.

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