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And it gets better,
Hugo Chavez has blamed America for the earthquake in Haiti. According to ABC News Chavez asserted that
the U.S. navy launched a weapon capable of inducing a powerful earthquake off the shore of Haiti. He adds that this time it was only a drill and the final target is ... destroying and taking over Iran.Video is included in the link above. Keep in mind, this is the same tyrant that Obama is trying to normalize relations with.
Its like clockwork. Anytime an international crisis erupts, whether by act of man, God, or tectonic plates the
Its interesting, Obama is likely not used to such criticism. I think many on the left thought that the blame game was indicative of Bush's personality, not the
I can't say that I agree with many of these criticisms.
No matter which way we handle world crises,
To paint a bigger picture, aid coming from
Personally, I'd rather see compassion of private organizations pour out to
Before I get on with the content of this post, I want to sincerely apologize for the lack of content on DSSFeed. Most of us have been terribly busy with the semester hitting its peak work load. No excuses though. I know most of you hang on the edge of your seat for updates and I apologize for keeping you there - it must be quite uncomfortable.
As you probably know, there is a lot off buzz about the future the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. A bit of background -
The United States and Russia signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991, effectively reducing the size of the United States and Soviet (now Russian Federation) strategic arms deployment. The subsequent Moscow treaty initiated further reductions, but relies solely on the verification regime of the initial START treaty. However, on December 5th of this year the START agreement will expire, thus rendering the Moscow treaty unverified until its expiration in 2012. In order to prevent a gap in verification, the administration has set a goal to renegotiate the START treaty, at least in part, by December 5th.
It is likely that there will be an interim agreement signed prior to December in order to provide an extension for a comprehensive agreement, which may take several years to negotiate and ratify.
There are some troubling rumblings coming out of the administration which make me question our dedication to primary and extended deterrence. Most notably was a joint statement issued on April 1st, in which both parties committed to negotiating the issue of the "interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.”
I posit that there are four major reasons why tying offensive and defense strategic systems is bad for the security of the US.
1) It will effectively set a precedent for future agreements. After a treaty is ratified, it ascends to law higher than our constitutional. We may bind our hands in future agreements because of our carelessness during this one. We do not know the future of Missile Defense its true potential. Though it is not a perfect technology now, we may well have that technology one day. Be weary of entangling alliances.
2) Missile defense is crucial to deterring, and dissuading our opponents, particularly rogue states. It is too important to concede no matter who we are negotiating with. With Iran developing sophisticated warhead designs, and North Korea continuing to develop ICBM's, we will soon operate in a world in which those states can threaten the US mainland.
3) Both major strategic arms reduction treaties (START, SORT) we negotiated on the heels of a major advancement in missile defense (SDI, and the removal of the US from the ABM treaty). Missile defense allows us to negotiate in a position of strength.
4) Russia has not proven itself as a reliable partner in strategic arms control. Most notably, their testing of a modifed Topol M - the RS 24 violates START if it is deployed. They also seem to be channeling back deals with the Iranian regime which has undercut our effort to stifle the rogue nuclear program.
This is an important piece of language to watch for once START has been renegotiated. It may set the tone for future arms control treaties, and could even bind our ability to defend America from rogue missile threats.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), an agreement which would ban all nuclear tests, may soon be revived from its purgatory in the Senate. It was signed by President Clinton in 1996 and rejected by the Senate in October 1999. The arguments that denied ratification by a 19 vote margin still ring true today. In his Prague speech, however, President Obama called for prompt U.S. ratification of the treaty. He is expected to do the same at the UN later this month.
In rejecting the CTBT, Senate opponents listed several concerns that motivated their decision. They believed the CTBT was unverifiable and that others nations could easily cheat; the ability to enforce the treaty was dubious; the U.S. nuclear stockpile would not be as safe or reliable in the absence of testing; and the benefit to nuclear nonproliferation was minimal.
Ten years later, many of these concerns are still relevant. The issue of verification has been improved but not settled. The CTBT Organization has set up a network of 228 monitoring stations around the world, but significant gaps still exist. There are no stations in India or North Korea, and only one in Pakistan and Turkey. Sixty-one stations detected North Korea’s nuclear test in May 2009, but none detected radioactive gases to corroborate the seismic data. If North Korea was able to conceal such radiation, there is no reason to believe China or Russia could not as well.
As the continuing crises with North Korea and Iran illustrate, enforcing treaty obligations or punishing rule-breakers is not always effective. It is often, in fact, completely ineffective due to a lack of international cooperation. If a nuclear test were detected in Pakistan, India, or China, what would happen next? If the record with Pyongyang or Tehran is any indicator, the violating state would take some rhetorical heat and little more than a toothless UN Security Council resolution (if that). The CTBT will not immediately change other states’ policies.
The last decade has not been kind to the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Though the Stockpile Stewardship Program has successfully replaced older components, confidence in reliability has declined as the warheads age. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has stated that a credible U.S. deterrent cannot be maintained without testing or modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons. If modernization is not pursued, many experts believe testing will be needed to guarantee the weapons’ reliability.
Most significantly, the treaty’s perceived benefits toward enhancing nuclear nonproliferation are still debatable. Pro-CTBT voices have made several valid claims to consider. They argue that without the CTBT the nuclear arms race will continue, especially in Asia, with more states hedging their capabilities to be able to assemble a nuclear weapon quickly. Treaty advocates are quick to point out that the U.S. has already received a benefit for pursuing ratification – the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995. The NPT, which divides the world into five nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the rest as non-NWS, is up for review in May 2010. The non-NWS are likely going to insist on CTBT ratification in exchange for nonproliferation cooperation.
These arguments still do not explain how the CTBT will be good for nonproliferation. For one, the existence of a nuclear arms race (outside India and Pakistan) is suspect, given the fact that the U.S. and Russia are reducing their nuclear stockpiles. Nuclear hedging is a problem to be tackled by IAEA monitoring; not by attempting to ban nuclear tests (the NPT already does this for non-NWS). Though the non-nuclears may insist on entry into force of the CTBT, there is little reason to believe they will take tougher actions on Pyongyang and Tehran once the U.S. ratifies it. If unilaterally and bilaterally reducing nuclear arsenals and not testing for 17 years have done nothing to convince non-NWS of U.S. leadership, why will the CTBT?
The CTBT is simply not in the U.S. national interest. The U.S. would not be guaranteed a seat on the Executive Council, which geographically would be unfriendly to Washington. Since it requires North Korean, Pakistani, and Egyptian ratification (to name a few), the U.S. would be binding itself to a treaty unlikely to ever enter into force. Though there would be a growing ability to detect nuclear tests, there would be no effective way to enforce the treaty. The U.S. stockpile would continue to atrophy as explosive testing for reliability would be prohibited, which could spur proliferation. The CTBT needs to be rewritten to mitigate these drawbacks, not “immediately and aggressively”[xi] brought before the U.S. Senate.
In an excellent WSJ article, Peter Spiegel details the reasons behind the Obama administration’s shelving of the missile defense third site in Central Europe. Though they are claiming that it was based on a technical assessment and that Iran’s long-range ballistic missile program is proceeding slowly, it should be apparent to the casual observer that this has been Obama’s plan since January 20th. In a move to appease Russian objections to installing U.S. military assets in their “sphere of influence,” the U.S. has walked away from defense commitments made to Poland, the Czech Republic, and other nations within range of Iranian missiles. This decision is misguided and dangerous for several reasons.
First, the procurement issue. Even if you accept the delay in Iranian ICBM capabilities until mid-2010s, due to the slow acquisition process (and slower deployment timetable), that is about the time the Third Site would become operational. By shelving the plans, the U.S. will be putting itself in the position where it finds the Iranian missile program progressing faster than its missile defense deployment. In the time period between Iranian long-range missile capability and U.S. BMD deployment, Iran may be able to coerce the U.S. or Europe by threatening unprotected European cities. Their stopgap measure of rotating terminal-phase missile defenses (those that intercept the missile in its last minutes of descending flight) through Europe will leave plenty cities vulnerable and will take just as long to deploy (and probably cost more).
Second, the timeline issue. The 2007 national intelligence estimate, which had a lot of political influences, delayed the timeline of Iran’s nuclear program. However, it failed to account for technical surprise, and it is likely the missile estimate failed to do so as well. In 1998 virtually every intelligence agency in the world was surprised when North Korea launched a three-stage ICBM. In 2003 the unraveling of (some of) the A.Q. Khan network revealed how private individuals could essentially proliferate nuclear weapon technology to any country with cash. The point is that a significant surprise – such as North Korean or private-network assistance, could propel Iran to an ICBM capability far sooner than the intelligence currently suggests. The third site would have provided valuable insurance against this possible eventuality.
Third, the allies’ defense. True, the administration is pledging to deploy some missile defenses, like terminal-intercepts, but this is a far cry from the planned midcourse-intercept system that could have provided coverage of virtually all of Europe. Terminal systems have a small “footprint” that can only cover smaller areas, like a city. In a must read letter to the Obama administration, current and former leaders of Central and Eastern Europe basically ask not to be forgotten or sacrificed. They state “all is not well in our region or in the transatlantic relationship…storm clouds are starting to gather on the foreign policy horizon… [Russia] at a regional level and vis-a-vis our nations, increasingly acts as a revisionist [power].” They worry that Russia’s intimidation and influence-peddling will lead to a neutralization of their region.
Regarding the missile defense site, they pointedly write that “regardless of the military merits of this scheme and what Washington eventually decides to do, the issue has become a symbol of America’s credibility and commitment to the region… The small number of missiles involved cannot be a threat to Russia’s strategic capabilities, and the Kremlin knows this. We should decide the future of the program as allies and based on the strategic pluses and minuses of the different technical and political configurations.” They conclude on this subject that “abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too deeply in it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic can undermine the credibility of the U.S. across the whole region.” Central and Eastern Europe would know about Russia’s operations. They lived under their iron boot for generations.
Finally, the Russian problem. The Russians have protested loudly to the planned third site since it was first announced, despite the fact it is only 10 defensive interceptors that would be incapable of countering one SS-18 or even catching up with its missiles if they headed out over the polar routes. Once again, our allies understand the situation: “When it comes to Russia, our experience has been that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not only strengthen the West’s security but will ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy as well.” This would require firmness in negotiations with Putin and Medvedev.
The third site was likely the price the Obama administration figured it could pay to get Russian assistance on sanctions against Iran and in order to conclude the START follow-on. If anyone is convinced the Russians can exert the leverage to make the Iranians comply with their obligations (forget the UN Security Council, China will still block that), they have not been paying attention. Short of a crippling cut-off of all gasoline imports or nuclear reactor fuel from Russia, Iran is unlikely to even consider talks about its nuclear program. As I stated in a previous post, linking the new START to removal of the missile defense site from Europe would be unacceptable. Linking offensive and defensive weapons is walking right back into the Cold War paradigm the Clinton and Bush administrations did so much to end.
This is perhaps the administration’s worst foreign policy action to date. It delays deployment of a real capability that could not only defend European allies but also the eastern United States from Iranian missiles. It cannot be viewed as anything other than backing away from commitments made to Central and Eastern European allies and ignoring their legitimate concerns. The Senate should reject ratification of the START follow-on treaty and mandate the deployment of the planned missile defenses as the price for their support. Given this decision and the administration’s likely objection to warhead modernization, it will be hard to get 67 votes to ratify START.
Never Forget.
When peace, like a river, attendeth my way,
When sorrows like sea billows roll;
Whatever my lot, Thou has taught me to say,
It is well, it is well, with my soul.
UPDATE:
A half-hearted missile defense effort only encourages investments in missile technologies on the part of our adversaries, making them believe that with additional resources they will be capable of overwhelming American defenses.Also keep in mind that we are unable to create an effected extended deterrent if we are unwilling to invest in missile defense technologies for these allies.U.S. missile-defense policy should be designed to elicit the opposite response. Our enemies and competitors should be forced to conclude that energy and funds spent developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them will be wasted because Americans have the know-how and hardware to prevent them from reaching their intended targets.
The Obama administration also has floated the idea of a combined U.S.-Russian missile defense system and of a Joint Data Exchange Center for sharing information on missile launches. It is unclear what the United States expects in return for trading away the defensive system in Eastern Europe, but giving up something tangible for a promise of good behavior from Moscow is a fool's bargain.So we are effectively taking a step back from making nuclear weapons delivered by ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete. Shouldn't this be our goal?
So the letter of the day is apparently R. I'm not sure that it is a tribute to pirates worldwide, but i'm sure they arghhhh happy.
So why not discuss a word that has two R's! RRW or reliable replaceable warhead.
A program that was once dead has since been revived, well at least the debate has been. This should have been done yesterday.
Elaine M Grossman wrote on the latest tug of war in an article published through the Global Security Newswire. I assure you, it's a worthwhile read.
Much to my surprise, Robert Gates is leading the charge on the issue, and has received considerable support from top officials including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Energy Secretary Steven Chu, Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, as well as his successor, Gen. Kevin Chilton, and perhaps most importantly DSSFeed. That is an impressive list, no matter what you think about this administration or this blog for that matter.
Most surprising to me is Chu's about face, as his Department of Energy called for the death of RRW in their FY2010 budget. (although it did call for a program which very much resembles RRW)
The support is not universal. Joe Biden, being the heavy hitting nuclear strategist that he is, was the lone critic at the NSC meeting. His concerns are legitimate - how can we expect other nations to limit and even disarm their nuclear arsenals if we are modernizing ours.
His logic is sound if you believe nuclear abolition is the primary end goal for our arsenal - he makes a poor argument if you tend to think otherwise.
The RRW is aimed at maintaining a credible deterrent, and were not the only ones contemplating it. The Russians and Chinese have blatantly pursued nuclear modernization programs, even pursuing new kinds of warheads like EMP and ERW.
While they move ahead, we are lagging behind. We have a large arsenal, and as of January 2009, it is estimated at 5,200 nuclear warheads: approximately 2,700 operational warheads, 2,200 of which are strategic (greater than 3,500 miles) and 500 are nonstrategic (less than 3,500 miles) warheads. We have about 2500 in reserve due to START restrictions. The size and scope of the arsenal means next to nothing if our opponents know they will not function on a reliable basis. Imagine trying to deter a robber with a rifle he knows isn't loaded - it won't work very well I promise.
We must also consider the safety mechanisms of these weapons. Some of these weapons like the w62 and w76 are still operational and date back to the 70's. Consider the fact that just 2 years prior; cars were required to be outfitted with seat belts. We are stockpiling weapons that were built during the same era that seat belts were new. Consider the new safety technology that has increased the survival rates of drivers everywhere. Now think of how much higher the stakes are on nuclear weapons. Shortfalls in safety are not acceptable - and Gates agrees.
Also consider the scientific capital we are missing out on. The United States has not built a nuclear warhead since 1992, and the scientific community has lost out on perhaps cutting edge technologies that may make the US in a better strategic position, perhaps by even making nukes impotent and obsolete.
The goal isn't disarming the world of its nukes, because it's far too lofty. Convincing rogue nations and even potentially FTO's to disarm will ultimately be fruitless. I don't want to hear the hogwash that diplomacy may work. No nation that is looking out for its national preservation will give up their nuclear warheads if they deter their regional and global opponents. It just won't happen. The only way nuclear states will give up their weapons is if they realize they will no longer help them achieve their unique geopolitical objectives.
So fight on Righteous Gates. (I'm still not forgetting that you lead the charge on axing the f22)
So DSS is going back into session this fall starting August 24th. Ahhh back to the grind.
Much has changed since the summer recess. A few DSSers got married, some got engaged, and im sure some have had their hearts broken. Summer lovin, it happens so fast...
Anyhow, it seems as though the international community did not take a "summer break." Many strategically significant events have taken place, leaving students of defense and strategy with much to think about. (I'm sure as I write this that Walt is daydreaming about a victorious confrontation with the PRC over Taiwan)
So what will be the hot button issues for DSS this semester? What will guide the thesis options for students. Just as an aside, when I wrote the word thesis, a little part of me died.)
Will it be...
Burma's nascent nuclear program?
The successes and failures of Afghanistan and Iraq?
The significance of the shift in ballistic missile defense?
The volatile situation in Honduras?
The status of Dr. Thayer takeover of the Swedish riksdag?
Feel free to comment on what issues will guide the discussion.
Now off to buy some books...
Yes - another blog post on the DPRK.
The chief reason: I am reading Bradley Martin's Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty.
The secondary reason - North Korea is very important to US strategic interests and setting a precedent for rogue nuclear states.
You probably also know that the Dear Leader (Kim Jong-il, not Obama) once again captured a world audience by hosting former President Bill Clinton and "negotiating" the release of two American journalists.
So let me share a bit of what I have learned from the book as well as the recent Clinton visit.
Power in North Korea is highly centralized on the elevated figure that is Kim Jong-il. He is the unquestioned centerpiece of the reclusive communist state. The cult of Kim Jong-il is said to be even stronger than his Father, and former leader of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung.
Kim Jong Il succeeded his father by strong arming his competition, including siblings, party members and even his own uncle. His greatest tactic? Hwang Jang Yop, a high ranking North Korean official who defected to South Korea describes Kim's ruse.
Kim Jong-il is by nature a person who does not like living in harmony with others. He makes people fight against each other and depend only on him. Thus, when he talks about strengthening the organization, he means making strict rules to guarantee unconditional obedience to him... the more party members criticize each other and fight among themselves, the greater Kim Jong-il's authority becomes.Does this seem a little familiar? Recall the recent North Korean rocket launch. The world was heavily divided between the West (plus Japan) and the rest of the world about how to react. Kim sits back and watches his stock go up, while we waste political capital forging a coalition to respond to his antics. If we "feed the animals" in this way, it is almost impossible to deter their unwanted actions.
Like others who had worked in the higher levels of the regime, Hwang noted Kim Jong-il's penchant for holding drinking parties. But Hwang put them in context as "an important element in Kim Jong-il's style of politics."Bradley goes on
Although the parties had a business function from Kim's point of view, they inevitably led to some drunken policy making. Kim at his parties would occasionally issue orders so odd they could not be carried out.Deterring such an individual with such habits would be extremely difficult. The solution is not only attempting to deter him, but also hedging against potential attacks. The deployment of Aegis BMDS is a good step towards defending against a North Korean missile launch.
He (Kim) even dislikes the good fortune of other countries, and becomes jealous of leaders in other countries who are known to be popular with the people.Hwant writes that Kim justifies this jealous because
Kim opposes the worship of any individual. He is the Great Leader of the people and therefore not an individual.So what can we learn from all this?
Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS), located in Fairfax, VA, provides professional, graduate-level education in national security policy; foreign policy; arms control; missile proliferation; international security affairs; defense policy analysis, planning and programs; and intelligence analysis.
