Sunday, April 18, 2010

The NPR on Force Structure

The NPR is remarkably non-committal on the U.S. nuclear force structure. It tends to skirt the issue by insisting that flexibility will rule the triad, while ignoring the obvious fact that under New START cuts will have to be made to one or more of the legs. The NPR states that "the United States should retain a smaller Triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, and heavy bombers. Retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities." The document admits that the technical hedge will be reduced overall, but compensates for it by retaining the "ability to upload some nuclear warheads as a technical hedge against any future problems with U.S. delivery systems or warheads, or as a result of a fundamental deterioration of the security environment."

The NPR is full of ambiguity in addressing the force sizes of each leg of the triad. It promises to "sustain strategic submarines," while floating the idea to "consider reducing from 14 to 12 Ohio-class submarines in the second half of this decade." The ICBM force is to be completely de-MIRVed, which is a modest warhead reduction since no more than 50 warheads are on ICBMs with multiple warheads. There is no indication that the sacrosanct 450 Minuteman-III force will be reduced, perhaps to avoid or postpone upsetting the bipartisan Senate ICBM Coalition. In a further move towards a de facto dyad, the U.S. will maintain "a smaller and highly capable nuclear bomber force." Since the NPR talks of funding upgrades to the B-2s and converting some B-52Hs to conventional roles, it is safe to assume that the nuclear bomber force will be a scant 18 B-2s and a few dozen B-52Hs.



Despite the ambiguity in the NPR on force structure, the numbers in New START will clearly lead to significant force reductions. The New START limits the U.S. and Russia to 800 total strategic delivery vehicles and 700 deployed ones. Setting the bomber fleet aside for the moment, the U.S. currently has 450 ICBMs and 288 SLBMs (336 total when the 48 unloaded for submarine refit are counted). That comes to 738 deployed delivery vehicles, without bombers included. The U.S. will likely have to either reduce the SSBN fleet by 2 (to take out 48 SLBMs) or reduce the ICBM force by 50 Minuteman. Since either of these reductions would take the total down to 694 or 688, there would either have to be additional cuts to accommodate the bomber fleet, or most of the bombers would be "non-deployed."

What are the implications of such reductions? First, cuts in ICBMs will provide a potential adversary with a lower threshold to attempt to reach strategic parity. China would basically need to double or MIRV its ICBM force to be equal with the U.S. in that capability. Second, cuts in SSBNs will reduce the flexibility of being able to keep a certain number of boats on strategic patrol while deploying some to trouble spots to reassure allies. Third, cuts to either could be a death blow for the fragile solid rocket motor (SRM) industry. In the wake of the cancellation of NASA's Constellation program, the SRM industrial base has lost well over a half or two-thirds of its business. Further cuts in orders for ballistic missile SRMs may well knock this critical industry into insolvency. Say goodbye to manned space flight and deterrent sustainability that day.

By boxing in the U.S. force structure this way, the nuclear force is moving perilously close to a dyad. The bomber force has suffered from neglect for years, consisting of 20 year old B-2s and Eisenhower/Kennedy-era B-52s. Studies to produce a next-generation bomber drag on, pushing the timeframe for initial operational capability into the late part of this decade or 2020s. If bombers really are valued for their stability, ability to be recalled, and flexibility, it would follow that there would be a commitment to sustain the capability. This has yet to satisfactorily emerge - a new bomber has been talked about for years, with little movement towards developing one. The perils of a dyad should be obvious - we lose the ability to send signals by raising alert levels and forward deployments. And if we would for whatever reason decide to strike, it is impossible to recall an ICBM, not so a bomber.

The NPR therefore dodges and postpones a lot of the tough decisions on force posture. Although it claims to endorse the limits set by the New START, it offers no concrete path for achieving those reductions. If it did so, it may have lost the votes from senators whose states would be hit hard by the reductions (states the delivery vehicles are deployed or manufactured in). Unless there are classified analyses of this issue, the New START may not win many of the votes it sought to avoid offending. It is foolish to commit to a set force structure for ten years, but the NPR and New START leave little room for maintaining the flexibility to adjust to changes in the international security environment.

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Saturday, April 17, 2010

Ragged Old Flag

Incredible. This never gets old.



"I thank God for all the freedoms we've got in this country. I cherish them. Even the rights to burn the flag. I'm proud of those rights. Let me tell you something, we've also got the right to bear arms, and if you burn my flag, I'll shoot you."

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Saturday, April 10, 2010

The NPR and Declaratory Policy

The Nuclear Posture Review released last week turned out to be far from the transformative document President Obama lobbied for. In his Prague speech of April 2009, the President declared he would "reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy." It could be argued he somewhat succeeded in that objective.



To truly understand the changes it is necessary to understand the previous policy. President Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara introduced the policy of flexible response, which committed the U.S. to pursuing a range of responses in case of conventional or nuclear aggression. This policy morphed into the practice of issuing ambiguous declarations of U.S. response policies. By adopting a policy reminiscent of Schelling's "threat that leaves something to chance," the U.S. often kept adversaries off-balance and unsure about potential U.S. responses. This can be seen in President H.W. Bush's warning to Saddam Hussein about using WMD and in President W. Bush's promise to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression with all means necessary. This calculated ambiguity therefore kept adversaries guessing and provided U.S. presidents with substantial freedom of action as events developed.

The 2010 NPR has made two basic changes to U.S. declaratory policy: 1) the U.S. promises not to respond to a chemical attack with nuclear retaliation and 2) the U.S. promises not to use nuclear weapons against any country in full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The NPR states that countries that use "CBW against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response... Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat." Since the U.S. is "reserving the right" to change its policy with regard to biological attacks, it is fair to say that the threat of nuclear retaliation still exists for countries that would use BW. Only chemical weapons use seems to be immune from the prospect of nuclear retaliation. This is a reasonable development, given the fact that CW are hardly weapons of mass destruction when compared to biological and nuclear weapons. On the battlefield they are much easier to defend against and in most scenarios their impact is relatively localized. The one area where this policy may prove problematic is in extended deterrence. Many allies do not feel this way about CW, for understandable reasons. North Korea, Syria, and Iran have lots of chemical weapons. Do our allies in Seoul, Ankara, or Abu Dhabi consider chemical attacks undeserving of nuclear retaliation?

Declaring that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons against countries in full-compliance with the NPT is a reasonable policy, if somewhat difficult to interpret. In most instances, the U.S. would have no desire or need to use nuclear weapons against a country that was not pursuing an illicit nuclear weapons program. Examining two case studies is instructive. In 2002 it was revealed that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program. The IAEA Board of Governors did not find Iran in noncompliance with its NPT obligations until 2006. Would the U.S. have renounced preemptive nuclear strikes to destroy Iran's capability in that time period? Currently, Syria has not fully cooperated with IAEA inspectors investigating the nuclear facility destroyed by Israel in 2007. Syria has not been found in noncompliance by the IAEA Board of Governors. If it used CBW against Iraq or Turkey, would the U.S. take nuclear retaliation off the table because an IAEA Board weighed down by political pressure failed to put it on notice?

This brings us to an important point regarding this aspect of the policy. Should not a state be required to be in compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as the NPT, to avoid the possibility of nuclear retaliation? Otherwise it seems possible that BW could become "the poor country's usable nukes." It becomes a foreseeable possibility for a state to forgo nuclear weapons and be in full compliance with the NPT while developing and deploying robust biological and chemical weapons. Would not this be attractive for countries that cannot acquire nuclear capabilities but want an asymmetric deterrent anyway (look in Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia). To those who say conventional U.S. forces can provide the same level of deterrence and retaliation as nuclear weapons, what do the continuing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the potential one on the Korean peninsula, say about trusting conventional strength to produce quick and adequate victories?

I conclude by arguing that the declaratory policy section of the NPR is not the travesty it could have turned out to be ("no first use," "sole purpose of nukes is to deter nuclear attack"). The exclusion of chemical weapons from the list of reasons to launch nuclear retaliation is reasonable from an American perspective, but I hope we consulted with our friends and allies to make sure they felt the same way. There are currently few (if any) countries in *actual* compliance with the NPT that we worry about as a threat. The NPR refrained from defining "compliance" (Board of Governors referral, noncooperation, suspicions), which leaves the U.S. with enough flexibility to argue that a country is non-compliant (and thus eligible for nuclear attack) even if it has not been found in noncompliance by the IAEA. I do worry that some countries may read a green light into this, and decide to abide by the NPT while developing alternative means of deterrence - but here again, the U.S. "reserves the right" to change as threats develop.

Overall, the "Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons" section of the NPR has turned out to be acceptable declaratory policy. It is also good to keep in mind that what a country says one day may not be what it does the next. Even if an NPT-compliant state launched a chemical or low-level biological attack that killed as many people as the 9/11 attacks did (however unlikely such a result would be), I doubt we would feel completely bound by this policy document. At the end of the day, ambiguity seems to remain a central pillar of our declaratory policy.

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Tuesday, April 6, 2010

NPR Released


After months of delays, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review was released today. It can be found here. Secretary Clinton (State), Secretary Gates (DOD), Admiral Mullen (JCS), and Secretary Chu (Energy) gave a briefing on its relase. They were followed by Undersecretary Ellen Tauscher (State Dept), Undersecretary Jim Miller (DOD), General James Cartwright (JCS), and Thomas D'Agostino (NNSA). In the coming days we will seek to provide analysis, defenses, and rebuttals of the key policies embedded in the new NPR. Until then, we invite you to read the document as well.

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Thursday, April 1, 2010

Obama and Kim - Pledge to "Hang Out More"



In an apparent reversal of White House policy, United States President, Barack Obama met with North Korean Dear Leader, Kim Jong-Il early this morning. The two apparently struck up a relationship quite quickly as Kim suggested to begin breakfast with Champagne. According to White House Staff, Obama responded with, "hell its 5 o clock somewhere."

The two leaders decided to go bowling, upon request from DPRK General Ri Yong-Ho, who is apparently the country's "Dear Bowler." Obama swept the North Korean envoy, which was seen by the international community as an upset.

Obama responded to his bowling critics with a turkey in the 10th frame, placing punctuation on his accomplishment with a loud "Booya." Clearly frustrated, the Dear Leader suggested the two move on to more pressing matters: the diplomatic gift giving session.

Obama, clearly excited by his choice of gift first presented the North Korean envoy with snuggies, the popular blanket gown. Press Secretary Robert Gibbs commented on the gifts "these are no normal snuggies, they are the designer kind. I really think President Obama outdid himself on this one."
The North Korean dictator apparently loved the gift and decided to sport it in his latest military photograph. Kim Jong Il apparently liked the designer garb so much that he will now allow his working class to wear them, as long as they are affixed with the traditional Kim badge.

After the gift exchange, the two pledged to "hang out more." Obama subsequently released a statement declaring the two countries as future bowling allies. The statement also mentioned that President Kim "knows how to party." The two are scheduled for a follow up hang session early next week.

Happy April Fools, folks.

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About Missouri State

Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS), located in Fairfax, VA, provides professional, graduate-level education in national security policy; foreign policy; arms control; missile proliferation; international security affairs; defense policy analysis, planning and programs; and intelligence analysis.

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