Tuesday, March 17, 2009

Embracing the Instability Paradox

Consider this scenario: This weekend thousands of protesters took to the streets in Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province, marching to the house cum prison of Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, the deposed chief justice of Pakistan's supreme court. The group was led by the leader of the opposition party, Nawaz Sharif. A subsequent movement of protestors was about to descend on the capital. The protestors were not giving in until either Chaudhry was reinstated to his previous post, or the military persuaded them to retreat with batons, gas, and perhaps guns.

Recall, Chaudhry was fired twice in 2007 by then-President Pervez Musharraf for filing judgments against Musharraf's increasing incursion on Pakistan's constitution. The streets flooded with lawyers who were then beaten heavily by police. It was then the most significant challenge to Musharraf's rule. The United States, putting their counterterrorism and Afghanistan objectives ahead of democratic ideals, did not withdraw support from Musharraf, perhaps giving him the confidence to stand firm.

The situation this weekend was much more dire. The new president, Asif Ali Zardari, is certainly not as sure in his new role as Musharraf was for a variety of reasons. The protests were far more organized and organized by the political opposition, magnifying the danger of a coup. Surely, the failure of Zardari to fulfill his campaign promise by delaying the restoration of Chaudhry to his previous post, would be the last straw on Pakistan's failing back.

But, an interesting thing happened in Pakistan this weekend: nothing. The government backed down. Christian Science Monitor attributed this to two factors: Zardari did not have the full backing of the military and the Pakistani Army was not likely to step in and stop the protest march to Islamabad. The second factor CSM cites is Zardari no longer had the full, unconditional support of the United States.

Many on the right would blast this decision. Pakistan is a key part of U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Certainly, the United States should support any regime in Pakistan - instability and unrest in Pakistan would spell doom for regional security and U.S. national security. This was the policy of the previous Administration who supported Musharraf right or wrong because that was the perceived key to stability in the country.

This weekend, Obama and Clinton took a different tack. It would appear they put systemic determinants over personal ones. They correctly recognized that Zardari was not as strong as Musharraf and likely not the sole path towards a stable future in Pakistan. Rather, the reconciliation of a gross wrong and the restoration of some semblance of judicial independence, a key to democratic stability was the only way to ensure Pakistan would become more stable. To do so, the current Administration had to fight the urge to provide temporary stability by backing Zardari and instead embrace instability not knowing how the protests would turn out, hoping Zardari would rationally recognize his weakness and capitulate before irrationally ordering a crackdown.

Indeed, Pakistan has many more problems to resolve before they can be considered stable by most measures, but this weekend was an important step - both for Pakistan and the United States. The Pakistani people found that there were more avenues for change than just through force. The United States realized that a little instability in the short term could actually create more stability in the long term.

The paternalism that kept Musharraf in power may have been more destabilizing than the Wilsonianism that allowed Pakistan to settle their own problems this weekend. Hope, here, was indeed a foreign policy. In the same way neoconservatives have faith that democratic institutions and free markets will bring stability, so too liberals hoped that Pakistan's protests, left unaltered by Western intervention, would bring a more stable country. The departure between the two camps is encouraging. In Pakistan's case, it appears that Western interventions have postponed democracy and stability while, at least this weekend, Washington's absence led to a step towards liberal goals.

Photo:
AFP via BBC (16 MAR 2009)

Background:
Christian Science Monitor (18 MAR 2009)
Economist.com (16 MAR 2009)
International Herald Tribune (25 MAR 2007)
Washington Post (17 MAR 2009)

4 comments:

Dcentofante March 18, 2009 at 10:09 AM  

This begs the question - Where Pakistan is on the openness-stability J curve? If you take the Heritage Foundations assessment, which defines Pakistan as a "mostly unfree" state, one would have to assume regime stability is derived from the its authoritarian composition.

However, it doesn't seem like Zardari fits that mold. He is a bipolar playboy (the economists words not mine).

This seems like a stay tuned kind of story - One protest went on without a hitch, but that certainly will not dictate the future of Pakistani demonstrations. Given Pakistan's storied culture of violence, I cannot say I am optimistic.

Dcentofante March 18, 2009 at 10:12 AM  

BTW interesting read from a former professor of mine, Walt Rodgers. Rodgers was the former chief international correspondent for CNN. Much of his journalistic interest is on Pakistan.

http://www.jmu.edu/nelsoninstitute/rodgers0708.pdf

sdvarner March 18, 2009 at 2:02 PM  

It seems that if the US slowly disinvests itself from Pakistan, that would be best for stability in the country. Constant US intervention/support has just emboldened extremists there, perhaps letting them sort out their own problems may lead to moderation. The only problem is that our continued presence in Afghanistan necessitates having some formal relationship w/ Islamabad (since rapprochement w/ Iran does not seem likely).

Dcentofante March 18, 2009 at 2:10 PM  

There is also the issue of roughly 20-50 nuclear warheads, most of which are not guarded under IAEA standards.

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Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS), located in Fairfax, VA, provides professional, graduate-level education in national security policy; foreign policy; arms control; missile proliferation; international security affairs; defense policy analysis, planning and programs; and intelligence analysis.

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