Friday, November 13, 2009

Untying Offensive and Defensive Systems

Before I get on with the content of this post, I want to sincerely apologize for the lack of content on DSSFeed. Most of us have been terribly busy with the semester hitting its peak work load. No excuses though. I know most of you hang on the edge of your seat for updates and I apologize for keeping you there - it must be quite uncomfortable.

As you probably know, there is a lot off buzz about the future the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. A bit of background -

The United States and Russia signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991, effectively reducing the size of the United States and Soviet (now Russian Federation) strategic arms deployment. The subsequent Moscow treaty initiated further reductions, but relies solely on the verification regime of the initial START treaty. However, on December 5th of this year the START agreement will expire, thus rendering the Moscow treaty unverified until its expiration in 2012. In order to prevent a gap in verification, the administration has set a goal to renegotiate the START treaty, at least in part, by December 5th.

It is likely that there will be an interim agreement signed prior to December in order to provide an extension for a comprehensive agreement, which may take several years to negotiate and ratify.

There are some troubling rumblings coming out of the administration which make me question our dedication to primary and extended deterrence. Most notably was a joint statement issued on April 1st, in which both parties committed to negotiating the issue of the "interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.”

I posit that there are four major reasons why tying offensive and defense strategic systems is bad for the security of the US.

1) It will effectively set a precedent for future agreements. After a treaty is ratified, it ascends to law higher than our constitutional. We may bind our hands in future agreements because of our carelessness during this one. We do not know the future of Missile Defense its true potential. Though it is not a perfect technology now, we may well have that technology one day. Be weary of entangling alliances.

2) Missile defense is crucial to deterring, and dissuading our opponents, particularly rogue states. It is too important to concede no matter who we are negotiating with. With Iran developing sophisticated warhead designs, and North Korea continuing to develop ICBM's, we will soon operate in a world in which those states can threaten the US mainland.

3) Both major strategic arms reduction treaties (START, SORT) we negotiated on the heels of a major advancement in missile defense (SDI, and the removal of the US from the ABM treaty). Missile defense allows us to negotiate in a position of strength.

4) Russia has not proven itself as a reliable partner in strategic arms control. Most notably, their testing of a modifed Topol M - the RS 24 violates START if it is deployed. They also seem to be channeling back deals with the Iranian regime which has undercut our effort to stifle the rogue nuclear program.

This is an important piece of language to watch for once START has been renegotiated. It may set the tone for future arms control treaties, and could even bind our ability to defend America from rogue missile threats.



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Tuesday, September 22, 2009

The CTBT Revisited: Has Anything Really Changed?

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), an agreement which would ban all nuclear tests, may soon be revived from its purgatory in the Senate. It was signed by President Clinton in 1996 and rejected by the Senate in October 1999. The arguments that denied ratification by a 19 vote margin still ring true today. In his Prague speech, however, President Obama called for prompt U.S. ratification of the treaty. He is expected to do the same at the UN later this month.

In rejecting the CTBT, Senate opponents listed several concerns that motivated their decision. They believed the CTBT was unverifiable and that others nations could easily cheat; the ability to enforce the treaty was dubious; the U.S. nuclear stockpile would not be as safe or reliable in the absence of testing; and the benefit to nuclear nonproliferation was minimal.

Ten years later, many of these concerns are still relevant. The issue of verification has been improved but not settled. The CTBT Organization has set up a network of 228 monitoring stations around the world, but significant gaps still exist. There are no stations in India or North Korea, and only one in Pakistan and Turkey. Sixty-one stations detected North Korea’s nuclear test in May 2009, but none detected radioactive gases to corroborate the seismic data. If North Korea was able to conceal such radiation, there is no reason to believe China or Russia could not as well.

As the continuing crises with North Korea and Iran illustrate, enforcing treaty obligations or punishing rule-breakers is not always effective. It is often, in fact, completely ineffective due to a lack of international cooperation. If a nuclear test were detected in Pakistan, India, or China, what would happen next? If the record with Pyongyang or Tehran is any indicator, the violating state would take some rhetorical heat and little more than a toothless UN Security Council resolution (if that). The CTBT will not immediately change other states’ policies.

The last decade has not been kind to the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Though the Stockpile Stewardship Program has successfully replaced older components, confidence in reliability has declined as the warheads age. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has stated that a credible U.S. deterrent cannot be maintained without testing or modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons. If modernization is not pursued, many experts believe testing will be needed to guarantee the weapons’ reliability.

Most significantly, the treaty’s perceived benefits toward enhancing nuclear nonproliferation are still debatable. Pro-CTBT voices have made several valid claims to consider. They argue that without the CTBT the nuclear arms race will continue, especially in Asia, with more states hedging their capabilities to be able to assemble a nuclear weapon quickly. Treaty advocates are quick to point out that the U.S. has already received a benefit for pursuing ratification – the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995. The NPT, which divides the world into five nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the rest as non-NWS, is up for review in May 2010. The non-NWS are likely going to insist on CTBT ratification in exchange for nonproliferation cooperation.

These arguments still do not explain how the CTBT will be good for nonproliferation. For one, the existence of a nuclear arms race (outside India and Pakistan) is suspect, given the fact that the U.S. and Russia are reducing their nuclear stockpiles. Nuclear hedging is a problem to be tackled by IAEA monitoring; not by attempting to ban nuclear tests (the NPT already does this for non-NWS). Though the non-nuclears may insist on entry into force of the CTBT, there is little reason to believe they will take tougher actions on Pyongyang and Tehran once the U.S. ratifies it. If unilaterally and bilaterally reducing nuclear arsenals and not testing for 17 years have done nothing to convince non-NWS of U.S. leadership, why will the CTBT?

The CTBT is simply not in the U.S. national interest. The U.S. would not be guaranteed a seat on the Executive Council, which geographically would be unfriendly to Washington. Since it requires North Korean, Pakistani, and Egyptian ratification (to name a few), the U.S. would be binding itself to a treaty unlikely to ever enter into force. Though there would be a growing ability to detect nuclear tests, there would be no effective way to enforce the treaty. The U.S. stockpile would continue to atrophy as explosive testing for reliability would be prohibited, which could spur proliferation. The CTBT needs to be rewritten to mitigate these drawbacks, not “immediately and aggressively”[xi] brought before the U.S. Senate.

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Thursday, September 17, 2009

Walking Away from the Third Site and European Allies

In an excellent WSJ article, Peter Spiegel details the reasons behind the Obama administration’s shelving of the missile defense third site in Central Europe. Though they are claiming that it was based on a technical assessment and that Iran’s long-range ballistic missile program is proceeding slowly, it should be apparent to the casual observer that this has been Obama’s plan since January 20th. In a move to appease Russian objections to installing U.S. military assets in their “sphere of influence,” the U.S. has walked away from defense commitments made to Poland, the Czech Republic, and other nations within range of Iranian missiles. This decision is misguided and dangerous for several reasons.

First, the procurement issue. Even if you accept the delay in Iranian ICBM capabilities until mid-2010s, due to the slow acquisition process (and slower deployment timetable), that is about the time the Third Site would become operational. By shelving the plans, the U.S. will be putting itself in the position where it finds the Iranian missile program progressing faster than its missile defense deployment. In the time period between Iranian long-range missile capability and U.S. BMD deployment, Iran may be able to coerce the U.S. or Europe by threatening unprotected European cities. Their stopgap measure of rotating terminal-phase missile defenses (those that intercept the missile in its last minutes of descending flight) through Europe will leave plenty cities vulnerable and will take just as long to deploy (and probably cost more).

Second, the timeline issue. The 2007 national intelligence estimate, which had a lot of political influences, delayed the timeline of Iran’s nuclear program. However, it failed to account for technical surprise, and it is likely the missile estimate failed to do so as well. In 1998 virtually every intelligence agency in the world was surprised when North Korea launched a three-stage ICBM. In 2003 the unraveling of (some of) the A.Q. Khan network revealed how private individuals could essentially proliferate nuclear weapon technology to any country with cash. The point is that a significant surprise – such as North Korean or private-network assistance, could propel Iran to an ICBM capability far sooner than the intelligence currently suggests. The third site would have provided valuable insurance against this possible eventuality.

Third, the allies’ defense. True, the administration is pledging to deploy some missile defenses, like terminal-intercepts, but this is a far cry from the planned midcourse-intercept system that could have provided coverage of virtually all of Europe. Terminal systems have a small “footprint” that can only cover smaller areas, like a city. In a must read letter to the Obama administration, current and former leaders of Central and Eastern Europe basically ask not to be forgotten or sacrificed. They state “all is not well in our region or in the transatlantic relationship…storm clouds are starting to gather on the foreign policy horizon… [Russia] at a regional level and vis-a-vis our nations, increasingly acts as a revisionist [power].” They worry that Russia’s intimidation and influence-peddling will lead to a neutralization of their region.

Regarding the missile defense site, they pointedly write that “regardless of the military merits of this scheme and what Washington eventually decides to do, the issue has become a symbol of America’s credibility and commitment to the region… The small number of missiles involved cannot be a threat to Russia’s strategic capabilities, and the Kremlin knows this. We should decide the future of the program as allies and based on the strategic pluses and minuses of the different technical and political configurations.” They conclude on this subject that “abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too deeply in it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic can undermine the credibility of the U.S. across the whole region.” Central and Eastern Europe would know about Russia’s operations. They lived under their iron boot for generations.

Finally, the Russian problem. The Russians have protested loudly to the planned third site since it was first announced, despite the fact it is only 10 defensive interceptors that would be incapable of countering one SS-18 or even catching up with its missiles if they headed out over the polar routes. Once again, our allies understand the situation: “When it comes to Russia, our experience has been that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not only strengthen the West’s security but will ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy as well.” This would require firmness in negotiations with Putin and Medvedev.

The third site was likely the price the Obama administration figured it could pay to get Russian assistance on sanctions against Iran and in order to conclude the START follow-on. If anyone is convinced the Russians can exert the leverage to make the Iranians comply with their obligations (forget the UN Security Council, China will still block that), they have not been paying attention. Short of a crippling cut-off of all gasoline imports or nuclear reactor fuel from Russia, Iran is unlikely to even consider talks about its nuclear program. As I stated in a previous post, linking the new START to removal of the missile defense site from Europe would be unacceptable. Linking offensive and defensive weapons is walking right back into the Cold War paradigm the Clinton and Bush administrations did so much to end.

This is perhaps the administration’s worst foreign policy action to date. It delays deployment of a real capability that could not only defend European allies but also the eastern United States from Iranian missiles. It cannot be viewed as anything other than backing away from commitments made to Central and Eastern European allies and ignoring their legitimate concerns. The Senate should reject ratification of the START follow-on treaty and mandate the deployment of the planned missile defenses as the price for their support. Given this decision and the administration’s likely objection to warhead modernization, it will be hard to get 67 votes to ratify START.

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Friday, September 11, 2009

9-11

Never Forget.

When peace, like a river, attendeth my way,
When sorrows like sea billows roll;
Whatever my lot, Thou has taught me to say,
It is well, it is well, with my soul.

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Friday, August 28, 2009

Take Two Steps Back

UPDATE:

Although I personally believe that the European missile shield is dead, the Obama administration came out and denied claims of scrapping the program. There really is no coherent policy from this administration on European missile defense.



Maybe I'm being a bit melodramatic, but I feel like I have said goodbye to a lot of things since January 20th. I said goodbye to the F22 in this article, and arrivederci to Professor Dr. Thayer here. (Footnote - Dr. Thayer is now at Baylor teaching political science.) We are also seeing the loss of a once triumphant economy through government coercion and poor fiscal policy. More importantly we are seeing the loss of US Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities due to political mismanagement.

DSS professor, Ilan Berman predicted the demise of the European missile shield back in March.

In March, President Obama sent a secret letter to Russia’s president in March suggesting that he would back off deploying a new missile defense system in Eastern Europe (Poland and the Czech Republic) if Moscow would help stop Iran from developing long-range weapons.

Although at face value this seemed like a decent trade off, it's certainly was not the case once you start peeling back this onion. The United States has petitioned for some time to stage missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic as a means of defense against Iran, as well as the Soviet Union. It came with significant political will and even diplomatic costs. The Poles have been quite receptive, especially after the invasion of Georgia and our offerings of sophisticated air defense technology, but the Czech's haven't received the request as warmly. So, the Czech's have asked for a state referendum to determine the future of missile defense.

The problem with this letter being leaked is that we effectively tipped our hand. Since March, there has yet to be a referendum on the issue because both countries know there will be political consequences for pursuing a program this administration has no interest in.

Just this week Professor Berman, and Cliff May (President of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies) wrote on Op-ed for the Wall Street Journal on the issue of our lukewarm attempts at BMD and extending deterrence to our allies in the Middle East -
A half-hearted missile defense effort only encourages investments in missile technologies on the part of our adversaries, making them believe that with additional resources they will be capable of overwhelming American defenses.

U.S. missile-defense policy should be designed to elicit the opposite response. Our enemies and competitors should be forced to conclude that energy and funds spent developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them will be wasted because Americans have the know-how and hardware to prevent them from reaching their intended targets.

Also keep in mind that we are unable to create an effected extended deterrent if we are unwilling to invest in missile defense technologies for these allies.

It looks like its a done deal - The Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza reported yesterday that the Obama administration is going to scrap the "third site" in Poland and the Czech Republic.

An Op-ed in today's Washington Times gives a clear picture at the logic behind the cancellation.

The Obama administration also has floated the idea of a combined U.S.-Russian missile defense system and of a Joint Data Exchange Center for sharing information on missile launches. It is unclear what the United States expects in return for trading away the defensive system in Eastern Europe, but giving up something tangible for a promise of good behavior from Moscow is a fool's bargain.
So we are effectively taking a step back from making nuclear weapons delivered by ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete. Shouldn't this be our goal?

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Wednesday, August 19, 2009

RRW Rat Race


So the letter of the day is apparently R. I'm not sure that it is a tribute to pirates worldwide, but i'm sure they arghhhh happy.

So why not discuss a word that has two R's! RRW or reliable replaceable warhead.

A program that was once dead has since been revived, well at least the debate has been. This should have been done yesterday.

Elaine M Grossman wrote on the latest tug of war in an article published through the Global Security Newswire. I assure you, it's a worthwhile read.

Much to my surprise, Robert Gates is leading the charge on the issue, and has received considerable support from top officials including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Energy Secretary Steven Chu, Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, as well as his successor, Gen. Kevin Chilton, and perhaps most importantly DSSFeed. That is an impressive list, no matter what you think about this administration or this blog for that matter.

Most surprising to me is Chu's about face, as his Department of Energy called for the death of RRW in their FY2010 budget. (although it did call for a program which very much resembles RRW)

The support is not universal. Joe Biden, being the heavy hitting nuclear strategist that he is, was the lone critic at the NSC meeting. His concerns are legitimate - how can we expect other nations to limit and even disarm their nuclear arsenals if we are modernizing ours.

His logic is sound if you believe nuclear abolition is the primary end goal for our arsenal - he makes a poor argument if you tend to think otherwise.

The RRW is aimed at maintaining a credible deterrent, and were not the only ones contemplating it. The Russians and Chinese have blatantly pursued nuclear modernization programs, even pursuing new kinds of warheads like EMP and ERW.

While they move ahead, we are lagging behind. We have a large arsenal, and as of January 2009, it is estimated at 5,200 nuclear warheads: approximately 2,700 operational warheads, 2,200 of which are strategic (greater than 3,500 miles) and 500 are nonstrategic (less than 3,500 miles) warheads. We have about 2500 in reserve due to START restrictions. The size and scope of the arsenal means next to nothing if our opponents know they will not function on a reliable basis. Imagine trying to deter a robber with a rifle he knows isn't loaded - it won't work very well I promise.

We must also consider the safety mechanisms of these weapons. Some of these weapons like the w62 and w76 are still operational and date back to the 70's. Consider the fact that just 2 years prior; cars were required to be outfitted with seat belts. We are stockpiling weapons that were built during the same era that seat belts were new. Consider the new safety technology that has increased the survival rates of drivers everywhere. Now think of how much higher the stakes are on nuclear weapons. Shortfalls in safety are not acceptable - and Gates agrees.

Also consider the scientific capital we are missing out on. The United States has not built a nuclear warhead since 1992, and the scientific community has lost out on perhaps cutting edge technologies that may make the US in a better strategic position, perhaps by even making nukes impotent and obsolete.

The goal isn't disarming the world of its nukes, because it's far too lofty. Convincing rogue nations and even potentially FTO's to disarm will ultimately be fruitless. I don't want to hear the hogwash that diplomacy may work. No nation that is looking out for its national preservation will give up their nuclear warheads if they deter their regional and global opponents. It just won't happen. The only way nuclear states will give up their weapons is if they realize they will no longer help them achieve their unique geopolitical objectives.

So fight on Righteous Gates. (I'm still not forgetting that you lead the charge on axing the f22)

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Monday, August 17, 2009

Back to school... back to school...


So DSS is going back into session this fall starting August 24th. Ahhh back to the grind.

Much has changed since the summer recess. A few DSSers got married, some got engaged, and im sure some have had their hearts broken. Summer lovin, it happens so fast...

Anyhow, it seems as though the international community did not take a "summer break." Many strategically significant events have taken place, leaving students of defense and strategy with much to think about. (I'm sure as I write this that Walt is daydreaming about a victorious confrontation with the PRC over Taiwan)

So what will be the hot button issues for DSS this semester? What will guide the thesis options for students. Just as an aside, when I wrote the word thesis, a little part of me died.)

Will it be...

Burma's nascent nuclear program?

The successes and failures of Afghanistan and Iraq?

The significance of the shift in ballistic missile defense?

The volatile situation in Honduras?

The status of Dr. Thayer takeover of the Swedish riksdag?

Feel free to comment on what issues will guide the discussion.

Now off to buy some books...

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Wednesday, August 5, 2009

On the Dear Leader - Does traditional deterrence theory apply?

Yes - another blog post on the DPRK.

The chief reason: I am reading Bradley Martin's Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty.

The secondary reason - North Korea is very important to US strategic interests and setting a precedent for rogue nuclear states.

You probably also know that the Dear Leader (Kim Jong-il, not Obama) once again captured a world audience by hosting former President Bill Clinton and "negotiating" the release of two American journalists.

So let me share a bit of what I have learned from the book as well as the recent Clinton visit.

Power in North Korea is highly centralized on the elevated figure that is Kim Jong-il. He is the unquestioned centerpiece of the reclusive communist state. The cult of Kim Jong-il is said to be even stronger than his Father, and former leader of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung.

Kim Jong Il succeeded his father by strong arming his competition, including siblings, party members and even his own uncle. His greatest tactic? Hwang Jang Yop, a high ranking North Korean official who defected to South Korea describes Kim's ruse.

Kim Jong-il is by nature a person who does not like living in harmony with others. He makes people fight against each other and depend only on him. Thus, when he talks about strengthening the organization, he means making strict rules to guarantee unconditional obedience to him... the more party members criticize each other and fight among themselves, the greater Kim Jong-il's authority becomes.
Does this seem a little familiar? Recall the recent North Korean rocket launch. The world was heavily divided between the West (plus Japan) and the rest of the world about how to react. Kim sits back and watches his stock go up, while we waste political capital forging a coalition to respond to his antics. If we "feed the animals" in this way, it is almost impossible to deter their unwanted actions.

I also want to call attention to the theories of deterrence which some have applied to the Dear Leader. The argument goes something like this - Kim Jong-il is a rational actor bent on self preservation. His political actions will undoubtedly reflect his desire to maintain control.

This logic is not flawless, decision making can be influenced by a number of factors. What Keith Payne calls "cognitive distortion" influences decision making in the DPRK. Cognitive distortion can come from a number of factors, but most notably drug and alcohol abuse. Keep in mind that Hitler's decision making was influenced by a cornucopia of stimulants, depressants, and even cocaine.

North Korean governance at least seems to be somewhat influenced by the cognitive distortion of Kim Jong-il.

Bradley Martin writes:
Like others who had worked in the higher levels of the regime, Hwang noted Kim Jong-il's penchant for holding drinking parties. But Hwang put them in context as "an important element in Kim Jong-il's style of politics."
Bradley goes on
Although the parties had a business function from Kim's point of view, they inevitably led to some drunken policy making. Kim at his parties would occasionally issue orders so odd they could not be carried out.
Deterring such an individual with such habits would be extremely difficult. The solution is not only attempting to deter him, but also hedging against potential attacks. The deployment of Aegis BMDS is a good step towards defending against a North Korean missile launch.

One last thing - I am willing to bet that Kim Jong-il is extremely opposed to this current administration.

Hwang wrote
He (Kim) even dislikes the good fortune of other countries, and becomes jealous of leaders in other countries who are known to be popular with the people.
Hwant writes that Kim justifies this jealous because
Kim opposes the worship of any individual. He is the Great Leader of the people and therefore not an individual.
So what can we learn from all this?
1) We often play into the hands of Kim by making him the centerpiece of the nuclear debate. Our "in-fighting" only strokes his ego and gives him strategic leverage.

2) It is unlikely that Kim Jong-il can be unquestionably deterred by our nuclear and BMD capabilities. His drunken parties (thrown with cognac no doubt) have lead to decision making before, and could potentially lead to a catastrophic strategic move.

3) It is unlikely that Obama's god-like (newsweeks words, not mine) presence is well received in Pyongyang. Kim is no doubt jealous of Obama's popularity in the US and world wide. As a result, it is unlikely that any "negotiations" with North Korea will be fruitful under this administration.

4) The Clinton visit was a way to increase the prestige of the regime, and merely legitimized the capture of the two American journalists. Although this wasn't a move of our administration, it was likely a mistake.

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Friday, July 24, 2009

More info on the F22


A Yahoo News article outlines that there is a significant delay on the readiness of the "darling" f35. Hat tip to a friend on the story.

An internal Pentagon oversight board has reported that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is two years behind schedule, according to multiple congressional aides familiar with the findings...

The White House and some lawmakers who favor halting the production of any new F-22 warplanes say the F-35 will fill the gap and meet the nation's combat aircraft needs.

Senators and aides now lament that the Pentagon oversight panel's more pessimistic view on the F-35 program was not publicly released during the F-22 debate. They are calling for more open disclosure of the problems with the development of the F-35.

The Pentagon's Joint Estimate Team (JET), which was established to independently evaluate the F-35 program, is at odds with the Joint Program Office, which runs the F-35 program, the aides said. The oversight panel's calculations determined that the fighter won't be able to move out of the development phase and into full production until 2016, rather than 2014, as the program office has said.

That's assuming there are no further problems with the program, which has already faced cost overruns and schedule delays. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) said the delay could cost as much as $7.4 billion. The discrepancy between the Joint Estimate Team and the Joint Program Office was noted in a March report by the GAO, but it received little attention at the time.


So we are axing the F22 without a clear outlook on when the replacement will be done? Oh, I think our opponents won't lament the delay until 2016. The f22 is available NOW, and is significantly more capable than the F35.

This from Aviation Week.
Regardless of the vote in the Senate, “ The F-22 funding termination this week doesn't change a thing [about the tactical advantages offered by the stealth fighter’s advanced systems] and I think history will bear out the F-22 advocates' position when all the dust settles,” a senior U.S. Air Force intelligence officer tells Aviation Week. “ The F-35 [Joint Strike Fighter] is not an F-22 by a long shot,” he says. “There's no way it's going to penetrate Chinese Air Defenses if there's ever a clash.”

The intelligence official was referring to the fact that penetrating the latest surface to air missile defenses is something only the F-22 can do. China and Russia have variants of the the S-300/400 family that includes the SA-20 which is being sold in Asia and the Middle East. The F-22 can stay ahead of SA-20 because it it flies about a half-mach faster, two-miles higher and has a smaller Radar Cross Section than the F-35.

and this

“I’m still planning on getting those airplanes,” says Brig. Gen. Peter Pawling, who earlier this year was commander of the Hawaii ANG’s 154th Wing and has now moved to the staff of U.S. Pacific Command. “I’ve been assured that [despite a smaller fleet] they are still coming to Hawaii.

“It’s just that the F-35 and F-22 are such different airplanes,” Pawling says. “There are those who think you can simply build more F-35s [to compensate for a smaller Raptor fleet]. But the F-22 is one of those once-in-a-lifetime airplanes. There is nothing out there that can fly against it. If we had a major conflict [against someone with advanced air defenses], I can’t imagine going in there with anything but an F-22.”
The congress, our secdef, and our president are making a HUGE mistake.

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Tuesday, July 21, 2009

So long, old friend


According to the New York Times Senate democrats led the charge to remove provisions for funding seven more F22's from a military defense bill. This news is not particularly surprising, given the administration and Gates' overt feelings on the cost and utility of F22.

Sean outlined a few months ago about the importance of the F22 in his DSSFeed blog. I find his arguments on deterrence particularly convincing. Sean Wrote

Rather, elected officials and defense experts should insist on a return to the strategy of deterrence. They must make the argument that not only will the Raptor ensure air superiority for 40 years, but that it is necessary to have that capability for dissuasion and deterrence. A strong case can be made that the F-22 will dissuade rising competitors like China from challenging the US in the realm of air combat. Its advanced avionics and high technology can also deter a resurgent (and uppity) Russia from seeking a fait accompli in any future aggression against Eastern Europe (assuming F-22s are deployed in Europe).
The administration seems to disagree and it looks like the world's most advanced fighter will be capped at #187. The administration seems bent on cutting the defense budget of vital resources like the F22, in favor of grossly expanding other parts of the budget.

The administration rather favors the production of the F35 as its primary weapon to ensure air superiority over any current or potential adversaries. The problem is that many air force wonks disagree.

Retired General Merrill McPeak told Fox News
"I think it's a real mistake, The airplane is a game-changer and people seem to forget that we haven't had any of our soldiers or Marines killed by enemy air since 1951 or something like that. It's been half a century or more since any enemy aircraft has killed one of guys. So we've gotten use to this idea that we never have to breathe hostile air."
Former SecDef, Bill Cohen ( a clintonite ) said this about the f22
The F-22 will enable the Joint Strike Fighter (f35) to carry out its primary strike mission. The JSF(F35) was not designed for the air-superiority mission.
It all comes down to this - the f35 cannot achieve the same strategic objectives that the f22 was designed for.

We know that plans for the f35 have been hacked by the Chinese which means that its value has been at least somewhat compromised. Not to mention the fact that the f22 outperforms the f35 statistically in air to air exercises almost across the board.

So instead the funds will be diverted by the administration to some stimulus package designed to save wild horses.

Au Revoir, Raptor, mon ami!

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Friday, July 17, 2009

The best news you've heard on healthcare


The health care debate rages on. The left seems to have elevated the concept of health care to a right rather than a responsibility, a huge jump in American governmental philosophy. Perhaps they are right on the issue, but the ensuing implementation of health care by the federal government is going to be what I like to call MOAB, or the Mother Of All Bureaucracies. Not to mention the fact that our constitution is silent on the issue of health care, which means that legislation would require some kind of constitutional amendment. But lets be honest, that silly thing called the Constitution that won’t stop team Obama from ramming this through though.

Here's the issue with Americans, we always want something for nothing. The house wants to impose a 5.4% tax on the wealthy to pay the billions that are needed to raise money to implement this system. So long as the majority of citizens aren't paying for it, they don't mind taxing the minority. This is what we call de facto wealth redistribution for a socialized health care system. Those words should scare constitutionalists.


So easy access to health care for all eh? Let’s toss out the issues of implementation and constitutionalism. Those arguments are so last week anyhow. Let's look at the question at hand.

Is there free health care available for every American on demand?

By God there is! Great news! No need to inflate the deficit anymore this year Obama. No trillion dollar plan is needed. I've got your health care solution and its right under your nose.

Every American can get free healthcare by enlisting in the United States military. In fact under the 2006 Defense Authorization Act, any citizen that qualifies may enlist in the Army up until age 42.

That means for a good 24 years, every citizens eligible for service, which these days is darn near universal, is entitled to free health care through military service. This also includes insurance for your children.

The issue today isn't the question of access to health care, the military is more than happy to provide it to American's willing to defend their country. The question is, are American's universally willing to work to those ends?


My guess? They aren't.

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Wednesday, July 8, 2009

The Dear Leader Exacts Revenge


It seems as though the Dear Leader has not forgotten the Department of Treasury's successful 2006 bulwark of North Korea from the international financial system. The AP is reporting that North Korea is suspected of cyber-attacks against our Department of Treasury, Secret Service, and a few other agencies. I guess this is Kim Jong Il's attempt at revenge. Revenge you may ask? If you don't know the story - you should.

Daniel Glaser is known the architect behind the throttling of North Korea's illicit financial networks. Glaser works as the Department of the Treasury's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes. It serves as the offensive branch of the treasury which protects the international financial system from funding the activities of rogue nations, drug cartels, and terrorist organizations. They are the unsung financial warriors of our current GWOT (or overseas contingency.... whatever Barry and Napolitano call it.) They also have constructed mechanisms to keep rogue nations like Iran and North Korea out of the international financial system, thus hurting their chances of financing a war of annihilation against the United States and its allies. Needless to say I am thankful for their efforts.

One of the greatest efforts put forth by the TFI and the program under it FINcen (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) a program designed in 1989 to counter the use of the international financial system as a tool of criminals. Essentially FATF is a coalition of large first-world economies which monitor each others financial dealings and places restrictions on those that deal with less than savory characters. Since membership is voluntary, it takes some convincing to persuade nations to give up the free flow of financial capital.

Originally, the program targeted drug cartels as a part of the crusading war on drugs. We learned in the post 9-11 world that the system was also effective against other illicit networks; including FTO's and rogue states.

Glaser, serving as the head of the U.S. delegation to FATF, convinced member nations that it was not within their economic interest to allow banks in their territory to deal with the money laundering- counterfeiting- Hennessey drinking-Rambo loving- Kim Jong Il regime. These banks had a fiduciary obligation to their shareholders to insulate themselves from North Korea. It did help that section 311 of the patriot act allowed FINcen to target specific banks and order US banks to halt their dealings with them.

The most notable bank was the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) which crumbled under the financial isolation. This sent a clear message - stop dealing with North Korea or your financial institution may be next. This is the best "kickass" moment I think the Department of Treasury will ever experience.

Stuart Levey commented on the real impact of the financial restrictions was that,

"many private financial institutions worldwide responded by terminating their business relationships not only with [BDA], but with North Korean clients altogether".


Within a short period of time, North Korea found their hands financially tied. Thus we gained leverage over the North's nuclear program. Leverage that we quickly wasted - this was THE window of opportunity for the United States to take a meaningful shot at Kim's illegal nuclear program. Instead the Bush administration valued the six party talks as almost an end.

Robert Joseph (professor at DSS) commented in a WSJ article,

"For a short period, a matter of weeks, the approach seemed to produce results. But when Pyongyang announced its willingness to return to the negotiations, the Bush Administration, in an abrupt reversal of its policies which I opposed and could not support, rushed headlong into the snare. By February 2007, the Talks were becoming the strategy, and an end in themselves. There would be no more “pressure” placed on the North. Strengthening interdiction capacities and even implementing the mandatory UN sanctions were seen as too provocative, as threatening the prospects for diplomacy. It soon became apparent that the Administration would endure any humiliation to keep the Talks going. The spectacle of American diplomats pleading for foreign banks to facilitate the return of the assets from Macao, some of which were known to stem from the North’s proliferation activities, could not have been more pathetic or, ironically, more damaging to the prospects for diplomacy. "

So we lost an opportunity. We did however make inroads to discovering a meaningful tactic against rogue nations. If we can strangle finances, rogue states will come to their knees. Note that FATF is currently targeting Iran.

So it looks like Kim Jong Il is exacting his revenge against the United States Treasury in the form of cyber attacks. I'm not certain that his "revenge" will have a lasting impact on the United States, but I do know that the combination of the Patriot Act, FINcen FATF did.

Although I'm sure his advisers informed him that the attack was a resounding success.


Just as a side note, if you ever get the chance, take a look at Bradley Martin's Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty. I'm in the process of reading it now - the stories of the two Kim's - father and son - are unreal.

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Monday, July 6, 2009

Mr. Obama Goes to Moscow

President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev are meeting in Moscow to discuss a successor to the soon-to-expire Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). On the table for consideration (according to U.S. and/or Russian officials) are levels of deployed and stockpiled strategic nuclear warheads, strategic delivery systems (intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, and bombers), and missile defense. Off the table are nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the Russians hold in abundance.

Truly understanding the situation between Washington and Moscow requires a brief look at the numbers:
U.S. - 2,200 strategic nukes deployed (~2,500 reserve)
U.S. - ~1,000 ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers
U.S. - 400-500 tactical nukes
Russia - 2,700 strategic nukes deployed (unknown thousands in reserve)
Russia - ~650 ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers
Russia - 3,000-5,000 tactical nukes

In terms of strategic delivery systems, the U.S. still has decades before most of its systems will need replaced, while many Russian systems will reach the end of their service lives within the next decade, reducing their numbers to around 330.

The Obama Administration, in its rush to conclude the START follow-on by the current treaty’s expiration date on December 5th, is therefore playing into the Russians’ hands. By pushing for deep warhead cuts (the Russians will not go below 1,500 deployed) and considering a further reduction in the permitted number of strategic delivery vehicles, U.S. negotiators are essentially getting nothing for something. Since the Russians will have to eliminate many of their aging warheads, missiles, and bombers with or without an arms control treaty, they are trying to maintain parity with the United States through a new START accord. In return, the U.S. is getting something it would have gotten without having to reduce the survivability and flexibility of its nuclear arsenal.

Until recently, the Obama Administration was seemingly giving credence to Russian objections to a third missile defense site in Central Europe. Even former Secretary of Defense (and nuclear abolitionist) William Perry (D) stated in House testimony that trading missile defense for Russian promises was absolutely unreasonable. The president’s special assistant, Michael McFaul, stated last week the U.S. was “not going to reassure or give or trade anything with the Russians regarding NATO expansion or missile defense.” This is a step in the right direction. Tying defensive conventional systems to offensive nuclear systems, which President Medvedev is still insisting on, is a relic of the Cold War “mutually assured destruction” thinking.

Therefore, the U.S. approach to the START follow-on has been fundamentally flawed. By agreeing not to include nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the limits, the U.S. allowed Russia to maintain its biggest geopolitical advantage. Many experts believe it is these “battlefield” nuke stockpiles that will be the likely source of any future nuclear terrorism or nuclear use by a state (Russia explicitly states they would be used to “de-escalate” an invasion of their homeland). Furthermore, once U.S. warhead and delivery system levels have been drastically reduced, Washington will little leverage to urge Moscow to reduce its tactical nukes.

The arms control process is also misguided in the link some are attempting to make between a new START and “global zero,” the nuclear abolitionist movement. The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission determined that complete nuclear disarmament required a “fundamental transformation of the world political order.” Guiding a new treaty along what optimists consider a decades-long goal is a recipe for miscalculation and bad decisions. The Obama Administration needs to take a step back, assess U.S. interests over the long term, and proceed with a modest START follow-on from there. Idealism is one thing. Dealing with the Russians about nuclear weapons is entirely different.

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Thursday, May 28, 2009

Virtual Army Experience

I wrote a story for the Washington Times this week on the Virtual Army Experience, the Army's new tool to shape public conceptions of the Army. The 19,500 square foot arena is designed to give players a real feel for the combat situations that our military experiences every day in Iraq and Afghanistan. Truth be told - nothing can emulate real combat in my opinion, but the simulator harps on the more glorified aspects of being a soldier. If you want to read more about it, take a look at the article.

The highlight of my day was meeting Sergeant Jason Mike, a silver star recipient for his service in Iraq. Sgt Mike is a part of the Army's "Real Heros" program which is designed to put a heroic face to the Army.

Sargeant Mike is truly a hero.

When his convoy was on a patrol mission to clear supply routes of hostile targets and IED's, Sgt Mike's three hummer convoy was ambushed. Sgt Mike, a combat medic, proceeded to encounter the threat head on, fending off over over 50 insurgents while treating three injured soldiers. At one point Sgt Mike faced the enemy alone, wielding two weapons, an m249 light machine gun and an m4 assault rifle. Because of his heroism, Sgt Mike's convoy escaped the ambush with no casualties.

This man could not be more awesome. He even has his own action figure, which true to the story, has him wielding two weapons. Just as an aside, I was let down that the action figure was made in China.

His full story is here



The VAE was being showcased during a Joint Forces open house at Andrew's AFB. The tarmac was covered by aircraft from each o the services. I snapped a few photos, so here they are for
your enjoyment.















The B17 Memphis Belle. Probably the most famous bomber from WWII.















The Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor. RIP






Sikorsky HH-53 "Super Jolly Green Giant"















The Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon

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Monday, May 25, 2009

America's Strategic Posture

In the past several weeks, two key reports came out that analyzed the strategic posture and nuclear weapons policy of the United States. The one put out by the Strategic Posture Commission that was chaired by William Perry and James Schlesinger and included panel members Keith Payne and James Woolsey can be found here. The Council on Foreign Relations published a report on the U.S. nuclear weapons policy, which was chaired by William Perry and Brent Scowcroft, can be found here.
While the reports carry key differences, it is remarkable the amount of congruence between them. Some of the major similarities concerning the role of nuclear weapons include:

  • Nukes assure U.S. allies through extended deterrence
  • Geopolitical conditions for a "world without nuclear weapons" do not currently exist
  • Nuclear hedging is an appropriate strategy in an uncertain world
  • Ambiguity has been, and continues to be, good for U.S. deterrence
  • Importance of assurance/consultation with allies before changes in nuclear posture
  • Nuclear terrorism is more likely to take place than deliberate use by a state
There are also major similarities concerning modernization and arms control:
  • Article VI of the NPT calls for "nuclear as well as general" disarmament
  • Modernization of nuclear warheads can take place simultaneously with reductions
  • Both reports recognize that all other P5 states are modernizing their arsenals
  • The nuclear infrastructure and human expertise is decaying through lack of funds and a shortage of people entering the career field
  • Support for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and strengthening of the NPT
I encourage you to read the reports (at least their "findings" and "recommendations" sections) in order to reach your own conclusions and see what the experts are saying. The reports were divided on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which could be coming before the Senate in the next year. Also, the NPT Review Conference is set to take place in 2010 (with a preparatory session this month), so this debate is only going to get more important in the very near future.

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About Missouri State

Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS), located in Fairfax, VA, provides professional, graduate-level education in national security policy; foreign policy; arms control; missile proliferation; international security affairs; defense policy analysis, planning and programs; and intelligence analysis.

Disclaimer

The opinions of this blog in no way reflect the faculty of Missouri State University. They are just the incessant ramblings of a few graduate students. They may or may not be currently seeking employment, girlfriends, or free goods and services.

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